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Deals for NAFTA Votes: Trick, No Treat

(The Full Text Follows)

"If fast track becomes a referendum on NAFTA, [the Administration] could lose, because many industries feel the Administration has failed to live up to promises made during deliberations on [NAFTA]. California's cattlemen, for example, are raising those kinds of concerns, as are tomato growers in that state and Florida."

-The Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1997

On October 8, 1997, the House Ways and Means Committee passed a "fast track" bill that included significant changes from past fast track terms that had been demanded by Republican Members of Congress. Only four of the Ways and Means Committee's Democrats supported the bill. The absence of Democratic support for the GOP fast track has been widely perceived as a warning of the trouble this fast track proposal will face if it comes to a floor vote.

Still, some observers caution that the Administration will try to make "deals" with individual Members of Congress in order to procure the votes needed for passage. Indeed, as a recent article in the Wall Street Journal points out: "The trade bazaar is open for business."⁽¹⁾

The expectation of a barrage of special deals to buy controversial trade votes is based on precedent. In November 1993, Congress passed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), despite widespread popular opposition. Several weeks before the 1993 vote, opponents of NAFTA had gathered a slim majority of the votes. Yet NAFTA ultimately passed. At the time numerous press reports documented deals -- many unrelated to NAFTA -- that the Clinton Administration had made with individual Members of Congress and groups of Members to obtain their votes to pass NAFTA.

This summer a coalition of consumer and environmental groups and think tanks, including Public Citizen, released a report on NAFTA's U.S. impact over the last three years. The report showed a legacy of broken promises on NAFTA performance: NAFTA threatened the safety of the nation's food supply, undermined the nation's environmental regulations, and subverted American democracy while it cost the U.S. good jobs.

In this report we review promises made to congressional Representatives to push NAFTA passage, whether those promises were kept, and whether the concerns underlying the deals were in fact addressed.

We found that many of the commitments that the Clinton Administration made in 1993 in order to get NAFTA passed were never fulfilled. Many of the actions that the Clinton Administration did take proved worthless for the parties they were supposed to help.

Depending on the country being considered for a trade agreement with the United States, different sectors of domestic industry may consider themselves to be particularly threatened. The outcomes of the deals granted to industries concerned about NAFTA should serve as a warning for those now seeking safeguards for sectors likely to be threatened by future trade agreements under the proposed new fast track authority.


A. PROMISES MADE TO U.S. INDUSTRIES


1. Five Promises Made to Florida Fruit and Vegetable Producers:
As Paul DiMare, president of the Florida Farmers and Suppliers Coalition, has written, "The NAFTA promises made to us were not kept... Our position (on fast-track authority) is that we are opposed because we have been hurt and lied to before, and even a letter written by the President of the United States was not worth the paper it was written on."⁽²⁾

In 1993, fruit and vegetable producers in Florida had major concerns about the possible adverse impact of NAFTA on Florida commodities. Prior to NAFTA, the United States International Trade Commission had found that the Florida winter vegetable industry was in direct competition with Mexico and that it would be adversely impacted if NAFTA were adopted. The Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association and Members of Florida's congressional delegation demanded safeguards and assurances from the Administration that Florida's fruit and vegetable industry would not be harmed by Mexican imports.

In response, the Administration made several promises to the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association and Members of the Florida congressional delegation. Many of these promises have been broken.

i. Produce Inspections for Pesticide Contamination
The Clinton Administration promised that if there was a significant increase in imports from Mexico, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would "adjust the import program devoted to inspections of these imports accordingly."⁽³⁾ Indeed, even on October 4, 1992, in announcing his decision to support NAFTA in a major campaign speech, then-Governor Bill Clinton had said that "assistance should be provided to farmers who are threatened. We can assist them first by strict application of American pesticide requirements to imported foods."⁽⁴⁾

It is difficult to imagine how this promise could have been broken more spectacularly. As Public Citizen documented in its recent report, "NAFTA's Broken Promises: Fast Track to Unsafe Food," imports from Mexico of fresh fruit increased 35% under NAFTA, while imports of fresh vegetables climbed 52%.⁽⁵⁾ However, inspections of Mexican food for illegal pesticides fell 5% from 1993 to 1995.⁽⁶⁾ The most recent data available indicate that imported food is more than three times more likely to be contaminated with illegal pesticide residues than domestically-produced food.⁽⁷⁾ Indeed, several of the Mexican crops that were known by the FDA to have high rates of illegal pesticide residues in the early 1990's are among those imports which have risen the fastest under NAFTA.

U.S. government inspections of imported food for illegal pesticide residues have been falling. In fact, even though imports have risen as a share of the U.S. food supply, they have fallen as a share of government inspections.⁽⁸⁾

ii.Tomato Relief
In a November 10, 1993, letter to Michael Stuart, Executive Vice President of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, the Clinton Administration attempted to respond to concerns of the Association:

The Clinton Administration promised that the U.S. ITC would monitor imports of tomatoes and sweet peppers from Mexico under NAFTA to guard against import surges, and that if imports from Mexico were found to be harming the domestic U.S. industry, then U.S. Trade Representative Kantor would recommend that the Administration grant relief to the industry.⁽⁹⁾

In fact, although imports of tomatoes from Mexico surged 71% by volume under NAFTA⁽¹⁰⁾, and the Florida tomato industry claims to have lost $750 million under NAFTA⁽¹¹⁾, with the resulting loss of jobs and revenue to the Florida economy, the Administration has granted no relief to Florida tomato growers.

iii. Methyl Bromide Phaseout
The Clinton Administration promised the domestic tomato industry that there would be no restrictions on the use or manufacture of methyl bromide until the year 2000, by which time there were supposed to be "satisfactory alternatives." The Administration committed to "full funding" for research into alternatives to methyl bromide and promised that if "no satisfactory alternative is found, the Administration will consider appropriate action to guarantee that our agricultural producers are not left without a commercially viable means of achieving the necessary soil and post-harvest fumigation."⁽¹²⁾

In fact, according to the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, the Administration agreed to a 25% reduction in the use of methyl bromide beginning in 1999.⁽¹³⁾ The commitment to full funding for research on alternatives has not been kept; and U.S. producers will face a methyl bromide ban in 2001 while their foreign competitors may use methyl bromide until 2015.⁽¹⁴⁾

iv. Import Surge Protection
On November 16, 1993, President Clinton sent a letter to Florida Representative Tom Lewis (R-FL) in which he stated: "I am committed to take the necessary steps to ensure that the USTR and the ITC take prompt and effective action to protect the U.S. vegetable industry against price-based import surges from Mexico. I want you to know that I am personally committed to ensuring that this system is enforceable and effective."⁽¹⁵⁾

However, according to Wayne Hawkins, Executive Vice President of the Florida Tomato Exchange, despite repeated requests from the industry, no direct action has been taken to fulfill this promise. The industry estimates that 10,000 workers in Florida have lost their jobs due to NAFTA.⁽¹⁶⁾

v. Tariff Phaseout Wiped Out
In order to enable domestic growers to adjust to the removal of tariffs on winter vegetables, the Florida tomato growers were granted a 10-year phase-out of the tariff.

However, even though the 40% devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994 effectively canceled out this provision, the U.S. government took no compensatory action.

2. Promises Made on Wine
In order to secure the votes of certain California representatives for NAFTA, the Clinton Administration and the government of Mexico agreed to pursue accelerated reductions of tariffs on wine.⁽¹⁷⁾

The Wall Street Journal now reports that the Wine Institute, representing 450 wineries and affiliated businesses, is opposing the Clinton Administration's request for renewed fast track authority, in part because Mexican tariffs on California wine were not reduced.⁽¹⁸⁾ "If fast track becomes a referendum on NAFTA, [the Administration] could lose," wrote the Journal, "because many industries feel the administration has failed to live up to promises made during deliberations on [NAFTA]." ⁽¹⁹⁾

3. Promises Made on Citrus
The Clinton Administration promised Florida Representatives that it would take care of the citrus and frozen orange juice industry. The relief was to take the form of a expedited "tariff snapback," that is, pre-NAFTA tariffs would be quickly re-imposed on Mexican imports in the event of an import surge which drove down prices.⁽²⁰⁾ However, citrus producers say that "after three years of NAFTA, Florida citrus is still not even allowed into Mexico."⁽²¹⁾

The Florida Citrus Commission is opposed to President Clinton's request for renewed fast-track authority. "The suggested fast track legislation...would devastate the Florida citrus industry...industry support for this legislation would be committing industrial suicide."⁽²²⁾ The citrus industry opposes any reduction in the import tariff for competing foreign producers who benefit from lower labor and environmental standards, especially Brazil.⁽²³⁾

4. Promises Made on Durum Wheat
In a November 15, 1993 letter to a representative of a wheat producing state, the Clinton Administration undertook to investigate the issue of Canadian subsidies to wheat growers.⁽²⁴⁾ At the time North Dakota agricultural officials were skeptical that the Clinton Administration's promises would do them any good since a similar commitment from the Reagan Administration under the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement had turned out to be useless. "What we had thought was protection, was simply a series of hollow promises. The hortatory language in the Statement of Administrative Action and Implementing Act ended up as meaningless words on paper," wrote Sarah Vogel, North Dakota Commissioner of Agriculture at the time NAFTA was passed.⁽²⁵⁾

According to congressional staff, the investigation did happen but it served merely as a temporary Band-Aid to a problem which is now worse than before.⁽²⁶⁾ The investigation found that "Canadian imports did cause material interference" and a one year agreement to limit the Canadian imports was imposed. The one year limit expired in September 1995. "The problem persists," says a congressional staffer from an affected state. "After a two year hiatus the imports coming in have increased rapidly and US farmers are being negatively impacted." ⁽²⁷⁾

In addition, the Clinton Administration agreed in the Uruguay Round to eliminate the mechanism under which this investigation was completed. ⁽²⁸⁾

5.Promises Made on Cut Flowers
The Administration promised cut flower growers and interested congressional representatives to review the issue: that is, that the Department of Agriculture would monitor imports and exports of cut flowers.⁽²⁹⁾

However, representatives of the cut flower industry say they now are being literally decimated by unfair trade in cut flowers from Latin American countries.⁽³⁰⁾ In particular, cut flowers enter the U.S. from Ecuador and Columbia duty free; the domestic industry has also been hurt by imports of Mexican roses.⁽³¹⁾ According to the Floral Trade Council and the California Cut Flowers Council, every year 10% of the U.S. producers are driven out of business by low-wage foreign competition.⁽³²⁾

According to Betty Stone of the California Cut Flowers Commission, the majority of the California growers are Asian-American family farmers. Many of them are second-generation Japanese-Americans whose parents lost their lands during the World War II internment of Japanese-Americans; ironically, their children are in danger of losing their land due to the federal government's failed trade policy.⁽³³⁾

The President's "refusal to address a debilitating trade arrangement" that is decimating the U.S. cut flower industry was one of two key reasons for opposition to the President's fast track proposal recently cited by Sam Farr (D-CA), who supported NAFTA in 1993 after obtaining assurances.

6. Promises Made on Asparagus
A Republican House Member obtained written assurances from then-USTR Mickey Kantor: "Let me confirm again that I will devote my energies to ensuring that our asparagus farmers remain competitive under NAFTA."⁽³⁴⁾

Fresh asparagus imports from Mexico have grown under NAFTA, but U.S. farmers have not found the increase problematic enough to merit a trade action. However, a major swell in imports of frozen asparagus from Peru in the past three years has largely eliminated the U.S. frozen asparagus industry.

After three and one half years of NAFTA, Mexico remains the number one source of asparagus imports. The amount of asparagus imported from Mexico has grown under NAFTA -- from a three year average before NAFTA (91-93) of $27.1 million to a post NAFTA three year average (94-96) of $32.8 million. During the post-NAFTA three year period, exports of fresh asparagus have dropped from a peak export level during 1990-1993. The increase in fresh asparagus imports has not caused U.S. asparagus farmers to request specific trade intervention on imports of fresh asparagus and mainly impacts California growers whose season overlaps with Mexico's.

However, a major swell in imports of frozen asparagus from Peru in the past three years has largely eliminated the U.S. frozen asparagus industry. Peru, one of the countries targeted for NAFTA accession, has increased its frozen asparagus imports, cutting a $10 million a year U.S. industry in the early 1990s to a one million dollar industry in 1996.

"We face a lot of challenges with the third world, particularly the differential in labor costs. Labor costs are a big part of asparagus production," said Mike Harker of Asparagus USA. Asparagus is both picked and processed by hand. In order, top importing countries of asparagus to the U.S. are: Mexico, Peru, Columbia, Chile, and Argentina.

7. Promises Made on Trucks
The Clinton Administration promised to the American Trucking Association that it had obtained Mexico's agreement to allow longer (53 feet) trailers, which are preferred by the U.S. trucking industry, on Mexican roads.⁽³⁵⁾

According to the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, these promises never came true. Rather, the Mexican Trucking Association doesn't want the border open at all and would never agree to these conditions.⁽³⁶⁾ As of today the 53-foot long trailers are still not allowed.

8. Promises Made on Appliances
In order to secure NAFTA votes from the Iowa delegation,⁽³⁷⁾ the Clinton Administration promised to protect certain appliance companies including Maytag, Amana and Frigidaire.⁽³⁸⁾ The Administration incorporated into the NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action its promise to ask Mexico to enter future negotiations for faster tariff reduction on appliances.⁽³⁹⁾ Maytag, Amana and Frigidaire had been concerned that their competitors with large manufacturing capacities in Mexico -- Whirlpool and General Electric -- would have a significant competitive advantage since under NAFTA Mexico would retain high tariffs on appliances (20 percent) which would be phased out slowly.

These firms were mostly concerned about Mexican tariffs on clothes-washers and refrigerators. According to Doug Horstman, vice-president for government affairs for the Maytag Corporation, shortly before the NAFTA vote, company representatives from Maytag, Amana and Frigidaire were told by Clinton Administration officials, "We'll fix that situation (high Mexican tariffs on clothes-washer and refrigerators) once this agreement (NAFTA) is concluded."⁽⁴⁰⁾

Although the United States Trade Representative's (USTR) Office did enter tariff acceleration talks with the Mexican government, they were unable to lower tariffs on refrigerators and clothes-washers. "The U.S. Trade Representative's office brought tariff reduction acceleration to the table," Horstman said, "but once the Mexicans objected they dropped the issue. The USTR had no stomach for a prolonged fight," he said.⁽⁴¹⁾

USTR was able to lower Mexican tariffs on dishwashers and clothes dryers. However, according to Horstman, the Mexican consumer market for other U.S. made dishwashers and dryers "is virtually nil,"⁽⁴²⁾ thus this tariff reduction was of little benefit to U.S. industry.

According to John Melle, Director for North American Affairs at USTR, the Administration will try again to reduce tariffs on refrigerators and clothes-washers. It is unlikely that it will be successful.⁽⁴³⁾ According to Rubin Mata, an analyst with the International Trade Commission, a company representative from Whirlpool's Mexican partner Vitro told Mata that he was on Mexico's appliance tariff negotiating team.⁽⁴⁴⁾

9. Promises Made to Protect Broomcorn Brooms
A Republican House Member was promised that the broomcorn broom industry would receive protection if swamped by Mexican imports under NAFTA.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Result: Unlike the tomato industry, where tens of thousands of U.S. jobs have been lost, action was taken to protect this industry which employs very few U.S. workers. However, action was taken under a limited NAFTA safeguards measure⁽⁴⁶⁾ which only allows three years of special treatment limited to a 10% tariff increase. Mexico immediately retaliated against the U.S. action with raised tariffs on alcohol and other products the U.S. exports to Mexico, arguing such industry protection is banned under NAFTA. The case is now before a NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute resolution panel which is expected to rule on whether the U.S. safeguards must be eliminated by December of this year.

Less than 500 U.S. workers are employed in the U.S. hand-made natural fiber corn broom industry, which employs a significant number of blind craftsmen. To secure the vote of one House Member, the Administration committed to "ensure the continuing health and survival of the...industry" and included this promise in the NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action.⁽⁴⁷⁾ President Clinton promised specifically that "...the Executive Branch will take action consistent with the Agreement (NAFTA) and U.S. law to rectify the situation..." ⁽⁴⁸⁾

In September 1996, the U.S. International Trade Commission ruled that indeed the U.S. industry had suffered serious injury sufficient to trigger safeguards under both U.S. domestic law and NAFTA.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Immediately, President Clinton ruled out the longer term, more "generous" relief available under the 1974 Trade Act section 302. ⁽⁵⁰⁾ In December of 1996, President Clinton agreed to use the three year limited "snap back" provision of NAFTA⁽⁵¹⁾ which restored tariffs to pre-NAFTA levels.⁽⁵²⁾ The industry, unable to open longer term safeguards, has responded by replacing its blind craftsmen with machines that wire the corn stalks to the broom handles. Such mechanization is the only way it can compete with the new Mexican exports with only three years of limited protection.

Mexico quickly retaliated even against these modest safeguards. "We did not want to impose retaliatory tariffs, but we felt we had no choice after the U.S. move," said then Mexican Trade Undersecretary Jaime Zabludovsky.⁽⁵³⁾ The usefulness of any promised snap back protection under NAFTA is called into question with this Mexican retaliation move. The Journal of Commerce noted that "The broom case, incidentally, demonstrates the limited relief that Section 302 of the NAFTA."⁽⁵⁴⁾

10. Promises Made on Textiles and Apparel
The domestic textile and apparel industry has been one of the hardest hit by low-wage imports in recent years. In the last 28 months the U.S. apparel industry lost 158,000 jobs. Over the same period the textile industry lost 73,000 jobs. Meanwhile, from 1993 to 1996, apparel imports from Mexico to the United States have more than doubled in volume. "Apparel and Other Textile Products" is the largest category of workers certified as having lost jobs due to NAFTA, accounting for more than 20% of the certifications through April.⁽⁵⁵⁾

To obtain support for NAFTA in November 1993 from four Representatives of states with significant employment in the textile and apparel sectors, the Clinton Administration promised to negotiate for a 15-year, rather than a 10-year, phaseout of American textile quotas in talks then underway on the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.⁽⁵⁶⁾

In fact, in December 1993, U.S. negotiators accepted a 10-year phase-out of American textile quotas.⁽⁵⁷⁾

11. Promises on Peanut Butter and Peanut Paste
On November 15, 1993, in an effort to garner another NAFTA vote, President Clinton wrote a letter to a Democratic Representative regarding peanut products related to NAFTA. In the letter the President stated:

"I am also requesting the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) to commence, in 60 days, investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (7 U.S. C 624) to make findings and recommendations as to whether imports are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions, and in such quantities as to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the peanut program of the Department of Agriculture. I am also asking the ITC to give precedence to this investigation."

According to ITC commodity analyst Steven Burkitt, the report was initiated by the ITC but was suspended at the request of President Clinton before they could issue a final report or make recommendations.⁽⁵⁸⁾

The President also promised that: "all peanuts, whether shelled or in-shell, imported in to the United States will be inspected and handled as provided in, and fully comply with, Marketing Agreement No. 146."⁽⁵⁹⁾ This agreement was to ensure quality standards for raw commodities to be processed in the United States. According to a report by the USDA Inspector General, a regulation to establish the same quality requirements and inspection procedures for imported peanuts as those for domestically produced peanuts was not published until February 1, 1996.⁽⁶⁰⁾

12. Promises Made on Flat Glass
In order to obtain votes for NAFTA from Texas and Oklahoma Representatives, the U.S. and Mexican governments agreed to talks on accelerated tariff reductions for flat glass.⁽⁶¹⁾

However, according to John Reichinbach, of PPG Industries, the Mexican tariffs on flat glass were never reduced -- in fact, the Mexican government refused to even discuss it once NAFTA was passed.⁽⁶²⁾ Reichinbach says this failure constitutes a "virtual barrier" for the U.S. flat glass industry.

13. Brussels Sprouts
The domestic brussels sprouts industry was also given protection from Mexican imports in the form of an expedited tariff quota snapback.⁽⁶³⁾

However, according to Jack Olsen of the San Mateo County Farm Bureau, the tariff snapback under NAFTA "has been a total failure."⁽⁶⁴⁾ In January 1996, Mexican producers sold brussels sprouts on the U.S. market below cost. The office of the U.S. Trade Representative failed to respond to industry requests for timely intervention.⁽⁶⁵⁾


B. PROMISES MADE TO INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATIVES


14. Protection and Promotion of Labor Rights Outside the Core Text of NAFTA
To address the concerns of a Democratic Representative who has fought to ensure that the United States considers human and labor rights records in determining a country's trade status, President Clinton promised to use existing trade law to take action "if Mexico's action or policies deny internationally recognized workers' rights..." Not only did the Administration not fulfil its promise -- which required issuance of an executive order -- but it since has taken steps in its fast track proposal to ensure that neither President Clinton nor any future president has the authority to do so. In 1993, within days after the promise was made, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a memo noting that it would be NAFTA-illegal to carry out the promise.

In a letter to this Member, President Clinton pledged to use "Section 301," a long-standing U.S. trade law that provides for sanctions against countries the U.S. determines have violated trade obligations, to sanction labor rights abuses in Mexico. To do this, the President pledged to issue an executive order expanding a definition in Section 301 because Section 301 only has somewhat vague language about "unfair trade practices" and worker rights. President Clinton committed to issuing an executive order defining "unfair labor practices" to include violation of internationally recognized labor rights.

The Member announced support of NAFTA specifically based on this promise and released the president's pledge letter to the press.⁽⁶⁶⁾ By November 8, 1993, the Congressional Research Service had issued a legal opinion that the use of Section 301 promised by President Clinton to enforce labor rights would be banned under NAFTA, a concern raised to the Administration and dismissed by the Administration before the promise was made.

President Clinton sent his promise letter at the end of October 1993. Now, almost four years later:

The promised Executive Order -- to make violation of internationally recognized workers' rights actionable under Section 301 -- was never issued.

• Neither Section 301 nor any other trade or other policy mechanism has been used by the U.S., despite growing labor rights violations in Mexico under NAFTA.
• In fact, the fast track proposal tabled by the Clinton Administration in early October 1997 specifically eliminated the negotiating objective on "unfair labor practices" that had existed in the Reagan-Bush fast track.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Elimination of this fast track provision would affirmatively restrict future presidential action in this area. Thus, not only did the Administration not fulfil its promise, but it has taken steps to ensure that neither President Clinton nor any future president has the authority to do so.

As recently reported by the Wall Street Journal⁽⁶⁸⁾, proponents and opponents of increased labor and human rights protection both agree that labor rights protection and/or enforcement in Mexico under NAFTA also was not improved by NAFTA's labor side agreement or the new public attention NAFTA put on the issue. Since NAFTA, violence against Mexican workers trying to organize unions has increased, as has mass firings of suspected union organizers at Maquiladora assembly plants.

15. Extradition of Mexican Rapist
On November 16, 1993, a Republican Representative announced that he would vote for NAFTA on the basis of assurances from the Mexican Attorney General that the Mexican government would extradite Serapio Zuniga Rios to the United States if he were caught by Mexican authorities. ⁽⁶⁹⁾ Rios had been accused of raping the niece of the Representative's secretary. "After having met with Mexican authorities several times, I have been told that Mexico will extradite Serapio Zuniga Rios to the United States," the Representative said in a press release issued by his congressional office on November 16, 1993. ⁽⁷⁰⁾ The Representative had previously said that he would not vote for NAFTA without assurances that Mexico would abide by the terms of its extradition treaty with the United States, noting that Mexico had never extradited a Mexican national accused of committing felonies in the United States.

It is remarkable enough that a Member of Congress would openly admit trading his vote on NAFTA for a promise from the U.S. and Mexican governments on the criminal case of a single individual. Moreover, as of October 1997, according to the Representative's office, Serapio Zuniga Rios is imprisoned in Mexico and has not been extradited to the United States.⁽⁷¹⁾

16. Frozen vegetable country-of-origin labeling
On Saturday, November 13, 1993 a newspaper reported that President Clinton had offered a deal to a Democratic representative who until then had been an outspoken critic of NAFTA.⁽⁷²⁾ The reported deal was that if the representative voted for NAFTA, the Clinton Administration would vigorously enforce the U.S. country-of-origin food labeling law with respect to imports of frozen produce, requiring that such labels be prominent and on the front of packages.⁽⁷³⁾

The representative did vote for NAFTA, disappointing many constituents who had campaigned for him on the basis of his strong opposition to NAFTA. However, as of October 1997, the country of origin labeling for imports of frozen produce has still not been improved.⁽⁷⁴⁾

17. Prisoner Exchange
According to a congressional press release issued November 16, 1993 announcing support of NAFTA, the Clinton Administration promised at least two California Republican Members of Congress for a new prisoner-exchange agreement with Mexico to move convicted illegal immigrants from U.S. jails to south of the border to reduce prison costs. Indeed, according to the press release an agreement had already been reached with the Mexican government and "could be implemented as early as December" of 1993.⁽⁷⁵⁾

According to federal and state justice officials, no new prisoner exchange agreement with Mexico has been reached since 1993. The Treaty of Execution of Penal Sentences, ratified in 1977, provides that prisoners can request to be sent from the United States to their native country in order to serve time. The state in which the prisoner is doing time, the United States and Mexico all would have to approve a prisoner's request which is a very long and complex process. Therefore, there is still a large number of illegal immigrants in U.S. jails today. ⁽⁷⁶⁾

18.The Highway Deal
In order to help secure the vote of a Member of Congress from California, the Clinton Administration promised to help secure federal highway funds for an interchange on Highway 126 linking the Golden State freeway and Antelope Valley freeway.⁽⁷⁷⁾

However, as of August 1997 no such interchange had been built and no federal highway money had been allocated for the project.⁽⁷⁸⁾

1. Bob Davis, "Administration Offers Package to Get Liberal Democrats to Back Fast Track," Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1997.

2. Letter from Paul DiMare, Florida Farmers and Suppliers Coalition, Inc and DiMare Homestead Inc., Homestead, Florida to Senator Bob Graham, September 13, 1997.

3. Letter from US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to Michael J. Stuart, Executive Vice President and General Manager of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, November 10. 1993.

4. Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina, October 4, 1992.

5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Trade Data, Analyzed by Commodity and Marketing Programs, Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA.

6. "Residue Monitoring - 1993", Food and Drug Administration, October 1994, p.5; "Pesticide Program Residue Monitoring 1995", Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration, October 1996, p. 7.

7. "Pesticide Program Residue Monitoring 1994", Food and Drug Administration, October 1995; "Pesticide Program Residue Monitoring 1995", Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration, October 1996.

8. See also "Imports Swamp U.S. Food-Safety Efforts", Jeff Gerth and Tim Weiner, New York Times, September 29, 1997.

9. Letter from US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to Michael J. Stuart, Executive Vice President and General Manager of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, November 10. 1993. Reprinted in Inside U.S. Trade, November 19, 1993.

10. "Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the U.S. Economy and Industries: A Three Year Review," U.S. International Trade Commission, June 1997, p. 6-65

11. Letter from John Himmelberg on behalf of the Florida Tomato Exchange to Representative Joe Scarborough, August 25, 1997.

12. Letter from US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to Michael J. Stuart, Executive Vice President and General Manager of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, November 10. 1993.

13. Interview with John Himmelberg, representing the Florida Tomato Exchange, 10/13/97.

14. Interview with John Himmelberg, representing the Florida Tomato Exchange, 10/13/97; confirmed by EPA on their web site defending U.S. policy, "Methyl Bromide and Ozone Depletion,"http://www.epa.gov/docs/ozone/mbr/mbrqa.html#q3.

15. Letter from President Clinton to Representative Tom Lewis, November 16, 1993.

16. Letter from Wayne Hawkins, Executive Vice President of the Florida Tomato Exchange, 10/9/97.

17. Exchange of letters between Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, and Jaime Serra Puche, Mexican Secretary of Commerce, November 3, 1993, and letters from Rep. Eshoo (D-CA), Rep. Baker (R-CA), Rep. Brown (D-CA), Rep. Doolittle (R-CA), Rep. Lehman (D-CA), Rep. Mineta (D-CA), Rep. Pombo (D-CA), and Rep. Royce (R-CA), to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, October 4, 1993.

18. "To California Vintners, Promised a Rose Garden, Fast-Track Bill Is Wreathed in Grapes of Wrath," Greg Hitt, Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1997, p. A-24.

19. "To California Vintners, Promised a Rose Garden, Fast-Track Bill Is Wreathed in Grapes of Wrath," Greg Hitt, Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1997, p. A-24.

20. "Wheeling, Dealing to Assure a Victory," Steve Komorow, USA Today, November 18, 1993.

21. Letter to the Florida Congressional Delegation from the Florida Citrus Commission, Howard Sorrels, Chair, September 8, 1997.

22. Letter from the Howard E. Sorrels, Chairman, Florida Citrus Commission, September 30, 1997.

23. Letter from the Howard E. Sorrels, Chairman, Florida Citrus Commission, September 30, 1997.

24. Letter from President Bill Clinton to Oklahoma Representative, November 15, 1993 to Representative Glenn English.

25. Letter from Sarah Vogel, Commissioner of Agriculture, State of North Dakota, to Karen Lehman, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, November 17, 1993.

26. Michael Smart, Legislative Director for Congressman Pomoroy, interview, October 16, 1997.

27. Michael Smart, Legislative Director for Congressman Pomoroy, interview, October 16, 1997.

28. Michael Smart, Legislative Director for Congressman Pomoroy, interview, October 16, 1997.

29. "The Secretary of Agriculture shall collect and compile" information regarding acreage, prices, and quality of cut flower imports into the U.S. from Mexico. North American Free Trade Agreement, implementing legislation, Subtitle B, section 321(e).

30. Interview with Will Carlson, Floral Trade Council, October 16, 1997.

31. Interview with Betty Stone, California Cut Flowers Council, October 16, 1997.

32. Interview with Will Carlson, Floral Trade Council, October 16, 1997. See also "Why I Oppose Fast Track," Representative Sam Farr, October, 1997.

33. Interview with Betty Stone, California Cut Flowers Council, October 16, 1997.

34. Letter from US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to Representative Peter Hoekstra, November 10, 1993.

35. Interview with Bob Nicklas, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 10/16/97.

36. Interview with Bob Nicklas, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 10/16/97.

37. Senator Charles Grassley, Rep. Fred Grandy, Rep. Neal Smith.

38. Interview with Doug Horstman, Maytag Corporation, 10/21/97.

39. NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action, chapter 3, section (B)(2)(c.)

40. Interview with Doug Horstman, Maytag Corporation, 10/21/97.

41. Interview with Doug Horstman, Maytag Corporation, 10/21/97.

42. Interview with Doug Horstman, Maytag Corporation, 10/21/97.

43. Interview with John Melle, Director for North American Affairs, USTR,10/20/97.

44. Interview with Rubin Mata, International Trade Commission, 10/21/97.

45. "Hobson Believes NAFTA will Benefit Local Area and Ohio," press release from Rep. Dave Hobson, November 11, 1993.

46. NAFTA Article 302

47. NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action, chapter 3, section (B)(2)(d.)

48. NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action, chapter 3, section (B)(2)(d.)

49. "Swept Away by Corn Brooms", Richard Lawrence, Journal of Commerce, September 5, 1996.

50. "Swept Away by Corn Brooms", Richard Lawrence, Journal of Commerce, September 5, 1996.

51. NAFTA Section 201.

52. From 22% to 33%.

53. "Spirit of NAFTA is Swept Under the Carpet, Lesie Crawford and Nancy Dunne, Financial Times, December 19, 1996.

54. "Swept Away by Corn Brooms", Richard Lawrence, Journal of Commerce, September 5, 1996.

55. U.S. Department of Labor, NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program, Certifications by Industry, February 3, 1994, through April 4, 1997. Cited in "Business Frontier," Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Issue 1, 1997.

56. Letter from President Bill Clinton to Representative John M. Spratt, Jr., November 16, 1993.

57. "Trade Pact Negotiations Come to End," The Washington Post, December 17, 1993.

58. Interview with Steven Burkitt, ITC 10/16/97.

59. Letter from President Bill Clinton to Representative Glenn English, November 13, 1997.

60. Office of the Inspector General, United States Department of Agriculture "Implementation of Agricultural Provisions of NAFTA," (Evaluation Report No. 50801-4-At), at 27, (March, 1997).

61. Exchange of letters between US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and Mexican Secretary of Commerce Jaime Serra Puche, November 3, 1993.

62. Interview with John Reichinbach, PPG Industries (formerly Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co), 10/21/97.

63. Interview with Jack Olsen, Executive Administrator, San Mateo County Farm Bureau, October 17, 1997.

64. Interview with Jack Olsen, Executive Administrator, San Mateo County Farm Bureau, October 17, 1997.

65. Interview with Jack Olsen, Executive Administrator, San Mateo County Farm Bureau, October 17, 1997.

66. " Pelosi Supports NAFTA," San Francisco Chronicle, November 3, 1993.

67. See 1988 Fast Track at Sec. 1101(b)(7).

68. "NAFTA's Do-Gooder Side Deals Disappoint ," Wall Street Journal, October 15, 1997.

69. "Shaw claims judicial victory and will vote for NAFTA," press release, November 16, 1993.

70. "Shaw claims judicial victory and will vote for NAFTA," press release, November 16, 1993.

71. Interview with Donna Boyer, Press Secretary for Rep. Clay Shaw, 10/22/97.

72. "Wheeling, Dealing to Assure a Victory", Steve Komarow, USA Today, November 18, 1993; "Farr Switches Sides on NAFTA; Denies Any Deals", Earle Eldridge, Gannett News Service, November 16, 1993.

73. "Wheeling, Dealing to Assure a Victory", Steve Komarow, USA Today, November 18, 1993; "Farr Switches Sides on NAFTA; Denies Any Deals", Earle Eldridge, Gannett News Service, November 16, 1993.

74. Interview with Steve Trossman, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, October 16, 1997.

75. Press release issued by Rep. Jay Kim (R-CA), November 16, 1993.

76. Interview with official in Texas Governor's Office who wished to remain anonymous, October 16, 1997.

77. "Area Lawmakers Did Some Horse-Trading Before Vote," Alan C. Miller, Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1993.

78. Interview with Rep. McKeon (R-CA) congressional staffer Greg Campbell, August 1997.

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