The Melting Border

Mexico and Mexican Communities in the United States

by Robert S. Leiken

Center for Equal Opportunity
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Executive Summary

This study analyzes in detail for the first time the mutual influence between Mexico and Mexican communities in the United States. It surveys and incorporates what work has been done in this area, but relies most heavily on field research, including dozens of interviews with leaders, officials, and other individuals on both sides of the border. It concludes that there have been substantial efforts by the Mexican government in recent years to influence the opinion and activities of Mexican-origin communities in the United States, but they have been of limited scope and success. Conversely, voluntary associations and private activities by Mexican Americans and U.S. Mexicans—that is, Americans of Mexican ethnicity born in the U.S. and in Mexico, respectively—are having substantial influence on domestic activities in Mexico.

The mutual influence discussed in this study takes place against a background of change, as Chapter 1 explains. The Mexican government’s policy of acercamiento (getting closer or rapprochement) with what it calls “Mexican communities abroad” represents a sharp shift from earlier, decidedly noninterventionist principles. There have been not only political changes—on both sides of the border—but important technological ones as well.

In February 1990, the Mexican government launched its “Program for Mexican Communities Abroad” (the PCME). As discussed in Chapter 2, it had four objectives: (1) to respond to complaints of Mexican-American and Mexican organizations in the U.S. that Mexico was neglecting its U.S. compatriots; (2) to create a political lobby; (3) to assist Mexican immigrants subject to abuse and exploitation in the U.S.; and (4) to improve the image of Mexican immigrants in Mexico and to remove the abuses they suffered there. Mexico has also expanded and upgraded its consulates in the United States and opened more than two dozen cultural institutes. Mexico’s new activism in the U.S. included lobbying for NAFTA, taking a public stand against California’s Proposition 187, and amending the Mexican constitution to permit Mexican immigrants to retain their nationality after becoming U.S. citizens. In the past decade, Mexico has courted the major Mexican-American and Latino organizations while Mexican presidents and state governors have pushed U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans to the top of their agendas. Mexican-born immigrants—and, specifically, their hometown associations (HTAs)—would absorb much of the attention of the PCME’s programs.

Chapter 3 discusses these hometown associations; it is the heart of the book and, therefore, will make up the bulk of this executive summary. Mexicans, like other immigrants, tend to locate where relatives, friends, and neighbors reside. There is a marked hometown character to immigration, because immigrants from one community will settle in a single particular location in the U.S. Migrants enable their friends and relatives to follow them by furnishing information, job tips, and housing, making migration “a network-driven process.” Hundreds if not thousands of Mexican hometown associations have sprouted from such networks. HTAs are most common in the older, more settled immigrant colonies of Los Angeles, Chicago, and Texas but are also found in areas of more recent settlement, such as New York and Atlanta.

HTAs provide a concrete link to the communities of origin and a way of maintaining ties with their culture, customs, language, and traditions. They usually focus on helping the hometown by providing reconstruction or development aid, but they also provide opportunities to socialize and exchange information. Many HTAs help members pay for funeral expenses or transfer remains back to Mexico. They sometimes afford legal assistance, often through the Mexican consulate. They furnish clients and helpful contacts to their business members. HTAs encourage family unity and discourage offspring from drugs and gangs.

By 1998, some 500 Mexican hometown associations in the United States had registered with Mexican consulates. Since most clubs do not register with the consulate, however, they may number as high as 2000. During the 1990s, the HTAs have multiplied.

Those drawn to activities of the HTAs vastly outnumber club members. The HTAs raise money through raffles, beauty contests, radio advertisements, and door-to-door collections. Along with a visit home to the village festival, the beauty pageant or the HTA’s celebration of a local national or religious holiday is the immigrant’s crowning annual social event.

Most hometown associations appear to develop spontaneously, often unbeknownst to the Mexican consulate. But the consulates may bring potential members of a hometown organization together for the first time and provide them with a locale for their initial meetings. The Mexican government cooperates with HTAs by putting them in contact with new members, other HTAs, and authorities at home. Though some HTAs are suspicious of Mexican authorities, often the consulates provide them a forum through which club officials keep in touch with one another, meet with the press, and get to know Mexican-American leaders.

Though the Mexican HTAs are the most active and numerous, and receive the most support from their government, those of many other national origins have them, too. Hometown associations are thus a pervasive but largely invisible feature of the American landscape. HTAs abounded during the first great wave of immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Italian, Jewish, Mexican, Chinese, and Japanese HTAs specialized in mutual aid, insurance, and health services. Latino HTAs are less involved in mutual aid and other direct services for members partly due to the rise of private insurance and the welfare state. The hometown orientation of today’s Latino HTAs points to a salient feature of Latino immigrants, especially Mexicans—their “transnational” or transitional character as “perpetual in-betweens.” Their hometown focus can be attributed to the proximity of home and the availability of air travel, access to phone, fax, e-mail, and video cassettes, on the one hand, and the the paucity of English courses, the lack of citizenship programs, and the backlogs at the INS on the other.

HTAs are generally apolitical, nonsectarian voluntary
organizations, but many have begun to speak out on political issues on both sides of the border. Last fall, lobbying in the U.S. by HTAs forced the Mexican government to rescind a key funding measure that would have penalized motorists to Mexico. Most recently, both major opposition presidential candidates campaigned in U.S. immigrant communities, seeking to get them to lobby relatives and friends. As the main beneficiaries of their families and communities, the immigrants’ recommendations carry weight. In an unprecedented step, this year several Mexican hometown federations in Los Angeles joined organized labor in calling publicly for amnesty for illegal immigrants.

HTAs are most likely to be found among settlers from rural areas who face drastic adjustments of lifestyles and custom and steep learning curves. Back home, once-poor immigrants become respected leaders because of their investments and charity. HTAs collect money for the village’s religious festival, to renovate the church, or for a variety of infrastructure projects, including schools, roads, and wells. Recently, some HTAs have begun to focus on job-creation and have started small factories. They are thus a mechanism for the transfer of remittances. From the Mexican government’s perspective, they have the advantage of often focusing on productive or social investment.

Remittances have a significant multiplier effect in sender communities, comparing favorably to many aid programs that are vulnerable to money being siphoned off by local officials. HTAs tend to be scrupulous in the collection, transfer, and investment of funds in Mexico, which suffers from endemic corruption, clientelism, and informality. HTAs often form parallel committees in the home community to monitor projects. The hometown movement is an inconspicuous and uncelebrated channel of American influence in Mexico; generally fostering transparency, accountability, voluntary organization, and political competition in a country attempting to achieve a transition to a market economy and democracy. Such a transition, it might be added, is the best hope for reducing immigration flows into the United States.

Local HTAs often seek broader affiliations with other local clubs in state federations and with other city federations or with associations from their hometown located in other parts of the U.S. The visit of a Mexican state governor sometimes has sparked the confederation of individual social clubs into a statewide federation, a process encouraged by the PCME. While obviously reinforcing ties to Mexico, these contacts may also constitute part of the process of integration into American society. Organizing HTAs brings many immigrants into contact with the larger society. Association leaders learn how to conduct meetings, form nonprofit organizations, create statutes and bylaws, and become acquainted with the legal process. For many members, the hometown association is a springboard to community involvement in the host country. While tied to Mexico in numerous ways, the HTAs are also quintessential American voluntary associations, of the sort that Alexis de Tocqueville singled out as building blocks of American democracy.

The influence of the PCME and other Mexican organizations is important with respect to educational, cultural, business, health, and other activities, but so is the independent role played by U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans and by private and voluntary organizations (including, but not limited to, HTAs). Bilingual education is perhaps the most controversial of these issues, but they also include sports, civic awards—even beauty pageants. All are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Mexican government has cooperated with U.S. school districts in immigrant education for more than two decades. Mexico has placed particular emphasis on bilingual education. Mexico sees Spanish language training as the “main instrument” for teaching Mexican immigrant children English. To support bilingual education, Mexico has developed teacher exchange programs, immersion courses for U.S. bilingual teachers, and distance learning. It has also distributed Spanish-language textbooks and promoted adult education in Spanish.

To reach Mexican Americans and U.S. Mexicans, Mexico also has developed an array of cultural, recreational, health, and business programs. Each year Mexico nominates outstanding Mexican Americans for awards. The latter is part of Mexico’s courting of Mexican-American and Latino organizations. By law, the U.S.-born children of U.S. Mexicans are American citizens, and Mexican Americans enjoy population growth rates well above the national average. Mexico is aware of the increasing political importance of Mexican Americans, and accordingly their capacity to befrend Mexico or at least ward off criticisms of Mexico. But the interests of Latino organizations do not always coincide with those of Mexico, and they are just as liable to mount criticisms against Mexican government practices or support democratic reforms.

Chapter 6 is devoted to “political interpenetration”—that is, the mutual political influence of Mexico, including especially Mexican government agencies, on the one hand, and Mexican Americans, U.S. Mexicans, and their voluntary associations, on the other. The former have made outreach efforts towards leaders and organizations of the latter; they have also encouraged Spanish-language media in the U.S. One important innovation in the U.S. midwest is “networks of protection” (redes de protección), developed by the Mexican consulate in Chicago to provide information about immigrants’ rights and obligations on migratory, labor, penal, and other subjects. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the very controversial subjects of dual nationality and absentee voting rights.

Chapter 7’s conclusions and policy recommendations begin by pointing out that, without a doubt, Mexican immigrants in the U.S. are a primary target of Mexican federal and state policies, programs, and activities. Community organizing efforts are directed at the HTAs; teacher exchanges, bilingual programs, and textbook donations concentrate on schools with important contingents of immigrant children, and so do health programs and even the bulk of sports activities. Mexican Americans, on the other hand, are reached mainly by cultural and business programs and the granting of awards. But Mexico is neither so strong nor so foolish as to attempt aggressive political activism in the United States. This is not to say that there will not from time to time be efforts that cross the line nor, obviously, that the U.S. shouldn’t be alert to such transgressions and object when they occur. The study concludes by suggesting that citizenship promotion could be an important binational initiative. Both Mexico and the U.S. have an interest in U.S. Mexicans becoming U.S. citizens. For the U.S., this would further immigrants’ social and political integration into U.S. society. For Mexico, it increases the ranks of Americans unlikely to be hostile to Mexico.
CHAPTER ONE

A Background of Change

This study describes, among other things, the recent shift in Mexican government (federal and state) policies and activities towards Mexican populations in the United States. Broadly speaking, two groups compose the Mexican populations in the United States: those of Mexican origin and the Mexican-born. The former, U.S.-born Mexican-origin citizens, will be referred to as “Mexican Americans” in this study. The latter consists of Mexican immigrants—illegal aliens (or undocumented workers), legal residents, and Mexican-born U.S. citizens—and will be referred to as “U.S. Mexicans.”

Acercamiento Getting Closer

The Mexican government’s policy of acercamiento (getting closer or rapprochement) with what it calls “Mexican communities abroad”—U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans—represents a sharp shift. After a long period of neglect, Mexico established a national agency in 1990 to develop programs and coordinate relations with its diaspora. In the same year, Mexico expanded and upgraded its consulates in the United States and opened some two dozen cultural institutes and centers to work with Mexican Americans and U.S. Mexicans. Prior to that, Mexico had begun to move away from its strict policy of non-intervention—which had been spurred by nationalism and fears of U.S. interference—to a recognition of interdependence with the United States.

The new orientation cleared the way for Mexican activism in the United States. Mexico mounted an extensive lobbying effort from 1991 to 1993 on behalf of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Next, in 1994, Mexico took a public role in the fight against California’s Proposition 187. In 1995, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce declared that “the Mexican nation transcends the national boundaries.” The next year, partly in an effort to encourage U.S. Mexicans to vote in U.S. elections (and thus to ward off future initiatives like Proposition 187), Mexico amended its constitution to permit Mexican immigrants to retain their nationality after becoming U.S. citizens. In the past decade, Mexico has courted the major Mexican-American and Latino organizations while Mexican presidents have pushed U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans to the top of their policy agenda.

So has Mexico become a major influence in U.S. political life? Has it fostered an ethnic interest group that lobbies for Mexican interests?

The answer is no, not yet, and probably not in the foreseeable future. That has not happened, despite all of the above events, for reasons that shed light on developments, some of them richly ironic, on both sides of the border.

When the 1990s began, one Mexican goal seems to have been building a Mexican version of the Israeli or Cuban-American lobby. Though the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad, or PMCE, succeeded in improving relations with the major Mexican-American and Latino organizations, Mexican diplomats came to realize that the agendas of Mexican-American elected officials and organizations were often at sharp variance with Mexico’s. After arguably redundant lobbying for the passage of NAFTA, after the peso crisis, and after a backlash for its exertions against California’s Proposition 187, it became clear that Mexico needed to fine-tune its approach to American politics and Mexican Americans.

Mexico’s efforts to assist Mexican immigrants without political activism had proved more successful and rewarding. Operating through the invigorated Mexican consulates, the government systematically wooed Mexicans north of the border with services ranging from literacy classes and social security for migrant workers to investment advice for entrepreneurs, soccer leagues for youths, and AIDS counseling for teenagers—to go along with the traditional policy of providing extensive legal assistance for Mexican-born prisoners on death row.

But what came to absorb the most attention from Mexican consulates were immigrant hometown associations (HTAs). Though hometown associations have sprouted wherever there are major concentrations of Mexican immigrants—with or without the assistance of the Mexican government—Mexico’s consulates have boosted these organizations and have made a special effort to promote their federating in statewide groupings. The number of HTAs, if we include the smaller and less formal associations not linked to the consulates, could conceivably run as high as 2000. With their growth in numbers has come considerable influence back home.

Parallel to the surge in immigrants, financial remittances have increased steadily over the past two decades. In the process, Mexican immigrants have become politically and economically influential in their home communities. Accordingly, there has been a reversal in the Mexican image of their migrants—from baseborn renegades to hometown heroes.

Hometown associations are usually established to lend assistance to the rural community of origin. Wary of the corrupt practices of Mexican local, state, and federal government...
officials, HTAs set up local committees to monitor how the money is being spent and how a project is advancing. In this way, they are spreading the practices and the values of transparency and self-government into rural Mexico. At the same time, they have become an important vehicle of adaptation to American life for the immigrants.

Moreover, HTAs have become active politically both in Mexico and in the United States. In the U.S., HTAs are a wildcard in the Latino electorate—to date they have not been discovered by the national political parties, though local politicians in Texas and California seek their support and some groups have made their appearance on Capitol Hill. In Mexico, they have become a prominent political factor in many “sender” communities and states. In 1998, the governor of Zacatecas, the leading sender state, was elected with important, if not crucial, support of the powerful Zacatecas community in Los Angeles. This spring, Mexico’s presidential candidates made unprecedented efforts to woo U.S. Mexicans in the hopes that they would use their influence with voters back home.

If the decade began with hopes for building a pro-Mexican lobby, it ended with the Mexican government bested by immigrant groups it had promoted. In December 1999, HTAs joined with opposition activists to force President Zedillo to retract a conspicuous government initiative. “For ‘tis the sport to have the engineer/ Hoist with his own petar.” Yet as much as anything, the incident reflected the extent to which Mexican politics have evolved in a democratic direction over the past decade, an evolution welcomed by many in the ruling party.

The Mexican government promptly set about mending relations with its immigrant community even as it maintained the excellent ones it had developed with several major Mexican-American and Latino groups. Though the PCME expend most of its energy on U.S. Mexicans, the latter groups may prove to be more politically potent because of their prospects for lasting growth and influence. But their conversion, along with immigrant groups, into a potent Mexican lobby seems a remote prospect and not one the Mexican government is counting on for the present.

None of this should be taken to mean that the significant efforts of the talented Mexican officials involved in the acercamiento have been in vain. The following study will document just how far Mexico has come in its pursuit of U.S. Mexican groups have made their appearance on Capitol Hill. In Mexico, the video cassette lends immediacy to far-flung communities.

The Mexican Populations in the United States

The Mexican diaspora in the United States makes up nearly two-thirds of its burgeoning “Hispanic” population of more than 31 million, which has doubled in the past two decades (see Tables 1-5, Figure 1). Of the more than 20 million Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States, the U.S. Mexican population is approximately 7.3 million, of which legal residents make up about 4.8 million and illegal aliens (or “undocumented workers”) approximately 2.5 million (though that estimate may well be low) (see Tables 4-5). Mexicans are settling in the United States at the rate of more than 300,000 a year. In 1998, there were 131,575 Mexicans legally admitted to the United States, which was 19.9 percent of total immigrants admitted (see Table 6). In addition, more than 170,000 Mexicans were estimated to have entered illegally. Mexico is the leading country of origin of illegal aliens, with 2.7 million, or 54 percent, of that population in 1995 (see Table 7).

In the 1990 Census, Mexican populations were heavily concentrated in California, with more than 45 percent of the total Mexican population, followed by Texas with 29 percent, and Illinois, Arizona, and Colorado. Taken together, these five states were the place of residence for 11.2 million of the 13.3 million Mexican-born and Mexican Americans living in the U.S. at the time (about 85 percent). Mexican groups were also concentrated in a few urban areas within these states, such as the Los Angeles and Chicago metropolitan areas.

In the last thirty years, more than 10 million Mexicans have settled in the United States (about the same number have returned to Mexico after ten or more years in the U.S.). Though Mexicans remain centered in a few states and metropolitan areas, concentrations of Mexicans have spread to many areas of the country in the past decade. During the 1990s, nearly 75 percent of Mexican immigrants continued to settle in thirty-five counties in California, Texas, Illinois, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and New York. These included cities such as San Antonio, Houston, Dallas, Fort Worth, El Paso, Fresno, Phoenix, Chicago, and New York, as well as the Texas Rio Grande Valley. California remained the most common destination, normally accounting for almost half of the total influx of Mexican immigrants, but California’s overall share of the country’s Mexican-born population declined from 58 percent in 1990 to 47.6 percent in 1997. In the last several years, Mexican immigrants have fanned out to Oklahoma and Nevada and spread to the Midwest (Minnesota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa), to a band stretching down from Michigan through Indiana and Kentucky, to the northeast (Maine and Rhode Island), the south (Arkansas, Georgia, and North Carolina), and the east (New York, New Jersey, and Maryland) (see Table 8).

At the same time, Mexico and the United States have heightened their engagement and broadened their contacts, which now include not only a free-trade area (per NAFTA), but a plethora of contacts between states, counties, municipalities, and nongovernmental organizations. The thickening of the U.S.-Mexican relationship and the increased flux of Mexican migration form an essential part of the background to the changes that have occurred in Mexican policy towards Mexicans in the United States.

The revolution in technology has certainly played a major role in these changes, too. Air travel between the two countries has become less expensive and more frequent. Direct flights between mid-level Mexican cities such as Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi, Morelia, and Zacatecas, and U.S. cities such as Chicago, Dallas, Houston, and Los Angeles are a post-NAFTA phenomenon, and one often spurred by Mexican immigration. Telephone calls have become cheaper, fax and email have opened new, inexpensive modes of communication, electronic money transfers have made rapid remittances a reality, and the video cassette lends immediacy to far-flung communities.

But Mexico’s acercamiento with U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans reflects many other developments on both sides of the border.
Developments on the U.S. Side
The Immigration Act of 1965 instituted the policy of family reunification, and the 1986 Simpson-Rodino Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) granted legal-resident status to large numbers of illegal immigrants. IRCA dispelled the “illusion of impermanence” for these “Rodinos,” enabling them to discard the habits of clandestinity and to travel back and forth across the border without detention or deportation. IRCA also allowed long-term immigrants and special agricultural workers legal permanent residence.

Other important developments north of the border have included:

- The 1975 and 1982 expansion of the Voting Rights Act, affording Mexicans and other Hispanics the same extraordinary protections and benefits provided black Americans.  

- The Chicano movement and other political activity among Mexican Americans and the rise of Mexican-American and Hispanic organizations and Mexican immigrant social clubs or hometown associations (HTAs). Mexican-American organizations began demanding that the Mexican government develop an institutional response to Mexicans in the U.S.  

- The flowering of nongovernment organizations and the involvement of local community organizations in Hispanic and Mexico-related questions.  

- The advent and growth of bilingual education programs and an accompanying bilingual education bureaucracy and lobby—and the rise of opposition to them.  

- The rise of identity politics and multiculturalism.  

- The tendency of prominent U.S. foundations and U.S. government agencies to regard Mexicans and Mexican-Americans as part of a disadvantaged national minority.  

- The development of a well-funded pro-immigration lobby that includes such organizations as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR)—and the resurgence of restrictionist organizations on the other side of the immigration debate.  

- The controversy around California’s Proposition 187.  

It is important to note that these changes in U.S. politics and culture have been crucial to the mainly subsequent shifts in Mexican policy.

Developments on the Mexican Side
The developments south of the border prompted by events in the U.S. include:

- The shift from “sojourner” to “settler” immigration. Immigrants now tend more often to migrate with their spouses and children, head for urban rather than rural areas, and pursue year-round rather than seasonal work. This shift was deepened by IRCA. Before IRCA, 60 percent of immigrants were illegal settlers; after IRCA, more than three-quarters were legal residents.  

- Remittances from Mexican immigrants. Remittances are currently estimated at between $6 and $8 billion annually, registering an eightfold increase between 1980 and 1998. Remittances now constitute Mexico’s third largest source of foreign exchange, after oil earnings and manufactured exports.  

- The democratization of Mexican politics, which has featured the emergence of opposition political parties and their “export” to the United States. The competition for support from U.S. Mexican communities led the ruling Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) to attempt to improve relations with them. Soon the Mexican federal government implemented a coordinated and generally nonpartisan program.  

- Attitudinal changes. Because of the numbers of Mexican immigrants, their remittances to Mexico, and their increasing influence in Mexican communities, attitudes among many Mexicans towards immigrants and Mexican Americans have changed over the past two or three decades. Formerly, most urban Mexicans and Mexican officials saw the Mexican-born and Mexican-descended in the U.S. as poor and powerless. They were often disdained as renegades who had abandoned their country and culture. They were “pochos” (bland or rotten ripe) who spoke well neither Spanish nor English and were spurned by Americans. Over the past decade or two, immigrants have become valued for their economic contributions to their families and communities and are often considered heroes for braving the dangers of the border and the hazards of immigrant life. In many Mexican villages, immigrants have become political players as well as economic benefactors. Meanwhile, Mexican officials perceived that Mexican Americans had gained influence in U.S. society, culture, and politics. Rather than traitors, the Mexican diaspora is seen by Mexican officials, one of them writes, as a “precious resource from which to draw support, both in the domestic and international arena ....” The Mexican government now perceives a self-interest in U.S. Mexicans becoming proficient and remunerative and in Mexican Americans becoming influential. Moreover, it is enjoying the domestic economic and political impact of this ascendance.  

- The emergence of human rights as an issue. Partly as a result of the increasing numbers of immigrants and the prominence of opposition parties, the “human rights” of Mexican immigrants have become an issue in Mexican public opinion. Though Mexico recognizes that “any state enjoys the sovereign prerogative of controlling its borders,” it also considers the defense of immigrant rights a legitimate concern of their homeland under international law.  

- Economic liberalization. The opening of the Mexican economy, which culminated in NAFTA, led the Mexican government to “take advantage of the opportunities offered by the American political process” and to seek support among U.S. opinion leaders, politicians, media, and Mexican Americans.
CHAPTER TWO

The Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME)

1990: The Initiative of the Mexican Government

Though previous administrations made overtures to Mexican-American leaders, and individual states such as Zacatecas developed relations with their migrant communities in the U.S., the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) was the first to mount a coordinated federal outreach effort.

By 1990, the Mexican presence in the United States had become massive and permanent. Mexican immigration had doubled in the 1970s and again in the 1980s and was on a course to double again in the 1990s. The amnesty provisions of the 1986 IRCA legislation were in the process of providing legal resident status to some 2.3 million formerly illegal and transient Mexican aliens. 21

Meanwhile, the Mexican economy was becoming an export economy oriented to the United States for both capital and markets. The Salinas administration was launching a major effort to arrive at a free-trade agreement with the United States. That administration viewed the increasingly influential and prosperous Mexican-American community as a market, an investment source, and potentially a player in U.S. decisions that were sure increasingly to affect Mexico. 20

In previous presidential campaigns, the PRI candidate routinely held meetings at the border with Mexican-American leaders. But as in much else, the 1988 campaign broke the mold. An opposition presidential candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, who together with Munoz Ledo had left the PRI to form an opposition alliance, vigorously and personally courted Mexico’s California communities. Cardenas, a former governor of the state of Michoacan, was the son of a legendary populist Mexican president. Michoacan had been a major source of Mexican immigrants to California since the 1920s. 22 Cardenas himself visited California before, during, and following the PRI’s first truly contested election in sixty years. In the campaign, he sought funds and votes in the United States and came out in support of the right of immigrants to cast absentee ballots in Mexican elections. Cardenas criticized the PRI for neglecting U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans and proposed that the Mexican government develop programs to support that population. 23

Later in the campaign, the Mexican government was acutely embarrassed by a proposed amendment to the California Democratic Party platform from a Mexican-American caucus, citing human rights violations and demanding that U.S. Mexicans be given the vote. 24 In another stinging embarrassment, after the elections Cardenas’s claim that he was a victim of electoral fraud was supported by energetic and frequent opposition-led demonstrations in front of the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles. 25 Both mortifying incidents attracted widespread media attention in Mexico itself. Thus, domestic politics as well as immigration demographics, the new orientation of the Mexican economy, the growing size, affluence, and influence of Mexican communities in the U.S., and the prospect of a free-trade agreement all persuaded the Salinas administration to launch an unprecedented federal program for Mexican communities abroad.

A project was centered in the Mexican Secretariat of External Relations (SRE) and nursed by foreign minister Fernando Solana, a senior official named Roger Dias de Cossio, and Javier Barros and Andres Rozental, undersecretaries for North America. Theirs was “a great project of acercamiento” whose aim was to forge “a non-partisan instrument of Mexican foreign policy.” 26

The effort got a strong boost after President Salinas met on October 2, 1989, in Washington, D.C., with leaders of such Mexican-American organizations as NCLR and MALDEF. 27 Salinas unveiled a plan to create a federal office devoted to relations with Mexicans in the United States. 28

The Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME) was founded in February 1990 as an adjunct to the SRE and put under the leadership of Diaz de Cossio. Four objectives were advanced for the PCME. First, it was to respond to the complaints of Mexican-American and Mexican organizations in the U.S. that Mexico neglected its compatriots in the U.S. Thus, it was to develop friendly and cooperative relations with Mexican-American organizations that had become influential in the U.S.—or at least to defuse antagonism towards Mexico. 29 Or, to put it another way, the PCME would improve Mexico’s image—remove “stigmas” and “stereotypes”—in the United States thanks to relations with the increasingly powerful Hispanic organizations and the exposure of Mexican Americans to Mexico. 30 Second, the first Director General of the PCME recounted that there was “a great deal of discussion about creating the Mexican equivalent of the Israeli lobby.” But he was careful to add that fostering a Mexican lobby was “not a state policy” and was not part of the “Plan de Gobierno.”
Rather, such a lobby was expected to "evolve over the years as a result of the relationships formed." As Jose Luis Bernal, the Mexican consul in Los Angeles, enunciated it to me, a lobby was merely the "implicit" purpose of the program. Until the formation of the PCME, another Mexican official pointed out, his government "had no strategy regarding its diaspora, unlike countries such as Portugal, Greece, the Philippines, not to mention Israel; and this despite a huge diaspora." Third, the PCME would assist Mexican immigrants subject to abuse and exploitation in the United States, as reportedly strongly urged by MALDEF in the Salinas meeting. Fourth, the PCME would aim to improve the image of Mexican migrants in Mexico and to remove the abuses they suffered there.

To achieve these objectives, Mexico sought to build an institutional bridge between the Mexican government, on the one hand, and U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans—the two target groups of the PCME’s programs and activities. This would come to mean promoting and facilitating joint projects and serving as a link between the Mexican diaspora and public and private Mexican institutions.

With Los Angeles serving as a pilot city, the PCME rapidly established cultural, sports, educational, health, community, and business programs to promote these goals (PCME’s activities are described in greater detail in chapters 4 and 5). It began reaching out to Mexican-American groups in a systematic fashion and establishing relations with the immigrant hometown associations. Soon it began encouraging their federation, like the Zacatecas clubs in Los Angeles, which preceded these efforts (see below, pp. 17–18).

The main instruments in the PCME’s efforts were Mexico’s consulates in the United States and specially created “cultural institutes” and “cultural centers.” The consulates were strengthened institutionally. The traditional distinction between diplomatic and consular branches was eliminated—in Los Angeles, the consul was given ambassadorial rank—in order to attract superior personnel and upgrade assignments. New staff was added, “including people with extensive records in public service such as career diplomats, as well as former governors and secretaries and undersecretaries of state.”

For the new cultural institutes and centers, boards of directors made up of prominent local Mexican-American and Mexican-born citizens were formed. The consuls assumed the overall leadership of these organizations, which sometimes led to conflict with local Mexican-American leaders in which sometimes the latter prevailed.

In the past, aside from the normal administrative services, the consulates had very little contact with Mexican immigrant workers. Community relations usually focused on cultivating relations “with the Mexican-American elite of professionals and businessmen in the U.S., but without any clear plan.”

The Salinas administration placed considerable emphasis on the new initiative. The administration mobilized other government agencies to assist in the effort. Press offices were appended to important consulates, as were representatives of the Attorney General’s office and the Social Security Institute.

The new consuls were encouraged to transcend Mexico’s traditional and somewhat dogmatic accentuation of the principle of nonintervention. This was part of a broader rethinking of international relations as Mexico opened its economy and moved toward NAFTA. In general, the economic opening led Mexican officials to see the outside world not as something to defend against but as a lever of development.

Mexico’s traditional noninterventionism, known as the Estrada Doctrine, was a function both of Mexico’s old-style revolutionary nationalism and of its internally oriented economic policies. The latter involved, for example, strict protectionism, the building up of local industry, and the nationalization of oil reserves and production. Beginning in the 1980s, Mexico adopted policies of economic liberalization, including an export-oriented posture, liberalization of foreign investment guidelines, and privatization of many government companies. For some Mexicans, the entry into NAFTA meant that Mexico should amend its view on nonintervention.

Under the new orientation, the Mexican government began organizing efforts in the U.S. to influence the U.S. decision-making process. Mexican consulates started granting interviews with the U.S. media. The consuls abandoned a noninterventionism that had “failed to take advantages of the opportunities offered by American political process.”

Current Structure and Activities of the PCME

The “Plan of Government” of Mexico’s incoming President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon declared that one of his administration’s sovereign objectives was “to guarantee a close connection with Mexican and Mexican-origin communities abroad.” He promised to “grant priority” to an initiative that would bring together a group of programs designed to “reinforce cultural ties” with those communities “on the basis of the recognition that the Mexican nation transcends the national boundaries.” A former director of the PCME adds that “the Mexican state defines its nation as a cultural entity not limited by its geographic borders.”

Current Mexican government authorities consider it their responsibility to “attend to the educational, cultural, recreational and health needs of Mexicans abroad to support them in their personal development and their adaptation to their new circumstances.” It is important to note that the Mexican government tends to regard its assistance to Mexican immigrants as a means of adaptation and integration into American society: by improving their education (thus making them more fit for employment and civic life), their health, and their “self-esteem,” and by helping to keep them from the influence of street gangs and drugs.

In Mexico, the Ministry of Foreign Relations coordinates the PCME’s activity with nine federal departments, twenty-three state governments, hundreds of municipalities, and several public and private organizations. Since 99 percent of Mexico’s external population resides in the U.S., the PCME concentrates its activities in that country. In the U.S., the PCME functions through Mexico’s forty-two consulates and twenty-four cultural centers or institutes. The cultural centers and institutes are tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations with boards of directors drawn primarily from the Mexican-American community. These organizations are self-financing, raising revenues from Mexican and U.S. companies and foundations, so as to avoid criticism in Mexico that scarce budgetary resources are being spent outside of the country and also to

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encourage the host community to regard the projects as their own."68

When the PCME was conceived by the Salinas administration, it was assumed that its efforts would be primarily directed towards the Mexican-American community.69 But it soon developed that the Mexican-born immigrants, and specifically their hometown associations (HTAs), would absorb much of the attention of the PCME’s programs.70 “Although Mexican Americans may benefit from these programs,” writes Rodulfo O. De la Garza, “there is no doubt that immigrants are the primary target” of PCME’s efforts.71 From the next chapter’s discussion of the programs and activities of the HTAs, it will become apparent why this is so.

CHAPTER THREE

Hometown Associations (HTAs)

The main activities of the PCME involve community organization, education, culture, sports, health, business, awards, outreach to Mexican-American leaders and organizations, and disseminating information. Hometown associations or social clubs (clubes de oriundos) absorb the bulk of the attention of the PCME as well as of individual state programs directed toward Mexican communities in the United States.

Origins

As far back as the nineteenth century, Mexican communities in the United States formed “welfare organizations designed to provide their members with sickness and death benefits at a time when state-supplied social security was unavailable.”72 They also formed societies, such as La Sociedad Cervantes and La Sociedad Mutualista Mexicana, specifically dedicated to preserving Mexican national traditions.73 These societies were often highly structured and ritualistic and sought to preserve “old country social propriety” and “to remain Mexican in language, customs and social goals.”74

Regional social clubs for purposes of mutual aid or recreation date from the 1920s.75 The contemporary hometown association dates from the 1950s.76 At least one club has been in continuous operation since the 1950s: The Club Ávala in Los Angeles, composed of natives of Chihuahua, was founded in 1958.77

There is a marked hometown character to Mexican immigration to the United States. Mexicans, like other immigrants, tend to locate with family, friends, and neighbors.78 Thus, for example, in the last decade New York City has received as many as 700,000 Mexican immigrants, over 50 percent of whom hail from the state of Puebla.79 It stands to reason that, as the Consul for Community Relations told me, “no Mexican is going to New York in the dead of the winter without a place to stay and a job.”80 Generally, most emigrants from one community will settle in a single very particular location in the United States. Immigrants from Cueramaro, Guanajuato, live in Hawaiian Gardens in Los Angeles while those from Leon, Guanajuato, live in Compton, another Los Angeles suburb. These migratory patterns tend to perpetuate themselves in what have been called “migration chains.”81

In this respect, Mexicans resemble immigrants the world over for whom “particular destination points have tended to be linked to particular points of origin.”82 Migrants from different parts of China have settled in different places in Thailand, Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United States.83 Two towns four miles apart in northern Italy sent the bulk of their respective emigrants to opposite sides of the Australian continent. In Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Kansas City, Rochester, and San Francisco (as well as Buenos Aires and Toronto), Italians from specific towns and villages “concentrated in particular neighborhoods or even streets.”84 Polish Jews settled on different lower east side New York streets from Russian, Hungarian, and Romanian Jews; German Jews occupied very different parts of that city from the Eastern Europeans on the lower east side. Lebanese immigrants to West Africa settled in different locales according to the part of their home country from which they hailed, and the same was true of Japanese immigrants to the Philippines, Swedes in North Dakota, and Chinese in Indonesia. German immigrants from the Westphalian county of Tecklenburg settled in two adjoining counties of Missouri; Frankfurt, Kentucky, was founded by Germans from Frankfurt; and Lorima, Wisconsin, was settled almost exclusively by Prussians from Brandenberg even as the nearby towns of Hermann and Theresa were settled by Pomeranians.85

As far back as the 1920s, it was likewise evident that Mexicans from specific villages were migrating to particular zones in U.S. towns.86 American researchers were already noting “a tendency for migrants from particular sending areas to be channeled to specific districts in American cities.”87

Migration is “a network-driven process,” as Portes and Rumbaut stress, “and the operation of kin and friendship ties is
nowhere more effective than in guiding new arrivals toward
pre-established ethnic communities.”

The importance of migration networks in Mexican immigration to
the United States has been demonstrated in several investigations. Because the decision to migrate is usually
a product of spontaneous family decisions based on the presence of 
relatives and friends in specific places who can provide help and
shelter,” “[t]he influence of preexisting networks on loca-
tional patterns tends to be decisive among contemporary manual
labor migrants.” Once having arrived, the immigrants
often rely on neighbors or family members who have estab-
lished themselves in the U.S. to help them find jobs and hous-
ing and lend money; these are also the people with whom they
exchange useful information and pool resources, and make
friends and contacts. Here again the Mexican experience is
standard. As Portes and Rumbaut point out, “ethnic networks
provide sources of information about outside employment,
sources of jobs inside the community, and sources of credit and
support for entrepreneurial ventures.” As a result, “the process
of socioeconomic attainment in this context is entirely network
driven.”

Beyond the economic sphere, villagers run into each
other in the host country at baptisms, quinceañeras (“Sweet 16”,
parties), and posadas (Christmas parties). They help out one
another in emergencies. They may eventually form hometown
soccer or basketball teams and congregate to celebrate the
village’s patron saint’s day with a fiesta.

It stands to reason that such networks would form the soil
out of which voluntary organizations have sprung. At the out-
set, these groups may be little more than extensions of the
immigrant networks we have described. But kinship and
friendship alone are not usually enough to launch a successful
hometown association. Typically the hometown association
relies on a broader sense of derivation (oriundo) from a com-
mon community of origin. Mexicans refer to their associations or
clocks as clubes de oriundo—a term best translated as home-
town association but literally “a club of the commonly derived.”
Of course, origin from the same hometown “is not a meaning-
ful basis of social organization for people while they are at
home.” Derivation is just a “latent dimension of association in
the hometown community,” but it becomes crucial when
strangers from the same hometown find themselves living
living together in a foreign, often hostile, environment. Then deriva-
tion can become an important social relation. A relationship
established abroad can then produce “new forms of association
that not only promote the cohesion of migrants in the United
States but also facilitate their reintegration into the communi-
ty.”

Whether an informal group becomes an association may
depend on the presence of leaders—which in many cases may
be supplied or fostered by the consulate. What the consulates
call “natural leaders” are usually individuals who have achieved
some success in their occupation. In New York, where res-

Number, Size, and Composition

By 1998, some 500 Mexican hometown associations in the
United States had registered with Mexican consulates. But
many, probably most, clubs do not register. Michoacan is the
second biggest sender state of Mexican immigrants in Los
Angeles, but it has few clubs registered with the Los Angeles
consulate. That may be due to the “often conflictive relations
that the Consulate has had with immigrants from this state,
which has been a bastion for the leftist opposition party, the
PRD.” There are certainly “more” than 500 HTAs throughout the country “working in quiet, unnoticed ways on
small projects.” One team of researchers asserts that there are “literally thousands of associations” that are “known only to
their members and have no formal contact with larger feder a-
tions or outside groups either in Mexico or in the United
States.” But no one really knows their number. Here we shall
discuss only those hometown associations that are publicly
known, either to the consulate or because they belong to a larg-
er federation.

HTAs have grown rapidly in recent years. Sustained high
levels of Mexican immigration starting around 1970 are partly
responsible. But the growth also reflects the ending of “the illu-
sion of impermanence” for many formerly illegal immigrants
who became legal residents under the provisions of IRCA in
the late ’80s and early ’90s. (In 1986, IRCA legalized some 2.3
million Mexican “Rodinos.”)

Further legislation in 1990 augmented the number of
Mexican legal residents both by increasing the number of legal
immigrants and by stressing the criterion of family reunifica-
tion in granting residencies. Many formerly illegal and vulner-
able Mexicans now felt free to join organizations and otherwise
comport themselves as legal and permanent residents.

During the 1990s, HTAs have continued to multiply. In
1995,109 clubs were registered with the Los Angeles Mexican
consulate. By 1998, the number had grown to 170. In
December 1999, the consulate official in charge of community
relations told me that there were nearly 230 clubs. La Federa-
cion de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California (Federation
of Zacatecanos Clubs of Southern California), which was formed
in 1972, began 1999 with forty-seven clubs and ended it with
fifty-four. Some of this increase may reflect more comprehen-
sive consular work. But that does not appear a likely explana-
tion for most of the growth, since the consulate’s outreach to
immigrant organizations began in 1990.

No official estimates on the numbers of immigrants in
HTAs are available. In 1995, Carlos González Gutiérrez sur-
veyed the 109 clubs in Los Angeles and found their member-

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ship ranged from 4 to 846 members, averaging about 30.\textsuperscript{46} At the same time, he cites the National Immigrant Survey conducted by the NALEO (National Association of Latino Elected Officials) Educational Fund, which found that approximately 10 percent of first-generation Latin immigrants were active members of social clubs. Assuming only 500 clubs, these two approximations yield estimates of total membership ranging between 15,000 and 700,000 Mexicans. The estimates of González Gutiérrez in 1995, however, come in considerably below the numbers reported by the leaders of the Los Angeles federations of hometown associations in 1999.\textsuperscript{47} The president of the southern California F\textsuperscript{ederacion de Clubes Jaliscienses} (Federation of Jalisco Clubs) reported that the fifty-two clubs belonging to his grouping had a total of between 10,000 and 15,000 members. In 1995, González, who was working for the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, reported twenty-two Jalisco clubs with some 270 members. The Zacatecas Federation had forty clubs in 1995 with some 700 members. Now the Federation claims fifty-four clubs with 35,000 members for an average of 700 members per club. Aside from promotional hyperbole, the discrepancy may be due in large part to how “membership” is calculated. This varies widely because the clubs are organized and function differently.

For example, the Zacatecas clubs in Los Angeles average 700 members and the Jalisco clubs about 250 members. On the other hand, the clubs belonging to the California federation of clubs for the state of Sinoloa (La Fraternidad Sinoloense de California) average only “10–15 members per club,” according to the president of the federation.\textsuperscript{48} Tomás Ramírez, the head of the Chicago federation of clubs for the state of Guanajuato (Casa Guanajuato), says that his federation encompasses twenty-eight clubs with some 9000 members. A single club has over 3000 members and $850,000 in capital. In contrast, the state federation represented by Salvador Cervantes (the organizational secretary of the Chicago federation of clubs from Guerrero) claims twenty-one active clubs but each with only six or seven or so “members” (really, activist organizers). Yet the events sponsored by Guerrero clubs often attract as many as 300 participants. Clubs generally draw many times the number of dues-paying members to celebrations of religious and national holidays and other large public events, such as soccer games, dances, raffles, picnics, charreadas (rodeos), and beauty pageants.

Thus, those who are counted as members may come only occasionally to meetings; in other cases, “members” may be limited to activist organizers. Some clubs charge dues; others do not, but pass the plate at meetings.\textsuperscript{49} What appears clear is that in many cases the number of those drawn to activities of the club’s organizers is often many times the number of the organizers. Under these circumstances, an estimate of the number of members belonging to Mexican hometown associations would be hazardous.

On the basis of interviews with HTA leaders in Chicago, Los Angeles, San Antonio, and Washington, I would estimate that 40–50 percent of dues-paying members are legal residents, 30–40 percent have become citizens, and 10–20 percent are undocumented or illegal aliens. The percentages vary from club to club and federation to federation. The author of a study of Los Angeles hometown associations judged, for example, that the Zacatecas and Jalisco federations had a high number of citizens and few illegals, but the Oaxaca federations had high numbers of illegals or undocumented immigrants.\textsuperscript{50} In general, members range from recent immigrants with low-paying jobs to prosperous business people. Leaders of the associations include businessmen, workers from the service and manufacturing sectors, and community leaders. Generally leaders own businesses or possess very stable jobs.\textsuperscript{51}

The HTAs vary in character as well as size. Some clubs concentrate on specific projects for their hometown, while others organize large meetings to collect funds. The large Zacatecan clubs, with 700 members, have systematic and diverse programs of activities. Small, informal groups do not bother to register with the consulate and may undertake only a single project or activity.

In between are organizations such as the Los Angeles Club Ixtlan del Rio de Nayarit which is composed of some “45 couples.” They meet once a month in a different member’s home and pay no dues. Along with nineteen other HTAs, the club belongs to a citywide federation (Asociación de Nayarítas). It takes no part in politics but cooperates with the state and federal governments in hometown projects such as building a nursing home and a university campus. The members all try to return to Ixtlan for the September 16 Independence Day festivities. When they do they are greeted by a band, television cameras, all the local politicians, and some 5000 celebrants. In Los Angeles, the club attracts as many as 600 people to its dances, bazaars, raffles, and Christmas parties. The children help out and many are expected to join the club when they are older. The club also functions as a mutual aid society and “feels more like a family than a club.”\textsuperscript{54}

The associations often tend to form in older, more settled immigrant colonies, especially those whose sender communities have high per capita indices of emigration with firmly established networks.\textsuperscript{55} Los Angeles, where continuous, concentrated Mexican immigrant communities date back to the 1920s and 1930s and where hometown associations go back to the 1950s, had more than 230 HTAs registered with the consulate in 1999.\textsuperscript{56} New York City, where the bulk of Mexican immigration is a phenomenon of this decade, has only twelve HTAs registered with the consulate.

The Role of the Mexican Consulates in the Formation of HTAs

Most hometown associations appear to develop spontaneously, often unbeknownst to the consulate. The Club Solidaridad de Chinantla was founded in New York City around 1970, but did not register with the New York consulate until 1992.\textsuperscript{57} But occasionally the consulates bring potential members of a hometown organization together for the first time and provide them with a locale for their initial meetings.\textsuperscript{58} Frequently the consulate or cultural institute will collaborate with individuals interested in forming a club by offering support and putting them in contact with other individuals from the same community or state. Subsequently, the cultural institute is likely to supply general information about associations and, if there is a state federation, may put them in contact with it.\textsuperscript{59}

In Los Angeles, where there is the largest and most active Mexican consulate in the U.S., the consulate staff has devised “an extremely efficient way of promoting clubs.”
The Mexican government finances visits from municipal presidents [mayors] from high migration regions in Mexico to Los Angeles. Consular staff set up meetings in the Consulate for the presidents to talk with migrants from the municipio. The Consulate has a database of Mexicans living in the United States who have applied for identity cards called matrículas consulares, which captures information on birthplace within Mexico as well as address and phone number within the United States. This database is used to inform compatriots of the visit of their municipal authorities to the Consulate. These initial meetings usually draw from 20 to 50 compatriots, some of whom haven’t been in contact with each other previously. The Consulate staff and the visiting public municipal officials use these meetings to encourage the formation of a club, by articulating the importance of retaining their national and hometown identity and traditions, helping one another, and building unity among Mexican immigrants in the United States. Municipal presidents often stress the role that immigrants can take in promoting progress in their home towns. They also invite their “absent children” (hijos ausentes) to visit, retain ties, and invest in their home communities.

Many of the clubs belonging to the Federation of Jalisco Clubs in Los Angeles have been formed recently and are typical examples of consulate-initiated associations. The president of the Jalisco federation told me that frequently the founding of a club involves the consulate supplying a list of immigrants from a given village to the Federation. One of the authors of a study of Los Angeles hometown associations described the Jalisco Federation clubs as closely tied to the consulate.

Both the federal PCME and state offices cooperate with the hometown associations to consolidate organizing efforts and to put them in contact with other clubs and with authorities at home. San Antonio’s Casa Nuevo Leon began at the initiative of the consul in 1995 with “four or five families.” Now more than sixty families belong to the club. In New York City, the Mexican Cultural Institute Consul for Community Relations played a more active organizational role in the past. Now the HTAs are “completely independent,” according to the consul general.

The consuls are apt to see the associations as vehicles for providing services and protection to Mexican citizens in the U.S., for identifying “natural leaders” in the Mexican community, and for developing awareness of Mexico’s position on issues. The president of the Jalisco Federation in Los Angeles told me that the consulate sometimes asks for letters to U.S. Senators or Representatives backing Mexican positions. “We tell them, ‘if we agree with the position, we’ll write the letter. If not, no.’ We are autonomous.” When the consulate asked for letters supporting amnesty for illegal aliens, the Federation agreed to write them. A ranking Mexican official in one major city told me his consulate’s relationship with hometown associations served to identify community leaders. Another stated “off the record” that the consulate had solicited letters from community leaders supporting the “certification” of Mexico as a cooperative U.S. ally in the drug war.

Most hometown associations appear to be quite independent of the consulates. Indeed, many are suspicious of Mexican governmental authorities, with whom they may have had unpleasant experiences at home. While some appreciate the support of the consulates, others prefer to remain entirely independent of a government they have learned to distrust. Others welcome consulate involvement because of direct contact with engaged officials from the consulate or the cultural institute but prefer to have nothing to do with the PCME or state programs.

Hometown clubs maintain contact with the consulate and attend meetings to stay informed on matters concerning the Mexican community in the area. In San Antonio, the presidents of the clubs meet monthly in the consulate. In general, the consulates provide a forum through which club officials keep in touch with one another, meet with the press, and get to know Mexican-American leaders.

Rural Derivation

HTAs are found generally among settlers from rural areas. Though Mexican cities provide a larger share of immigrants than in the past, still about 60 percent of the Mexican-born in the U.S. come from rural areas. They face the more drastic adjustments of lifestyles and customs and the sharpest learning curves. The human need to seek out friendly faces in a gigantic, anonymous urban environment is probably felt more intensely by those used to the communal life of a village.

Saskia Sassen-Kooob explained the proliferation of social clubs among Dominicans in New York as rooted in the rural origin of the immigrants. The clubs served to reproduce the kinship and compadrazco systems of the sending communities. Such systems are familiar in Mexican villages. Moreover, Sassen-Kooob notes that Latin American scholars have found similar social clubs among communities that have emigrated from rural areas to Latin American cities: “a significant disparity between place of origin and receiving society is an important variable in the formation of these clubs.” The Mexican and Dominican associations endeavor to mediate the transition not only between developing and developed countries but also between town and country.

Mexicans and Dominicans are not the only nationalities forming hometown organizations and social clubs. Salvadorans in Washington, D.C., Virginia, Maryland, and California have founded numerous hometown associations. Peruvians, especially from rural areas, belong to similar HTAs. Indians have powerful and prosperous organizations. Nigerian and Ethiopian immigrants in Washington, D.C., belong to associations organized by tribe and region. Chinese immigrants also form regional associations; indeed almost all overseas Chinese belong to such an organization. Like the Chinese, Japanese and Korean immigrants bring with them a thick web of community organizations based on kinship and village.

Hometown associations are thus a pervasive but largely invisible feature of the American landscape—or cityscape, to be more precise. They are rarely if ever mentioned in the English-language news media and then only as an afterthought. Take, for example, this passage buried at the end of a feature article on how residents from Chirilagua, El Salvador, have migrated to a single Virginia town: “Chirilaguayans have opened new restaurants and other businesses, and a local committee raises money to build soccer fields, parks, and playgrounds back in their native village.”

Historical Precedents

Italian immigrants in the U.S. set up mutual aid societies based on their particular local community in Italy. There were 2000
of these in New York City in 1910. Chinese and Japanese immigrants in the early twentieth century also formed associations based on their region of origin.

In late nineteenth and early twentieth century America, immigrant Jews established an extensive network of hometown associations called landsmanshaftn. At their height, there were several thousand in New York City, 600 in Chicago, and several hundred in other U.S. cities, representing nearly 1000 European cities and towns and embracing nearly every Jewish family in urban America.

Serving as a “sanctuary from the excessive strains of acculturation” and a place to continue old traditions, the landsmanshaft was a vehicle for “reconciling American Jewish and East European identity.”

Chinese, Japanese, and Korean kinship and hometown associations offered welfare services and often spawned rotating credit associations that played a major role in supplying credit for business activities. Many evolved into quasi-credit unions that lent money and paid interest on deposits. U.S. Mexicans, Mexican Americans, and mutualistas (mutual aid societies) provided assistance to families in need and mediated disputes in the earlier part of the century, but, unlike the Asian associations, did not furnish start-up capital.

On the whole, Mexican hometown associations are less involved in mutual aid and other direct services for members than the immigrant organizations of yesteryear. That reflects the increased participation of private companies and the welfare state in social insurance. Today Mexican HTAs are far more oriented towards the hometown. That points to a salient feature of Mexican and indeed Latino immigrants in general: what some have called their “transnational” character, though they were better described by Roberto Suro as “perpetual in-betweeness.” The prolonged transitional character of Latino immigration can be attributed to the proximity of home and the availability of air travel and access to phone, fax, e-mail, and video cassettes on the one hand, and the fact that, in Suro’s words, the nation that hosts them seems “happy to let things go that way” —which I take to mean the paucity of English courses, the lack of citizenship programs, the backlogs at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and so forth.

Contemporary Mexican hometown associations are also distinct for their presence in so many parts of the United States as well as for their efforts to associate regionally and nationally. Though it must be acknowledged that the Jewish landsmanshaft of the early twentieth century also formed federations or farbandn based on national origin, these were confined mainly to New York City. Also distinctive is the role of the Mexican government and the complex relationships (antagonistic or agnostic though they may be in some cases) the hometown associations enjoy with Mexican authorities.

Today hometown associations, sports clubs, and consulates only begin to supply the services once offered by the “settlement houses” that became common at the turn of the century. The most famous settlement house was Hull House, established by Jane Addams in the Halstead section of westside Chicago, where immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe lived. The area was “a slum complete with overcrowded tenements, crime, disease, inadequate schools, inferior hospitals, and insufficient sanitation.” The activities of Hull House included citizenship and literacy classes, adult education, sports and hobby clubs, theater and dance programs, cooking, sewing, and homemaking classes, public baths, day nurseries, health clinics and visiting nurses, immunization programs, art appreciation, lending libraries, political discussion groups, lectures on educational and workplace reforms, loaned meeting spaces for labor meetings, mutual aid societies, social clubs — and hometown associations.

**Purposes and Activities**

Hometown associations have a variety of functions. They are “social clubs”: opportunities and places to gather and socialize, exchange information about relatives, the hometown, jobs, housing, moving, and documentation. They offer company for the sick and provide other forms of mutual aid. They afford legal assistance, sometimes through the good offices of the consulate—that is, clubs will lend members to the consulate to provide assistance if Mexicans run into trouble with the law.

Many hometown associations help members raise money for funeral expenses or to transfer remains back to Mexico. The clubs furnish clients and helpful contacts to their business members. They provide a concrete link to the communities of origin and a way of maintaining ties with their culture, customs, language, and traditions.

Some hometown associations will not undertake community activities in the host country. Others do get involved in their new homes. Most often the original engagement is animated by concern for the children. The Organizaciación Regional de Oaxaca is active in the formation of basketball teams (basketball, not soccer, is the typical sport of Oaxaca) with the aim of discouraging gangs and drug and alcohol use. Some members of other HTAs told me that their associations also help to discourage children from drugs and gangs and promote family unity. Club members from Jalisco form informal subcommittees to visit neighborhood schools and support their children.

If they find problems of general concern, they will bring them to meetings of the federation of clubs. If the child of a club member has gotten mixed up with a gang or is reputed to be taking drugs, the club will designate a member to speak with him.

Over the past several years, a number of studies have pointed to the “second generation decline” as a singular feature of the most recent wave of immigration, especially Latino immigration. These studies have found a lower level of drug and alcohol use among less “acculturated” immigrants and Mexican Americans.

Portes and Rumbaut argue that “[l]ess acculturated immigrants are not only less exposed to these practices, but are under the influence of the stronger family ties, social controls, and traditional values associated with their cultural heritage.” Rumbaut adds that his research has shown that the most disciplined, hardest working, and respectful students “tend to be the most recently arrived.” They are the ones “who have not been here long enough to be Americanized into bad habits, into a Beavis and Butthead perspective of the world.” An attachment to one’s home country, culture and language can be very positive for immigrant children in U.S. schools, contends.
University of Nebraska sociologist Lourdes Gouveia. These attachments “help maintain a sense of identity and self-respect when the family drops in status,” as often happens when foreigners immigrate. As a result, the Venezuelan-born Gouveia said, citing studies by Rumbaut and others, students who are the least “assimilated” often do better in school than other immigrants and sometimes top even the native-born. As one Mexican government official charged with Hispanic affairs observes, “Mexicans do not have any grievances against the U.S. government”138 and tend to regard the U.S. mainly as a land of opportunity. So their activities are not generally fueled by protest against the U.S. government (a situation that stands in contrast to the recurrent media image in Mexico of government mistreatment of Mexican immigrants).

Members of hometown associations usually meet in the members’ houses or garages, in churches, or in restaurants belonging to members (the clubs rarely have an office, though federations often do). San Antonio is opening a clubhouse with a library and a large meeting hall for the use of the hometown associations.139 A cherished aspiration of the California Sinoloan federation is to found such a center, a Casa Sinoloense which would house meetings and receive newcomers from Sinoloa.140 A project of the Chicago federation of Michoacan associations is to create a Casa Michoan as a center of operations.141 The newly elected (with the help of the HTAs) governor of Zacatecas has pledged a matching grant of $125,000 for the twenty-seven HTAs of the Chicago Zacatecas federation to build a Zacatecan cultural center this year.142 The construction of a center seems to be a general symbol of maturity for a federation.

The hometown associations are generally apolitical, nonsectarian, voluntary organizations, though at least one club in Chicago is devoted to promoting transparency and good government in San Luis Potosi. All of them depend entirely on the voluntary work and donations of members and collaborators.

Many clubs have formed around local soccer games and leagues.143 Sports serve to break up the routine of repetitive manual labor typical in the lives of many immigrants, and are a way of keeping contact with relatives, friends, and acquaintances from the hometown. Sports also tend to keep young people away from gangs and drugs. Cities with large public parks (such as Prospect Park in Brooklyn or Van Cortlandt Park in the Bronx) are more hospitable to soccer leagues than locations without them.144 Soccer leagues can be “a way of claiming a space in the city and beginning to construct a public sense of community.”145 But a competitive team needs funds to buy uniforms and equipment, pay league dues, reserve playing fields, and rent training space in the winter. Often these tasks fall to the relatives of the players.146 Team organizers often throw dances or other events to raise funds.147 But these events in turn require more sophisticated organizing as well as cash advances to buy food and drink, rent a hall, and hire musicians or entertainers. Around these tasks leadership groups may form, becoming the pivot of a hometown association. At this point the consulate may play a role by spreading the word and encouraging emulation. “We used to say,” the Consul for Community Relations in New York told me, “look at what Chinantla [an HTA] is doing.”148

Eventually the group may decide to collect money to help its home community. (In many cases, groups disappear due to exhaustion, internal conflicts, and the failure of the next generation to take up the tasks, but the associations usually survive and develop a broader social purpose.)149 They begin to collect funds for disaster relief or to send to home communities for reconstruction or development. Many have formed partnerships or other organizations to collect money to spruce up the village’s traditional religious festival or to repair or renovate the local church. They also may be dedicated to infrastructure projects such as construction and repair of roads, bridges, water systems, drainage and sewer works, schools, churches, orphanages, and recreational facilities (such as basketball courts, parks, and rodeos), as well as electrification, water purification, and pollution control. Funds are donated for educational and medical supplies and for vehicles for public use.150 Some associations have started small factories (maquiladoras) in light industries, such as the textile factory in Montelongo, Guanajuato.151

In short, HTAs are a mechanism, albeit today a minor one, for sending remittances to the old hometown. From the government standpoint, their contributions have the advantage of focusing on productive investment rather than exclusively on immediate consumption, as is the case with individual remittances.152 The collective investments by the HTAs are relatively small but they feed into a much larger stream.

Immigrant investors, generally individuals, and other entrepreneurs have taken advantage of the provisions of NAFTA that allow them to import some U.S. machinery and equipment duty-free. As a result, many Mexican rural towns are becoming garment-assembling centers with low unemployment. Combined with falling birth rates and a more stable economy, Mexico’s increased job creation has led some Mexican economists to foresee job growth matching labor force growth sometime in the present decade.153 That would tend to drive Mexican immigration rates down. HTA leaders often stress that the ultimate aim of their investments is to eliminate the conditions that led them to emigrate.154

Typically, individual Mexican immigrants will begin by sending money home for family consumption—for food and clothing, housing, and educational and medical needs—but also for productive purposes such as farm equipment. Remittances are concentrated in the nine western and northern “sender” states—seven states (Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, San Luis Potosi, Guererro, Chihuahua, and Zacatecas) receive about 60 percent of them—and the bulk goes to some 109 sender municipalities.155 In the case of Michoacan, remittances reach an estimated $1.2 billion each year, “a sum larger than the budget of the state government.”156 In Zacatecas, migrant remittances have outstripped federal revenues.157 According to the director of the Zacatecas Office for Zacatecan Communities Abroad, Zacatecan emigrants send as much as $1.2 million a day back to their home state.158 Remittances also have a significant multiplier effect in sender states and communities, comparing favorably to many aid programs that are liable to be siphoned off by local officials.

After they have begun to meet immediate family necessities, immigrant workers often broaden their attention to wider social needs. Sometimes this is a direct consequence of their improved standard of living in the U.S. An HTA member who can now afford a car and drives back to Mexico to live or to visit during holidays may wish to see that his village has a paved road. Similarly, he may become concerned that the vil-
lage has potable water, or a recreational park, or that the school his siblings attend is in good repair.

Fundraising is commonly carried out in the first instance by going door-to-door. An activist with the Heartland Alliance, a nonprofit agency that works with HTAs in Chicago, considers this the hallmark of the HTAs: “a sort of vanguard, grassroots philanthropy” carried out by organizations without offices or paid staff. The money is moved entirely by volunteer work “because they [HTAs] are so dedicated to the principle that every cent should end up in the home community.”

Many clubs have been able to procure, gratis, second-hand fire engines and rescue vehicles and send them on to communities in Mexico. One example involves Santa Monica, California, and Mazatlan, which are sister cities. The former, via the Sinoloa Brotherhood of clubs, donates used ambulances and fire engines that are repaired and put to use in Mazatlan. Each year, HTAs are beneficiaries of a raffle for the services of Chicago hospitals. When the San Luis Potosi HTA won the lottery in 1998, club members went back home to assess Chicago and Los Angeles saved a small Roman Catholic ers this the hallmark of the H TAs: “a sort of vanguard, grass-

In one instance, the sight of a blind man was restored by means of a medical procedure unavailable in the region.

A joint project of the Monte Escobedo, Zacatecas, clubs of Chicago and Los Angeles saved a small Roman Catholic school on the brink of extinction. The Comite San Miguel Epejan, a Chicago Michoacan hometown association, contributed $125,000 towards the state’s project of building a road connecting the village to the county seat and the regional market, thus contributing to the economic development of the region. In order to raise money, HTAs hold soccer matches and tournaments, and organize dances, raffles, barbecues, Christmas and birthday parties, convivios (get-togethers), races, artistic recitals, and seminars, and they participate in their federation’s annual beauty pageant (concurso de belleza o cartamen), celebrations of national and local holidays, and religious festivals.

The home village’s annual fiesta of the patron saint is always a signal event. Over the past thirty years, these yearly festivals have become an major vehicle of return migration and “a symbolic demonstration of the community’s cohesion in the face of diaspora.” The fiestas now make an honored place for los ausentes (the absent ones), who quite often finance the celebration with their fundraising activities in the United States. Those who can afford it will choose this time of year to return home, usually bearing hi-tech gifts. It is a time to start building or repairing a home with money earned and saved over the past years. The fiestas are also local mating rites, when an unmarried woman and a visiting bachelor may find romance, courtship, and marriage.

Back in the United States, the beauty pageant is often the crowning annual social event for the HTA and will involve many months of preparation. It is one of the main ways the HTAs seek to involve the younger generation. Winners are chosen not only for their comeliness but also for their understanding of the home community’s history and culture and for their success in raising funds by selling raffle and dance tickets or refreshments at association social and sports events.

In Los Angeles each federation of clubs from Jalisco, Michoacan, Sinaloa, and Sonora chooses its own queen. “No mere beauty pageant,” a recent Los Angeles Times front page feature called the Zacatecas contest, it is also “a cultural rite of passage for members of a bridge generation, caught somewhere between Mexico and the United States.” The highest scores in the contests are racked up by cultural knowledge rather than looks. Part of the former is gained in a two-week bus tour of the state, with stops at each community represented in the contest. Besides banquets and parties “and midday dances with boys not yet old enough to travel north,” the trip calls for “sober examinations of the reasons why people left, and the projects funded by U.S. clubs.” The finals take place in a Los Angeles ballroom to the accompaniment of a band belting out typical Zacatecan music, with contestants in “folkloric dresses, feathered indigenous headpieces, skirts of bamboo”—all characteristic of Zacatecas culture. Last year’s award ceremony was held a month later at the Montebello Country Club and attended by the new governor, Ricardo Monreal, and a dozen Zacatecas mayors. “With an eye toward future voters,” several U.S. politicians, including a Congressman and a city councilman, were also in attendance.

During the first week of August, the largest and oldest HTA in the Los Angeles Oaxacan federation—Organizacion Regional de Oaxac (ORO)—hosts the Guelaguetza, a festival of regional dance, music, and costume that attracts some 6000 people annually. HTAs everywhere advertise their events on local Spanish-language radio and television. The consulate often helps spread the word about events, may defray the costs of renting a hall, and promotes seminars and special events. Consulates also furnish legal assistance and help with paperwork.

Mexican Independence Day, September 16, brings the clubs together. In Los Angeles, over 200 clubs march in a parade in regional costumes, underneath city or state banners, with floats featuring their beauty pageant winners. The associations also often celebrate the Fifth of May (Cinco de Mayo), another Mexican and Latino holiday.

Local, State, and National Ties: The Federation of HTAs

The visit of a state governor sometimes has sparked the individual social clubs to create a statewide federation. Individual state governments, such as Guanajuato and Zacatecas, also have also encouraged the formation of state federations of hometown associations. The governors encourage federation as the most convenient form for dealing with many hometown associations; in turn, the HTAs find that federation helps win state funds and attracts the governor to visit their area in the U.S. Leaders who had encountered difficulty in gaining the attention of town officials in Michoacan say that, since putting together a federation, they found they had “much bigger keys to open much bigger doors.” Association members acknowledge that they are often doing the work of the government, but they are convinced that if everything were left to the government, little would get done. Besides, the HTAs’ work catalyzes additional government help now because of their remittances and their public investments.

Despite such incentives, it is not always easy to federate. This is especially true since the states themselves are not very
The three Oaxacan federations are divided along geographic and tribal political lines, with one (the ORO) sympathetic to the government and two hostile to it. In Chicago, where multiple Michoacan hometown associations existed for some time, it took several years and the intervention of the consulate, the PCME, the Zacatecas Federation of Southern California, and finally the governor of Michoacan before a federation was formed. In Los Angeles, political differences have impeded the formation of a Michoacan federation.

The PCME plays a prominent role in the federating process. It first began to encourage the formation of hometown organizations in Los Angeles between 1991 and 1994. Partly as a result of PCME-coordinated visits of state governors, state federations of hometown clubs for the states of Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nayarit, Sinaloa, and Tlaxcala were formed in greater Los Angeles. The PCME, through the consulats, has continued to help coordinate visits to U.S. clubs and federations by state governors and of mayors ("municipal presidents"). Prominent individuals from other walks of life also pay visits. This spring, the San Luis Potosí federation hosted the Archbishop of San Luis Potosi along with the governor at its annual festival.

In Chicago, the PCME has been instrumental in instigating the formation of nine federations, each representing the hometown associations of an individual Mexican state in the greater Chicago area. They are now planning to federate these federations into a single Chicago-wide federation. According to the Mexican Foreign Office, by 1998 there were more than a dozen such regional federations. A Mexican official claims that such "super federations" have not prospered, however, and that they are not usually promoted by the PCME or the consulats.

The Statutes of the Federation of Zacatecas Clubs of Southern California lists its objectives in the following order:

a) To unite and organize all Zacatecanos located in Southern California through activities which lead to the social and economic welfare of our communities here and in Zacatecas.

b) To encourage interest in preserving our customs and traditions by orientating and supporting our children and youth and encouraging respect of the family unit.

c) To unite all members to assist in satisfying our legal and consumer necessities by establishing relations with agencies that provide social services such as hospitals, schools, insurance companies, government agencies and similar associations that can assist us.

d) To create a friendly and engaged relationship with the governments of Mexico, Zacatecas, and municipalities of origin so that together social and economic projects can be achieved in our communities.

Some of these regional federations are reaching out to one another. Moreover, existing federations have contributed to the formation of new federations. Leaders of the Los Angeles federations were invited by the PCME to Chicago. As a result, "some of the [Chicago] federations ... emerged very quickly due to the enormous impact that the example of the federation in Los Angeles had on them."

The formation of federations has linked otherwise dispersed hometown associations and their members. At the same time, it paves the way for other linkages that transcend the boundaries of the hometowns and states and brings together Mexicans from various regions. The gala dinner celebrating the formation of the Michoacan federation not only welcomed the governor as honored guest but "became the first activity organized cooperatively by all of the clubs of Chicago."

In San Antonio, in addition to the association of local clubs in state federations, the consulate has fostered the formation of a citywide federation of federations. At least one national federation of federations, the Casa Guanajuato, is contemplating opening an office in Washington, D.C., to lobby for the interests of their members and region.

It is interesting to note that Mexican immigrants prefer not the supranational "Hispanic" or "Latino" organizations that seek to organize in their communities, nor even "Mexican-American" associations, but rather subnational, local groupings. The latter legitimate and authenticate "one of the most elementary forms of immigrant identity, their roots in their place of origin." As one of the contributors to the Binational Study on migration between Mexico and the United States states, "immigrants are not the primary constituents of ... U.S. based Hispanic organizations." Once organized in local clubs, however, they begin to seek, as we have seen, broader affiliations with other local clubs in state federations and with other city federations or with associations from their hometown located in other parts of the U.S.

While obviously reinforcing ties to Mexico, these contacts can also constitute part of the process of assimilation to the United States. Historically, as Thomas Sowell points out, immigrants have "tended to assimilate first with compatriots from different parts of their country or origin, and later with members of the larger society around them in the country where they settled."

Comparatively few first-generation Mexicans have reached even the first stage of this process—their lives rarely afford them the leisure—but the very effort to organize clubs and federations brings many immigrants into contact with the larger American society. Association leaders learn how to form nonprofit organizations, create charters and bylaws, and reach out to lawyers and become acquainted with the legal process. Some come to master customs, regulations, and arrangements for transferring and monitoring substantial remittances to Mexico. Members meet donors who offer medical, accounting, and legal services. In the process, they are absorbing American values and practices and discarding Mexican ones. For many members, the hometown association is a springboard to community involvement in the host country.

The Impact of HTAs on Governance and Politics in Mexico
One of the most impressive features of the associations is their handling of the collection, transfer, and investment of funds in Mexico, a country that, especially in rural areas, is marked by
endemic corruption, clientelism, and informality. The HTAs’ scrupulous procedures have encouraged more regular procedures in Mexico.

Victor M. Espinosa’s study of the federation of Michoacan hometown associations in Illinois notes their “scrupulously updated membership lists” and well-documented collection procedures—replete with receipts, public reports by treasurers and secretaries, close tracking of expenditures, cosigning of checks, and other procedures and controls learned in the U.S. Chicago-area club leaders have formed parallel committees in Michoacan villages to consult with the community about priorities, develop proposals, and “monitor implementation and follow-up of projects undertaken.”Some of these parallel committees are elected in open, public meetings in which trustworthy and independent individuals are sought. The donations of the Oaxaca ORO are monitored by an elected committee for each project. Receipts, bills, videos, and photographs are employed in the monitoring process.

The Zacatecas federations likewise have an extensive monitoring system. Projects are first approved by the federation. If they are to qualify for state or federal matching funds (see pp. 35-36 below, “State Programs”), proposals must carry the signature of the federation officers. That requires a feasibility study and a technical business plan. Each community that receives funds has a committee that represents the donating club in the United States. This committee is elected by the residents. For each project a subcommittee is also formed. This subcommittee buys the materials, contracts laborers, and establishes competitive bidding for contractors. In the case of a matching funds “three-for-one program” (see pp. 35-36 below, “State Programs”), supervisors from the state, federal government, municipality, and the federation monitor the project. Receipts and bills must be presented to the supervisors. “You can bribe one supervisor, but it’s pretty hard to bribe four,” commented one federation office.

Federation leaders add that these open, competitive, and transparent procedures enhance the credibility of the local and state government. Thus, the hometown associations promote “open and honest governance” and stimulate “unprecedented voluntary participation in their communities of origin.”

In some regions, where there is a history of corruption among local authorities, committees have excluded traditional officials with bad records. In others, returning migrants who have retired from their jobs have themselves become elected officials. “Thus the hometown associations and their parallel committees in Michoacan have become alternative structures for decision-making at the local level in the communities of origin.” Officers of the Zacatecas Federation of Southern California speak of a “parallel government.” This competition can sometimes lead to conflict: Some local officials complain that, when they do not follow the agendas of their wealthy American cousins, the latter become “self-righteous” and accuse them of “corruption” without offering any evidence.

The hometown movement is an inconspicuous and uncelebrated channel of American influence in Mexico: generally fostering transparency, accountability, voluntary organization, and political competition in a country attempting to achieve the transition to a market economy and democracy. Such a transition, it might be added, is the best hope for reducing immigration flows into the United States.

The hometown associations have adopted American technology as well as American practices of organization, accountability, and self-government. Club leaders in San Antonio and Chicago use videotape to document key meetings and send them to their counterparts at home.

The clubs also organize hometown visits. The importance of the immigrants and the social clubs in Mexico is illustrated by the fact that they are often formally greeted on visits home for the holidays by the municipal president. Conversely, the associations frequently invite hometown officials—secular and religious—to appear at events in the United States. Governors and other local officials then will often spice their speeches with descriptions of the needs of their state or municipality and will appeal for the investment of remittances.

In many rural villages of the sender states, the hometown associations have become political actors. This is most conspicuously the case with the Zacatecas associations, but it is also true elsewhere in states such as Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, and Puebla. Like many of the Zacatecas associations, the Puebla Club Solidaridad Chinantla de New York became a factor in local Mexican politics as early as the late 1980s. In 1989, the Club actually ran a candidate for mayor. The candidacy led to a formal agreement between the club and the PRI-led municipal government. Following the party’s traditional practice, the PRI was seeking to co-opt an autonomous rival by effectively agreeing to negotiate with him in making future local decisions.

There are 1.5 million registered Mexican voters living in the United States, according to the Mexican Federal Election Institute. Every electoral district along the border is installing several special polling places for them. Over the past two years, it had become almost commonplace for Mexican state governors in Mexico to campaign among Mexican communities in the United States at election time.

But the 2000 Mexican presidential campaign posted a landmark in émigré involvement in Mexican political campaigns as all three major political parties actively courted Mexican communities in the United States. The presidential candidates of the two opposition parties came to the United States to campaign among immigrant communities. Both barnstormed through California, and Vicente Fox also traveled to Chicago. The PRI’s Francisco Labastida Ochoa had made a campaign pledge not to leave Mexico until after the election, but he sent his wife and daughter to the U.S. in his stead.

Opposition campaigns concentrated their efforts in California, Texas, Illinois, Michigan, Oregon, and Washington state, all of which have large Mexican communities. Campaign officials for Cuauhtemoc Cardenas said they hoped to mobilize 100,000 registered Mexican residing in California to vote in Mexico for their candidate. The leader of Mexican Migrants for Change, who invited Fox to California, told The San Diego Union-Tribune that her organization would “send teams into Mexico during the final days of the campaign to convince people of the importance of change….We are beginning to realize that we have influence.”

But most U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans would exercise their political influence from a distance—by lobbying relatives, friends, and neighbors with phone calls, postcards, and messages tucked into money transfers. The Fox campaign, which was running a close second to Labastida at the time, was
anxious to offset the PRI advantage in rural districts by gaining the support of the influential émigré communities. That campaign devoted part of the funds raised on U.S. soil—they cannot be used in Mexico—to purchasing postcards to be sent home before the elections. Fox told The Washington Post that he hoped as many as two million cards would be sent: “These are people who are sustaining the economy [in their hometowns], and they have moral authority in their families to influence votes.” Fox said.216

The candidates were also capitalizing on the publicity they would garner in the Mexican media from events staged in the United States. Fox used his departure for Chicago to inform the Mexican City daily La Reforma that he was going to “visit Mexicans expelled by Labastida’s PRI, that had to leave because the regime is murdering them in their own land with starvation.”217

Another novelty in this year’s campaign was the presence of U.S. Mexicans as candidates. A Chicago activist who works with some of the HTAs, Raul Ross, became the first Mexican living in the U.S. to be nominated for federal deputy candidate in the Mexican Congress. The native of Veracruz had lived in Chicago for almost fifteen years and was running for election under the Alliance for Mexico, a coalition of five political parties led by the PRD. Ross, who is also director of Mexican affairs for the American Friends Service Committee in Chicago, told the Chicago Tribune that he intended to represent the interests of U.S. Mexicans: “They should have a voice and a vote in congressional matters.”218

The Automobile Deposit Affair

One demonstration of the growing influence of Mexican communities in the United States on Mexican politics—and an illustration of the distance and even rancor that separates some U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans from the Mexican government—was a dispute over automobile deposits in the fall of 1999. The hometown clubs were instrumental in forcing the Mexican government to cancel a highly visible public policy.

HTAs and the Mexican government began to lock horns in October 1999 when the government raised the deposit for incoming foreign vehicles from $11 to between $400 and $800. Mexico was trying to stem the tide of illegal used cars and trucks brought in by migrants as well as contraband gangs. In recent years, the number of illegally circulating vehicles had soared to some 1.5 million—one out of every ten vehicles in Mexico—evading duties and damaging local producers, according to government officials. The vehicles are especially popular in sender states such as Chihuahua, Durango, Guanajuato, Michoacan, and Zacatecas, where emigrants have helped to improve roads and the vehicles often replace donkey-drawn carts. Vehicles often cost twice as much in Mexico, where the country’s banking crisis also has made automobile loans prohibitive. Local automobile producers such as Daimler-Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Nissan, and Volkswagen enjoy protective tariffs negotiated under NAFTA and are responsible for 18 percent of Mexico’s manufacturing jobs. The Mexican dispute over the “chocolates,” as the illegal vehicles are called, dates from the 1970s.

The 1999 climax of the controversy pitted peasants against industrialists and state governors against central authorities. For years, Mexican authorities had tolerated the “chocolates.” The vehicles used to be “amnestied” around election time, and if authorities did try to seize the vehicles, protesting peasant groups blocked thoroughfares. The new PRI governor of Chihuahua, which borders Texas and New Mexico, discovered upon taking office in October 1998 that half the vehicles in the state were illegal. The governor claimed that some of the illegal vehicles were being used in holdups and robberies and contributing to the rising crime wave. He then challenged the federal government, which has authority over imports, by having the state register and tax the illegal vehicles. That drew the fire of Mexico’s Treasury Minister, who hauled the governor into the Mexican Supreme Court. Fellow state governors made common cause with their Chihuahuan colleague in what they saw as the latest and most critical round of a rising conflict between local and federal authorities.

With pressures building from various sides, the federal government resolved to levy the fee.219 The measure would have forced many Mexicans to cancel planned visits. As many as two million were expected to come home for the holidays, many driving automobiles.220

Hometown associations in Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, San Antonio, and San Diego immediately began organizing weekly demonstrations outside Mexican consulates. These were sometimes led by activists from the left-leaning opposition party, the PRD. The associations declared a boycott against Mexican products. Projected automobile caravans to Mexico were cancelled.221 Several West Coast associations protested at their consulates and in Tijuana.222 They told officials that the deposits “instead of being spent in Mexico would stay on the border.”223 PRD activists and some HTA members formed a group called the International Coalition of Mexicans Abroad (CIME), one of whose activist leaders told The Dallas Morning News: “If the United States government required us to pay a deposit, we would kick and scream, but we’d comply because we know we’ll get our money back. With the Mexican government, there is absolutely no trust.”224 The leaders of the Zacatecas Federation of Southern California, among others, made it clear that they did not believe in street protests but would write letters to the authorities.225 (The Sinoloa federation did not join the protests because its rules prohibit participation in political events.)226

Responding to the protests, several U.S. lawmakers, including Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas), wrote Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, requesting that the government rescind the plan. Hutchison threatened to hold Senate hearings on the car deposit policy.227 U.S.-based consular officials, claiming they were never consulted by Mexican treasury department officials, sent strong protests to Mexico City, reflecting the sentiments of the hometown associations and others in the Mexican diaspora.228 The proposed policy itself, drawn up by Mexican treasury officials, also unleashed a slugfest within the government.229

On December 3, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, in an awkward about-face, announced the cancellation of the policy two days after it had been implemented. Zedillo’s shift came two hours after the Mexican Senate, with support from both the opposition and leaders of his own party, had passed a resolution calling on him to scrap the plan. The lower legislative house was set to pass a similar resolution.230

The decision was greeted jubilantly by Mexican hometown
associations. “I applaud the decision, because so many of our Mexican brothers travel with just enough for expenses and couldn’t afford the deposit,” Gerardo Escamilla, the head of the San Antonio Casa Nueva Leon, told Reuters.211 “We are celebrating,” exulted Luis Eduardo Pelayo Gomez to The New York Times. Pelayo Gomez, an opposition activist involved with hometown associations in Chicago, told the Times. “This is the first time the Mexican community here managed to bring this kind of pressure on Mexico. It shows that we can use our power and make changes.”212 The chief of staff for a Texas legislator who played a key role in lobbying for the immigrants told the Dallas Morning News that the immigrants’ political clout “will have future ramifications for years to come.”213 The role of the more politically oriented of the associations was so decisive that one Mexican consul said it could mark a new stage in which the associations start to engage the federal government as interlocutors.

Activists from the left-leaning PRD also saw the event as a watershed. CIME held its first convention in Dallas in February 2000.214 By April, the group was lobbying the U.S. Congress and meeting with prominent members such as Representative Henry Hyde (R-Illinois), the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over immigration laws, and Lamar Smith (R-Texas), who chairs its immigration subcommittee.215 The lobbying effort was part of a biartional agenda on behalf of U.S. Mexicans in the United States and Mexico. Coalition members told the Dallas Morning News that the mainstream Latino organizations such as NCLR and LULAC “do not represent their interests in this country.” Pointing to countries such as Colombia, France, and Ireland, the coalition planned to push for immigrant representatives with full voting rights in the two Mexican legislative chambers.216 The group announced its intention to register as a political-action committee. Along with demands on the Mexican government, the ten pages of coalition resolutions sought action by the U.S. government on a new amnesty for illegal aliens, protection of the civil rights of immigrants, and the promotion of safer working conditions and better wages for immigrant workers.217

Future Prospects

Mexican officials worry that the hometown associations may have reached their apogee since such a high proportion of members are first-generation immigrants, beneficiaries of IRCA’s 1986 amnesty. It is true that children participate in the activities of the club via sports leagues, beauty pageants, and organized visits to the hometown,218 and the cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe has awakened interest among youth in Mexico and thus led to involvement in hometown associations.219 Some of the younger generation go on to become leaders, and a few become leaders of the associations. But that is hardly the rule. Most association leaders believe that their organizations will be replenished not through their children but through the ongoing entry of new immigrants.220

Mexican hometown associations today, like organizations of other immigrant populations in the past, have had a difficult time attracting the second generation. One illustration is the difficulty many members have in persuading their daughters to enter in the annual federation beauty contest. Last year’s search for Senorita Zacatecas “began, as it does every year, with a desperate scramble for candidates.”221 The bylaws of the Zacatecas Federation require that each club participate, but less than half of the HTAs turned out candidates notwithstanding radio commercials and badgering the eligible daughters of their members. Every year it becomes more difficult to find an attractive, articulate teenager who speaks decent Spanish, has the time and the inclination to trudge through rural construction sites or peer into community wells, and is willing to endure the old-fashioned corniness of it all. “American culture pulls strongly on these young women, while Zacatecas threatens to become ever more faded and remote.”222

There are exceptions. The current leaders of many of the Michoacan hometown associations in Chicago “are the sons and nephews of the organization’s founders.”223 These new leaders were educated in U.S. schools and tasted organizational work in Latino student groups and in high school and college sports. Their higher educational level is reflected in the quality of their newsletters and their involvement in Chicago area local politics on school boards and in social service agencies, and as supporters of Mexican-American candidates for local and state office. But it appears far more common for offspring to resist their parents’ attempts to integrate them as their successors.

In any event, as long as Mexican immigration remains at high levels, the hometown clubs figure to persist and to expand their activities, contacts, and concerns. If, as the AFL-CIO proposed on February 16, 2000, amnesty is again granted to current illegal aliens, HTAs will be major beneficiaries. Like all ascriptive organizations—based on family, ethnicity, geographic origin, or some other characteristic acquired at birth—the role of hometown associations in a modern society is limited. Among first-generation immigrants, HTAs have helped create small businesses, banks, charities, and other institutions critical to success and integration. But in succeeding generations they can become an obstacle, reducing the range of economic and social opportunity and fostering parochialism, chauvinism, and ethnic ghettos. Crucial will be the extent to which these associations can inspire confidence and trust not only among their members but in the entire community and nation.224

The American Character of the HTAs

I asked several club and federation leaders and members, as well as officials of Mexican cultural institutes, why Mexicans, who are generally unwilling or unable to establish independent organizations in their native land, so often succeed in doing so in the United States. The leader of the Jalisco Federation said in Mexico “the people remain subjugated to the PRI. They don’t want problems. Here, there’s more freedom.”225 Members of the Club Ixtlan del Rio pointed out that in Mexico, “the clubs are exclusive, only for those with money. And they’re all organized by the PRI or the government.”226 Here, the immigrants found others in like circumstances, and the equality of conditions make it easy to mingle and join. Dante Gomez of the Mexican Cultural and Educational Institute of Chicago, who for two years has been the Chicago consulate’s point-person with hometown organizations in the area, gave four reasons: (1) immigrants are influenced by the “organizational environment” of U.S. society; (2) a U.S. perspective allows the Mexican-born to perceive “the deficiencies of our country” and
to develop a “critical spirit”; (3) some members have achieved the leisure time to dedicate to organizational tasks; and (4) independent organization is discouraged in Mexico, especially in the rural areas from which most club members hail.

Club leaders belonging to the Michoacan federation in Chicago speak of the “transmission of certain traditional values, including the promotion of voluntary participation ....” They maintain that “these values are opposed to the political apathy, individualism and anonymity of urban life in the U.S.” Thus, the Mexican-born may indeed be more “American” than many native-born when it comes to this key aspect of American society. The president of the Jalisco Federation agreed that in organizing they were not imitating Americans. “Americans go to work and then come home and watch TV. They don’t worry about things. We meet at parties (pachangas). We socialize (convivimos) more than the Americans do.” Yet 150 years ago Alexis de Tocqueville called attention to “the immense assemblage of associations” in the United States:

... Americans of all ages, all conditions and all dispositions constantly form associations....They have not only commercial and manufacturing associations ... but ... religious,moral,serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes.

HTAs serve to demonstrate that civil society develops most strongly under a liberal democratic regime, whatever the ethnic composition of the individuals involved.

“Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association,” Tocqueville wrote. In Mexico, “new undertakings” have been monopolized for seventy years by the PRI and even longer by the government. More often than not that means inaction rather than action, that roads, clinics, wells, or schools will not be built. When asked why they did not organize in Mexico as they do in the U.S., Mexican immigrants responded that fear of government reprisals and extortion impede independent organization in their homeland. In Mexico, nearly everything requires a permit from some government official and that means a hefty bribe or kickoff. This has begun to change, especially with respect to political associations and opposition parties. But in the rural areas from which most immigrants hail, the old order often prevails.

**HTA Citizenship Promotion and Political Participation in the Host Country**

The various events sponsored by hometown associations—from regular soccer games to annual beauty contests—bring Mexican migrants together on a regular basis, not only for recreation but also for exchange of information on jobs, housing, and schools. The talk may also encompass politics, especially when an issue arises affecting Mexicans.

Political activism in the host country appears to be the exception rather than the rule, but leaders of hometown associations generally appear to encourage naturalization. Since these are organizations dedicated to preserving ties to the old country, “the widespread consensus among HTA leaders about the importance of attaining citizenship is in some senses contrary to expectation.”

The president of the Asociacion de Clubes Nayaritas explained her efforts to overcome Mexicans’ resistance to naturalization in a 1997 interview:

...[A]s an association we have to say to people, “become citizens, you’re not betraying your nation, you keep your roots inside of yourselves and nobody can take your roots away, no one can change our love for where we were born. But think about your kin and your grandchildren, they are the ones who need you to pave the way so that they don’t have so many problems in the future, especially the ones who were born here, they’re not going to live in Mexico.”

According to Zabin and Escala, there was widespread involvement by the HTAs in the opposition to Proposition 187:

The federations and most independent clubs all ended up supporting the campaign against this initiative. Their support took various forms including: donating funds to “Taxpayers against Prop. 187,” the main professional political campaign against the proposition, participating in the October, 1994 street demonstration, which was Los Angeles’ largest demonstration since the Vietnam War, promoting the vote among their affiliates, and using the media to influence public opinion.

One club leader stated that “Proposition 187 opened our eyes to the necessity of getting involved in issues that affect the community here.”

The Proposition 187 dispute spurred naturalization among Mexicans, but it has not led to sustained political participation by HTAs. Proposition 187 stood as an exception for most of the leaders. And even then some club presidents “were adamant that their clubs should not get involved in politics.”

Following Tocqueville’s distinction, most leaders see their clubs as “voluntary organizations” but not as “political associations.” Zabin and Escala found that in Los Angeles most club presidents felt that “the main work of the clubs was to help their origin communities in Mexico and to provide a way for their compatriots to maintain social links in this country.” While not actively opposed to political participation, they simply did not see it as their “primary mission.” Club presidents often bring “from Mexico their profound distrust of the political process and politicians.” Only a minority of association leaders and members think the clubs should be more actively involved in U.S. politics. A member of the leadership of the Zacatecas federation and some leaders of small clubs shared the more activist view. But Zabin and Escala comment that “discussion or action concerning U.S. politics” is “notably absent” from the general activity of the clubs and federations.

The issue of political participation led to factional conflict in the largest of the hometown federations, the Zacatecas Federation of Southern California. The “Traditional” group, which reportedly had a closer relationship with the consulate, the PCME, and the PRI, held that the federation should focus on helping the clubs carry out their investment and philanthropy in the hometowns by putting their energies into raffles, dances, and beauty pageants. The “Policals” wished to maintain the former work but also wanted the federation to play a more active political role on both sides of the border.

The conflict first came to a head in the hotly contested 1997 elections for the leadership of the federation, which was
won by the Traditionals. The losers complained of irregularities and claimed that the Mexican consular officials had doctored the vote (which was held in the consulate). They soon after the vote, the governor of Zacatecas turned up in Los Angeles “on an unplanned visit … allegedly to ensure that the election dispute did not fracture the federation.”

The next year, a second and perhaps decisive round was fought. Ricardo Monreal, the apparent PRI nominee, came to Los Angeles in November 1997 to seek support for his candidacy for the governorship of Zacatecas. He met with members of the Zacatecas federation and made a favorable impression on the Political faction, which decided to back him. Back in Mexico, however, party bosses unexpectedly blocked his nomination. In February 1998, Monreal and 5000 of his supporters resigned from the PRI and joined a coalition of opposition parties, led by the PRD. The Political faction continued to decide their support of Monreal’s candidacy while the Traditionalists continued to back the PRI candidate.

The Politicals formed the Frente Civico Zacatecano (Zacatecan Civic Front), which organized political rallies in Southern California in support of Monreal. The Frente also arranged for the candidate to do radio spots on California stations, calling on local Zacatecanos to get their relatives back home to vote for him. Both candidates campaigned in California, even though U.S. Mexicans cannot vote in Mexico. Monreal visited twice during the spring campaign. Monreal’s spokesperson called his California campaign swings “very important, if not definitive.”

The intensity of that campaign produced discord in the Zacatecas federation. The organization survived, but Monreal’s victory invigorated the Political faction, which had endorsed him, campaigned for him in Zacatecas, and raised money for him. One of Monreal’s first official acts was to name his lead U.S. supporter to a newly created cabinet position of liaison with the Zacatecas hometown associations in the United States. He then asked the state legislature to create two additional seats for U.S. residents—a first for Mexico. On the strength of their victory, and of their warm relationship with the new governor, the Political faction defeated the Traditionalists in the next federation leadership elections.

The Frente Civico Zacatecano now seeks to become a political organization that works on both sides of the border. In California, the Frente endorses and supports candidates from both U.S. political parties. It has developed alliances with local unions and elected officials. During elections, it operates a telephone chain, gives press conferences, puts up banners and posters, interviews candidates, and endorses them on the Zacatecas radio station in Los Angeles. The Frente draws on members of the federation but is independent from it. It does not accept group membership and so HTAs may not affiliate with the Frente. The latter, according to the federation’s interpretation of the law, would be illegal, since the federation and many of its HTAs are nonprofit organizations. The president of the Frente, Guatalupe Gomez, says that its political force derives from its strength in the grassroots and its “lines of communication” with elected officials.

In June, Gomez joined the leaders of several of the major Los Angeles hometown federations in the HTAs’ first concerted effort to influence U.S. policy. Federation presidents from Zacateca, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Oaxaca, and Sinaloa announced their support for organized labor’s call for immigration reform and a new amnesty. The announcement was made at the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor and was described by the Los Angeles Times as marking “a turning point for the clubs, which are increasingly looking for ways to help fellow immigrants here.”

The “potentially powerful coalition” as the Los Angeles Times described it—was formed at a time when the AFL-CIO, led by unions in Southern California, has turned to urban Latino immigrants, who work mainly in low-tech and service industries, for the bulk of its new recruitment drive. Raul Hinojosa, director of the North American Integration and Development Center at UCLA, noted that these kinds of networks were a backbone of the labor movement 100 years ago. Italians, for example, had very strong hometown networks that labor tapped into in New York. What’s interesting is that in this current wave of immigration, the labor movement has taken so long to find them…. These immigrant networks are already organized. That’s an incredible advantage.

Educational Efforts of the HTAs

Members of the Los Angeles Club Ixtilan del Rio of Nayarit told me that, because members lived in different parts of the city, it was very difficult to organize political participation even in school communities. But the HTAs do often have educational programs—not only Spanish and English classes, but also citizenship classes. The clubs generally do not have the resources to pay teachers, who are therefore contracted through the consulate via the various educational programs of the Mexican Education Department (SEP) and the PCME. The Club Amigos de Coahuila in San Antonio gets help from the consulate for its Spanish classes and finances the English classes on its own. This also appears to be the pattern in Chicago. The Oaxaca ORF federation provides both Spanish and English classes as well as classes in the indigenous Zapotec language. George J. Borjas concluded that “as much as half of the relative wage growth experienced by immigrants in the first twenty years after arrival may be attributed to the gains from learning the English language.” Indeed, Hispanic immigrants with English earn 17 percent more than those without it. Of course, the benefits of English are sharply reduced if one lives and works in a Mexican community.

While some of the members of the HTAs and of other Mexican-American organizations I talked with seemed to favor bilingual education, others stressed that “English is everything.” The president of the Jalisco federation in Los Angeles contended that parents who were more involved (al tanto) with their children or had higher aspirations for them tended to be less supportive of bilingual programs. On the other hand, several club leaders liked the bilingual program because it aided them in achieving their goal of producing bilingual children. “Children are like sponges, they absorb languages.” A common complaint about bilingual programs was that the teachers were “incompetent.” Many club members and leaders supported bilingual education methods when it came to adults or adolescents, but not for children.

Educational issues deserve a chapter of their own, which follows.
CHAPTER FOUR

Educational Activities

The PCME considers education crucial to the demand of Mexican residents in the United States for "just and equitable opportunities for employment." For this reason it has promoted, with the support of the Mexican Education Department (SEP), programs in the areas of bilingual education, adult education, and migrant education. The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations (SRE) coordinates the services of the various Mexican programs in the U.S. These programs have no central organization in the United States. As a result, "most people are not aware of the many activities in which the Mexican education establishment in involved in the United States." Since most programs are arranged between local U.S. school districts and Mexican state or federal entities, it is not possible to provide more than a general idea of their scope here.

Historical Background

The activities in the United States of the SEP preceded the initiatives of the Salinas administration by more than a decade. The SEP's involvement with U.S. bilingual education dates from the mid-1970s. According to the SEP official who supervised the program, the initiative for cooperation with bilingual programs came from the United States.

Educators in the Pajaro Valley Unified School District (Santa Cruz, California) became aware that a large number of children in their schools all came from Gomez Farias in Michoacan. These children spent the winter months in Gomez Farias and the rest of the year with their migrant parents in California. They were denied access to the Gomez Farias schools because they were not present at the start of the school year. In 1976, the Pajaro Valley district administrator asked one of the teachers to investigate the situation in Gomez Farias. She convinced Mexican federal officials to allow the migrant children to attend the Gomez Farias schools.

When the teacher returned, she helped establish in 1977 the Gomez Farias–Pajaro Valley Project, supported by the California Migrant Education Program. By 1978, SEP had established a special department "to support the education of Mexicans in the United States." Under the acronym MEDIR (Migrant Education Data International Record), the Pajaro Valley project spread to several other California districts and to other Mexican sender communities in Guanajuato, Monterrey, Jalisco, and Nuevo Leon. Along with local and California state funding, the project received grants from UNESCO and from the David and Lucille Packard Foundation. In 1982, the Binational Project between Michoacan and California was inaugurated.

By the late 1970s, the SEP had developed a pilot program with the California Department of Education for teachers and administrators. The program focused not only on Spanish but on Mexican history and culture. Literacy courses for Mexican adults in the U.S. were established and the practice of donating excess school textbooks for supplementary purposes became widespread. In 1979, summer courses for U.S. bilingual education teachers began to be offered in Oaxtepec, Mexico.

By the 1980s, the SEP had begun sending Mexican teachers to schools in Los Angeles and Chicago with large Hispanic populations lacking English. In 1982, with the support of the SEP, the Colegio de la Frontera Norte was opened in Tijuana. The Colegio now part of the University of the Northern Border, has become the leading center for the study of Mexican migration to the United States.

During the 1970s and '80s, there were "handsome U.S. budgets for bilingual education," creating a great demand for the services of the SEP. In California and other U.S. states, Spanish teaching methods were "antiquated." The SEP helped modernize instruction for Spanish-language teachers. Binational meetings and the formation of binational working groups became common. The SEP also imparted courses introducing "the world view" of Mexican culture, Mexican history, and regional Mexican differences. The courses explained the socioeconomic pressures leading Mexicans to emigrate.

The initial SEP programs and other initiatives suffered a setback after 1982, when a severe financial crisis (then becoming the rule in Mexico every six years) forced drastic budget reductions. It was not until the Salinas administration that the Mexican government was prepared to take another big step forward. But most of the SEP programs continued, though many on a reduced basis. Some individual state governments, most notably Zacatecas, began developing their own programs for their own immigrant populations.

In August 1990, the U.S. Department of Education and the Mexican SEP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on Education. The memorandum established closer U.S.-Mexican cooperation on education issues and programs within the already established framework of the United States/Mexico Binational Commission. The memorandum has been called "the most comprehensive agreement that the U.S. Department of Education has made with any nation." It contains an automatic provision for successive two-year extensions.

Proposition 227, the "English for the Children" ballot ini-
itive approved by California’s voters in June 1998, appears to have somewhat curtailed this extensive program. For the past three years, the courses in Oaxtepec have been suspended, though there are plans to resume them this year with students from Texas, Chicago, Wisconsin, and California.

Bilingual Education

_The Washington Post_ reports that “bilingual education has grown increasingly controversial in some portions of the country because immigrant students sometimes spend years speaking mostly their native language in special classes.” According to _The San Jose Mercury News_, limited-English students tested in the spring of 1999 “made more reading and math progress in elementary schools that switched from bilingual to English immersion than in schools where most students used waivers to stay in bilingual classes....Except for fourth-grade math, there was more progress in every grade in the English immersion schools.” Nonetheless, the PCME declares: “In education, the basic concept is that a full knowledge of Spanish constitutes the main instrument for learning a second language, in this case English.” Officials from the SEP and PCME, as well as many other Mexican officials with whom I talked, hold that Spanish instruction is essential for the education of Mexicans in the United States. They regard this as “scientifically proven” and not a matter of controversy. They cite “the studies of Fishman and Cummings and many others.”

The position of the U.S. Department of Education appears to coincide with that of the Mexican government. The website of the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Language Affairs states that “research over the last decade in bilingual classrooms with established models of instructional excellence indicates that utilization of and facility in the primary language enhances the acquisition of a second language.” But a comprehensive 1997 National Research Council report on the subject found most of the research supporting bilingual education unscientific and inconclusive.

In principle, the director of special programs at the SEP sees no reason why bilingual programs should be transitional at all. “They should go all the way to the university. The ideal would be for everyone to speak two languages, especially in a globalized world.” They perceive several advantages in bilingual education:

- A bilingual individual has a greater capacity for academic and general development.
- The bilingual student identifies with the Spanish-speaking teacher, thereby strengthening his own cultural roots and facilitating learning.
- A language is a window to a culture.
- Bilingual education preserves family values. Immigrant children who retain the mother tongue have stronger ties to their parents. This increases parental authority and decreases the sway of television, gangs, and drug traffickers. On the other hand, children who lose the mother tongue are more exposed to these noxious influences.

But Mexican officials stress that they do not see themselves as promoters of bilingual education in the United States, but rather as serving a demand that has its origin in local U.S. school systems or the federal educational apparatus of the United States. “We only come when we are invited,” the director of the PCME told me. One PCME official stressed that “bilingual education is a U.S. policy not a Mexican policy.” At the same time, PCME officials pointed to Mexican bilingual programs with indigenous peoples in Mexico.

In particular, PCME has concentrated its efforts on immigrants and children whose first need is to master Spanish in order to then learn a second language.” With the support of the states, Mexican _normalista_ teachers are sent to schools densely populated with Spanish monolingual students to act as low-paid assistants for short periods, usually during summer school for children needing special attention.

The PCME boasts of its strong ties with the National Association for Bilingual Education (NABE) and with state associations for bilingual education in California, Colorado, and Texas, as well as with the National Association of State Directors for Bilingual Education (NASDME). Since the formation of the PCME, Mexican government officials and educators have regularly made presentations at the annual NABE conference. In 1991, Mexican educators spoke on theories of bilingual education. At the 1992 conference, they introduced a new program of Spanish instruction. During the 1993 conference, forty specialists from twenty-five Mexican educational institutions organized displays and presented workshops on education in Mexico. By 2000, the Mexican presence was somewhat more modest. The main presentations were by PCME officials on their program objectives and on distance learning. The PCME is proud of Mexico’s having been awarded the NABE’s Presidential Prize for 1997 for its support of bilingual education in the U.S.

But there are critics. Jorge Amselle of the Center for Equal Opportunity in Washington, D.C., sees Mexico’s relationship with NABE as part of an effort to undermine California’s Proposition 227 against bilingual education. Amselle notes that Mexico has been an NABE “Gold Sponsor,” which involves a $10,000 donation, and purchases booths at NABE conferences to promote the PCME. Amselle argues that the PCME’s educational programs stress “the cultural identity of Hispanics” as against “academic basics” and form part of a sustained effort to “influence U.S. education policy at every level of government, making the assimilation of Hispanics in the United States that much more difficult.”

Though Mexican officials stress that assistance to U.S. educational programs is by invitation only, at least in some instances Mexico appears to initiate relations. In November 1999, the Consulate General of Mexico in New York, Ambassador Jorge Pinto, hosted a meeting whose purpose was to review the education of Mexican students in New York state. The meeting was attended by directors of bilingual and ESL (English as a Second Language) programs in New York school districts. Joining Ambassador Pinto in leading the event were Mrs. Carmen Perez Hogan, Coordinator of Bilingual Education for the New York State Education Department, and Assemblyman Peter Rivera. The meeting featured a profile of New York students with Mexican backgrounds, an examination of the problems that Mexican and Mexican-American students face in the U.S. educational system, an overview of
education in Mexico, and a description of the education programs offered by the Mexican consulate. The meeting followed by a one-day conference in April 2000 in New York city—in which the SEP, the PCME, and the Mexican Office for Hispanic Affairs participated along with New York's state education authorities. At the conference, a series of education agreements between New York state and Mexico was announced.

On the website of the Texas Education Agency (TEA), the Mexican consulate lists programs “supporting bilingual education.” The website states:

The U.S.-Mexico Teacher Exchange Program is sponsored by Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Binational Program of Migrant Education, Mexico's Secretariat of Public Education, and the governments of several states and localities with a high rate of emigration. The Teacher Exchange Program cordially invites bilingual teachers in the U.S. and U.S. school districts with high immigrant student populations to participate in this program.

It certainly appears to be the case that, as the website goes on to state, the Mexican program was developed by Mexico “to help meet the demand for bilingual teachers in school districts with a large immigrant population.” Moreover, the Dallas Morning News reports that the 120 Mexican teachers participating in exchange programs in the United States in the summer of 1999 were all “directly solicited by U.S. schools that see them as an asset.” Yet it is equally clear that Mexico invites school districts to participate in the program.

### Immersion Courses for Bilingual Teachers in the U.S. and Teacher Exchange Programs

Leaders and members of Mexican hometown associations frequently complained to me of the low quality or incompetence of bilingual education teachers. Advocates of bilingual education acknowledge that “well-prepared bilingual teachers, resources and materials are in short supply.” The National Association of Bilingual Education estimated in 1994 that the United States needed 175,000 more certified teachers than are currently available. One 1993 study found that only 10 percent of the country’s 360,000 teachers providing bilingual instruction were credentialed bilingual teachers and only a third had ever taken a college course on “culture, language acquisition, or teaching English to limited-English proficient (LEP) students.”

It was in the light of these facts that the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Language Affairs (OBLEMA) embarked upon a binational effort to increase the number of qualified bilingual teachers and to help other teachers serve LEP students to learn Spanish and increase their knowledge of the history and culture of students of Mexican origin. Much of this work is being done with the Mexican Secretariat of Education.

The Mexican government agrees:

The training of bilingual teachers who serve children of Mexican origin in the U.S. is one of the most effective ways of contributing to the raising of living standards of our countrymen in that country. It is in the national interest of Mexico as well as the U.S. that bilingual teachers possess the best possible tools for dealing with the particular needs of our immigrants' children, especially with respect to a better knowledge of Spanish and of Mexican culture, as well as the mastery of technical-pedagogical questions related to the cultural and cognitive characteristics of Mexican children.

The PCME, in partnership with the Universidad Pedagógica Nacional (UPN), the SEP, and the Binational Program for Migrant Education (PROBEM), has collaboratively designed four training courses taught by Mexican instructors for bilingual teachers in United States school districts. The courses "seek to support bilingual teachers in improving their Spanish skills, increasing their knowledge of Mexican history and culture, as well as increasing their understanding of the special situation of Mexican and Mexican-American children and youth that have been relocated to the United States."

They include a basic Spanish course, an intermediate Spanish course with emphasis on Mexican expressions, a course on “Mexican Culture and Civilization,” and a course on classroom interaction in bilingual and bicultural environments. In the culture and civilization course, “students will engage pre-Columbian cultures, the Conquest, the Colonial period, the process of integration, the Liberal Republic, the ‘Porfiriato,’ the post-revolutionary system, and the Mexican influence in the United States, among other subjects.” These four courses are offered by the UPN to U.S. teachers who teach children of Mexican origin. Six hundred teachers have taken some twenty-five courses. Each course consists of five sessions of six hours each, in Spanish, for a total of thirty hours of instruction. Courses are offered at all times of the year also at Mexican cultural institutions and centers. They require sixty days advance notice.

The PCME also supervises the Teacher Exchange Program, which has involved 450 Mexican teachers and 50 U.S. teachers. The stated purpose of this program is to “contribute to the strengthening of the national history, values and traditions in students of Mexican origin,” as well as to promote a “permanent communication” between Mexican and U.S. teachers so as to improve teaching and learning on both the primary and secondary school levels. These exchanges usually last from four to six weeks. Teachers are chosen on the basis of their interest and proficiency; there is no official preference given to those of Mexican descent. In a second phase, teachers from the United States come to Mexico for unspecified periods—usually a week or two—to get to know the regions from which some of their immigrant students hail.

Mexican teachers in this program are expected “to know the history, traditions and culture of Mexico.” U.S. teachers should “be willing to collaborate with Mexico regarding the exchange of teaching and learning methodologies” and “to work … to further his/her knowledge of the culture and traditions of Mexican children and teenagers.” The activities undertaken by the Mexican teachers include “workshops about Mexican history, traditions and culture and self-esteem and identity of the Mexican or Mexican-American students.”

The state of Guanajuato receives U.S. teachers of Mexican students in the summer and sends Mexican teachers to U.S. school districts. The U.S. teachers receive Spanish-language training and courses in Mexican culture and history and observe Mexican classrooms to acquaint themselves with the idiosyncrasies of Mexican children. The Mexican teachers and...
administrators are exposed to advanced professional techniques in the U.S., such as how to cope with different age groups in one classroom, though transferring these techniques to one-room rural school houses in Guanajuato is no simple matter.199

The SEP has extensive contracts with school districts in various states of the U.S., most extensively in California. Because of the deficit of Spanish-competent teachers for the many bilingual education programs in the U.S., there is a considerable demand for Mexican teachers. Those who have studied English may spend two to three years in the U.S. as bilingual education teachers. SEP tries to find teachers from the same states and regions as the Mexican students they will be teaching (thus, teachers from Zacatecas will go to a particular locality in Los Angeles).190

The teacher exchanges are frequently financed by U.S. foundations. For example, the North Carolina Center for International Understanding has Ford Foundation funding for a program that brings Mexican teachers to North Carolina.191 North Carolina is one of several states that have acquired large Mexican populations rapidly over the past several years.

Arkansas is another, and last summer it hosted ten Mexican teachers. One of them worked in the small (population 2000) rural community of Green Forest set in the Ozark Mountains. Seven years ago, Green Forest had its first Spanish-speaking student. Now 15 percent of its schoolchildren are Spanish speakers. In kindergarten and first grade, the number is 25 percent. The Mexican government sent textbooks along with the teacher. The school’s principal said the school is trying “to think a generation ahead” as migrants who once swept in and out with the crops now sink roots to work in the burgeoning chicken-processing industry.192

Adult Education

Mexico’s National Institute of Adult Education (INEA) has given literacy training in Spanish, but not in English, to more than 8000 Mexicans in the U.S. The INEA works with the Mexican consulates and has offered ninety-two-language training courses for some 2062 instructors.193 INEA offers courses to train instructors in teaching adult immigrants how to read and write in Spanish and to help teachers of adult immigrants who are completing their elementary or secondary school under the Mexican open system. Mexico provides free textbooks and materials for literacy and elementary school programs, and the INEA charges only a nominal fee for the secondary school materials.

The purposes of this program include: to supply elementary educational tools to immigrants; to increase their self-esteem and their pride in their culture of origin; to strengthen their parental capacity to contribute to the education of their children; and to improve the mastery of the mother tongue so as to help in the learning of English as a second language.194 (This program rests on the assumption that mastery of Spanish will facilitate learning English.)

Many of the Mexican cultural institutes and centers offer Spanish-language classes. Leaders of the HTAs say that these classes are most relevant and useful for illiterate or semiliterate adults and adolescents.195

Transfer Documents for Binational Migrant Students

A major concern in migrant families is ensuring the continuity of their children’s education, given their mobile lifestyle.196 A binational program was originally established by the Migrant Education Program of the California Department of Education. It currently operates as part of the U.S. Department of Education’s Migrant Education Program. As of 1996, a binational commission included representatives from the Mexican SEP, all Mexican states, and some ten U.S. states.197

One of the primary purposes of this commission has been the development of a “Transfer Document for Binational Migrant Students.” The document, a kind of binational report card, contains demographic and educational information (subjects studied, grades) on binational students that is intended to support continuity of schooling experiences as Mexican students migrate between U.S. and Mexican schools on an annual basis. In recent years, the Mexican federal government has adopted the initiative of a number of states and promoted the Transfer Document for migrant students.198 The Transfer Document is printed by the SEP and distributed to state and district offices throughout Mexico and to consulates in the United States.199 The Binational Program for Migrant Education (PROBEM) has conferred 160,000 Transfer Documents to allow students to continue their studies while migrating.200 The PROBEM is run by the SRE, through the PCME, with the support of the SEP and the representatives of the SEP in the diverse federated states of the Mexican union as well as their U.S. counterparts.

Distribution of Free Textbooks

The Mexican government has a vast and active program for the distribution of textbooks. The provision of free textbooks is inscribed as a right by the Mexican Constitution. To combat domestic criticism that Mexican resources are being donated to America, Mexican officials emphasize that the books come from domestic surpluses.

The PCME states that “the program is intended to provide support materials for students in the US who speak only Spanish and to help US students who are learning Spanish as a second language.”201 Libraries, schools, and educational institutions that serve Mexican or Spanish-speaking patrons are eligible to receive donated textbooks. In order to receive books, eligible institutions must cover part of the expense for shipping the books from a port of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border to their final destination in the U.S. The Mexican government will provide the books free of charge and will transport them as far as the U.S.-Mexico border.202 And Mexican consulates “in major cities all across the United States have supplies of Mexican textbooks and other materials to assist in the education of Mexican migrant and immigrant children and adults.”203 In 1998, 307,000 books were distributed to U.S. schools and libraries to be used as, officials emphasize, “supplementary material.”204 A list of titles is available on-line at <www.tea.state.tx.us/resources/us-mex/textbooks.html>.

Distance Learning

In the exploratory stage is the adaptation of an SEP program
Education is not the only area where the PCME, HTAs, and other actors play an important role for U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans. Some of these other areas are discussed in this chapter.

Culture
The PCME wishes to promote knowledge of Mexican history, traditions, and culture in order to “reaffirm the identity of Mexican communities abroad” as well as to preserve the celebration of Mexican civic and popular holidays.354 PCME’s cultural program seeks to make immigrants and Mexican Americans “proud of their roots.”359

The PCME works with the forty-two Mexican consulates and twenty-three cultural institutes and centers to present expositions, exhibitions, concerts, readings, seminars, and the like. Since 1997, a children’s drawing contest entitled “This Is My Mexico” has been organized in the U.S. for children between 7 and 13 years old. The purpose of the competition is to “stir pride in our roots among children from Mexico and of Mexican origin who live in the U.S.”360

The PCME has used culture in its attempt to reconfigure Mexico’s relations with Mexican Americans. In one of its first major cultural initiatives, the PCME sponsored a photographic exhibition in California called “Mexican Faces in California.” The exhibit showed that, in appreciating the Mexican communities in the U.S., “artists have been way ahead of us,” according to Roger Diaz de Cossio, the PCME’s first director. According to the Los Angeles Times, the exhibition portrayed its subjects as “Americanized … but with clear links to Mexican culture.”361

The exhibition was timed to coincide with the awarding of Mexico’s highest honor, the Mexican Order of the Aztec Eagle, to three Mexican Americans: Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina; Texas politician, and later Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Henry Cisneros; and Raul Yzaguirre, president of the National Council of La Raza. For the third year in a row, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari presented the award to Mexican Americans whom the government considers defenders of the culture and human rights of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States (and who were helpful in getting NAFTA passed).

Sports
The PCME focuses its attention on sports, not so much for their own sake, but because they are “one of the most appropriate ways to reach the family and at the same time foment communal activity and to foster community organization.”362 Mexican consuls for community affairs and community liaison officers in Mexican cultural centers and institutes keep in touch with the Mexican-immigrant soccer leagues that often spawn hometown associations.

The PCME collaborates with the Mexican National Sports Commission (CONADE) in organizing various sporting events in the U.S. and Mexico. A major effort is the Copa Mexico national soccer tournament, which involves as many as 20,000 Mexican and Mexican-origin players in the U.S. The winners of the regional competitions and the national champion come to play in Mexico, where they are received by the state sporting institutes.363 The PCME has facilitated the participation of a Mexican-American delegation to three Youth Olympics in Mexican cities in which 399 athletes from twenty-two cities have taken part.364

Health
Mexican illegal immigrants often do not make use of U.S. public health services. This highly stressed and overworked population is therefore especially vulnerable to disease. The PCME health programs focus mainly on tuberculosis, diabetes, heart
disease, and mental health, as well as AIDS, alcoholism, substance abuse, and tobacco addiction.  

U.S. academic research would seem to confirm the relevance of not only these programs, but also of social clubs, to good health. A 1984 study of Mexican immigrants, native-born Mexican Americans, and non-Spanish whites found that a pervasive sense of cultural heritage was positively related to mental health and social well-being among both immigrants and native Mexican-Americans. Similar studies of Mexican farmworkers and women immigrants showed similar results. Various studies have shown the importance of "co-ethnic networks"—the presence or absence of friends and kin—as major predictors of depression. On the other hand, studies appear to indicate that alcohol and drug abuse increases with acculturation or "Americanization." These studies conclude that "the best way of dealing with the challenge of acculturation is apparently to balance its progress with a parallel reaffirmation of primary social ties within the ethnic community." This is part of a larger argument for "ethnic resilience" and the relevance of ethnic communities in making for a healthy gradual transition to American life. The classic study is Nathan Glazer's and Daniel Moynihan's Beyond the Melting Pot. 

The main activities of the PCME health programs have included the distribution of informational posters and folders in Spanish about the prevention of AIDS and tuberculosis as well as addictions, domestic violence, and diabetes; Spanish radio spots; an 800 number for health problems; the presentation of two traveling expositions on AIDS; seminars on AIDS and tuberculosis prevention, which have been presented to some 630 U.S. health professionals; seminars on "psychosocial aspects of immigrant life," which have been held for various groups, including INS agents and local U.S. police; and a pilot program, "Binational Interchange of Health Professionals," usually on a state-to-state basis, with the participation of forty-two health professionals. 

The Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) offers a Family Health Policy to Mexican workers in the United States. The central objective of the policy is to provide insurance to cover the medical necessities of workers’ families left in Mexico and to workers when they return to Mexico. 

Business
The principal aim of the business activities of the PCME is to provide links in the Mexican and Hispanic business communities, especially among small and medium entrepreneurs. The main work is conducted through the Council for the Promotion of Business with the Mexican and Hispanic Communities, which was created by the PCME in 1991. The Council is presided over by the Ministry of Foreign Relations (SRE) and includes the main Mexican participants in U.S.-Mexican commercial relations, such as the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, the Mexican National Development Bank (NAFIN), the National Bank for Foreign Trade, the Mexican Investment Bank, the Ministries of the Treasury, Tourism, Trade, and Industry; major banks, and so forth. 

In 1992, the Council established a "Hispanic Reserve" together with, among others, NAFIN, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, and NCLR. The project included an initial fund to promote joint ventures between Mexican and Mexican-American entrepreneurs and was billed as a "historic" agreement. Mexican-American investors are encouraged to apply for funds from the Hispanic Reserve, which sets aside $20 million annually. Preference is given to those working with Mexican partners. This program does not, however, seem to have attracted much interest. 

The Council also participates in conventions with Hispanic chambers of commerce in the U.S. It has organized two reunions of the business forum Acercaamiento al Mercado Hispano de Estados Unidos, where some 800 entrepreneurs, business representatives, and students met. Though the PCME wishes to focus on a niche of small and medium Hispanic businesses, this does not appear to be a very dynamic sector for PCME’s work. Hispanic and Mexican-American business groups were hostile to the formation of NAFTA because they feared Mexican competition. Moreover, they have apparently been slow to take advantage of Mexican offers of preferential treatment to Hispanic investors. According to Rodulfo de la Garza, there has been a “faulty assumption that cultural similarities would facilitate Mexican-American business relations.” Paradoxically, these Hispanic links fared better before NAFTA removed barriers to trade and investment. The utility of Mexican-American intermediaries familiar with the Mexican market declined as Mexican and American firms got used to dealing with one another directly. 

San Antonio has an especially active “Association of Mexican Entrepreneurs” that has been fostered by the consulate. It sponsors commercial and educational projects. Hometown associations also participate in business ventures. Every summer, the Sinoloa Brotherhood of California (La Fraternidad Sinolense de California) federation of Sinoloa HTAs, hosts a “mini expo” that features both cultural performances and products from Sinoloa (beer, coffee, canned goods, handicrafts, etc.). It is cosponsored by the Public Relations Department of the state of Sinoloa.

Awards
From its inception in 1990, the PCME has worked to see that Mexico's highest honor, the Order of the Aztec Eagle, was awarded by its president to leaders of prominent Mexican-American organizations. In addition to those mentioned above (see page 28), Antonia Hernandez, the president and general counsel of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), was given the award by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1991. Since 1995, the SRE, through the PCME, has granted the “Ohtli” award to Americans, usually Mexican Americans, who have worked to benefit the Mexican community. The award means “path” in Nahuatl, the Aztecs’ language. In January 2000, the award was given to Ruben Zacarias, the former Superintendent of the Los Angeles Unified School District whose ouster in the fall of 1999 angered many in the Latino community and remains an issue in Los Angeles politics. It was the third time the honor has been given by the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles. 

The PCME has awarded five “Bilingual Teacher of the Year” citations to people nominated by U.S. bilingual organizations. It also awards citations for outstanding athletes and entrepreneurs in the U.S. Mexican community.
One of the most interesting aspects regarding the role of Mexican-American and U.S. Mexican organizations—like HTAs—is the extent to which they influence Mexican domestic policy, just as there are undeniably attempts by Mexico to influence these organizations. This mutual political influence and related issues are the focus of this chapter.

**Outreach to Mexican-American Leaders and Organizations**

Mexican officials are well aware of the increasingly “prominent position” of the Mexican-American, Hispanic, and Latino communities in the United States, “a position,” Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce told the National Council of La Raza in 1997, “that should only be better and more influential in the future.” As President Zedillo suggests, Mexico’s courting of Mexican-American groups is a long-term, strategic effort. It derives from two unambiguous demographic realities: The U.S.-born children of U.S. Mexicans are by law American citizens, and Mexican Americans enjoy population growth rates well above the national average. Thus, even in the unlikely case that Mexican immigration continues at these high levels for another generation, Mexican Americans will greatly outnumber U.S. Mexicans. Mexican Americans compose nearly two-thirds of the Latino population, and their share is growing (see Tables 2, 3, 7, 9). The U.S. Census Bureau’s flat-line projection tells us that every fourth American will be a Latino by the year 2050—and more than two-thirds of them will be Mexican Americans (see Tables 9, 10). If the German, Irish, Italians, Poles, Jews, and many other American immigrant groups have sought political influence at first by forming ethnic alliances, it is only natural to expect the largest and potentially most powerful immigrant group to do the same. Demography, history, and politics all instruct Mexico that its relation with Mexican Americans is important. But that hardly means that the relation is straightforward or simple.

At the outset, Mexican officials saw their relations with Mexican-American organizations as a way to counteract negative publicity in the U.S. As a high-ranking foreign ministry official told the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) in 1990, they thought that:

> Through Chicanos, it will be possible to transmit a more accurate image of the Mexicans which states with fairness the accomplishments of the government and its efforts to overcome ancient problems, including the risks of modernization. This is the case of drug trafficking and extreme poverty. 387

The Mexican consul in Los Angeles, Jose Luis Bernal, acknowledges that the PCME was formed with “the implicit idea” of creating a Mexican lobby modeled on “the Jewish lobby.” 388 Andres Rozental, who directed U.S. relations for the Salinas administration, acknowledged to me that such an idea “was in the air.” 389

The PCME began to host board members of leading U.S. Hispanic and Mexican-American organizations such as NCLR, LULAC, the American GI Forum, the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP), and MALDEF. These organizations now hold an annual meeting in Mexico at the invitation of the federal government. They meet with top Mexican government officials who brief them on “the achievements of the current administration.” They are customarily received by the President of Mexico.

Since 1997, the PCME has been holding informational meetings about Mexico (Jornadas Informativas sobre Mexico) for Mexican-American leaders. Some thirty federal, state, and country officials have been invited each year to Mexico to become acquainted with the Mexican perspective on Mexican-U.S. relations and to learn about human rights, election processes, and the economic situation in Mexico. 390

Mexican-American organizations such as Teatro Campesino, United Farm Workers, LULAC, NALEO, and NCLR have all worked with the PCME. 392 Representatives of NCLR, LULAC, the American GI Forum, NABE, the National Clearinghouse for Bilingual Education, the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, and the Intercultural Development Research Association (IDRA) sit on the board of the Mexican government-funded Mexican and American Solidarity Foundation. This is a private, nonprofit organization that promotes ties between Mexico and U.S. Latinos, especially Mexican Americans. The Foundation sponsors seminars for activists from U.S. Latino organizations to acquaint them with Mexico and is led by the first director of the PCME. 393 The Foundation also has on its board representatives of the Mexican foreign and education ministries (SRE and SEP).

The PCME has achieved steady and close relations with the leading Mexican-American organizations. These advocacy
groups often help to fund and sponsor the Mexican government programs, as do American governments (the U.S. Department of Education and many municipal, county, and state organs). These parties differ on occasion but generally agree on such issues as immigration, bilingual education, affirmative action, welfare rights, and voting rights.

A 1994 *Los Angeles Times* article, describing a meeting between the personal emissary of the Mexican presidential candidate and Mexican-American leaders, envisioned the latter becoming "a lobbying force and conduit for Mexican interests and concerns." In 1995, *The Dallas Morning News* reported that the recently inaugurated President Zedillo told a private meeting of Hispanic leaders "that his goal is to develop a close relationship between his government and Mexican-Americans, one in which they could be called upon to lobby U.S. policy-makers on economic and political issues involving the United States and Mexico."

De la Garza believes that the PCME may have laid the foundations for an ethnic lobby through the relationship it has established with Mexican American elites, especially the leaders of organizations such as the Hispanic chambers of commerce, the National Council of La Raza, and the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project. [The PCME] has courted and worked with these groups to organize and host a variety of activities including junkets to Mexico.

Some Mexican officials appear to envision the Mexican rapprochement with Mexican-American organizations as a way of influencing U.S. policy on bilateral issues (such as drug certification and immigration) and even on some domestic issues (affirmative action, bilingual education, welfare rights, voting rights). A former Mexican press attache in Mexico’s Atlanta consulate has written that “the strategic long-range importance of the communities of Mexican origin in the U.S. will be their influence in the internal and international policy of the U.S. that affects Mexico and the Mexicans.” He advocates that the Mexican-born should be “lobbyists for Mexican interests in the decision-making process of the U.S.”

Most Mexican officials deny that the PCME is designed to convert Mexican immigrants or Mexican Americans into their allies. De la Garza says, however, that “Mexican officials deny that they are pursuing an ethnic lobby when they address non-Hispanic American audiences but indicate that they seek such a relationship in meetings limited to or dominated by Mexican Americans.”

Certainly when talking with me Mexican officials appeared to approach the subject gingerly. As mentioned, the founder of the PCME (now no longer a government official) acknowledged that forming a lobby was an original objective of the PCME but carefully denied it was a “government plan”—a puzzling distinction since the PCME is a government program. As mentioned, the Mexican consul in Los Angeles was careful to say that the formation of a lobby was only an “implicit” objective of the PCME. Ambassador Rozental acknowledges only that “there were some people” in the government who wished the PCME “to generate something like an Israeli lobby.”

At first blush, the skittishness of Mexican officials over the term “lobby” is puzzling. After all, Japan, another major U.S. trade partner, is well known for its lobbying efforts and seems to make no bones about them. Israel, with a large and active ethnic constituency, has a renowned Washington lobby. But the size of the Mexican ethnic presence, its fledgling political status plus the importance for Mexico of its relationship with the United States, and the relative newness of its improved standing, help to explain the hesitancy of Mexican officials to refer openly to an ethnic lobby.

Moreover, Ambassador Bernal stresses that the initial PCME project took for granted “the homogeneity of the Mexican community.” Mexican officials say that experience has taught them to recognize the independence and heterogeneity of the Mexican diaspora and the “variance of interests and opinions” between Hispanic and Mexican-American organizations, on the one hand, and those of Mexico, on the other. Bernal and others likewise emphasize the divergence of interests between recently arrived immigrants (3 million of whom have reached California in the last decade) and “the Mexican American or Hispanic or Latino establishment.”

The learning curve led to a “change of goals and instruments.” In addition, Bernal acknowledges the “resentment” felt by many immigrants toward the Mexican government, yet it is the hometown associations that nonetheless occupy the bulk of the consulate’s community liaison.

As for the Mexican-American organizations, De la Garza considers them “a tenuous foundation” for any Mexican lobby. “There is no doubt that the heads of these organizations are the most visible spokespersons for Mexican Americans.” De la Garza writes:

Nonetheless, these organizations are not widely recognized or supported by the Mexican American community … and there is no evidence that they have the capacity to influence Mexican American opinion or mobilize them to action.

Peter Skerry points to MALDEF as “the quintessential example” of the modern post-sixties “association without members,” to use the phrase of Harvard political scientist Theda Skocpol. Skerry writes nonetheless that MALDEF’s claim to represent all Mexican Americans—indeed all Latinos—is widely and routinely accepted. The organization, which has ten regional offices around the country, is widely recognized for its paramount role in *Plyer v. Doe*, the 1982 Supreme Court decision constitutionally requiring Texas schools to educate the foreign-born children of illegal immigrants, as well as for its prominent role in the promotion of voting rights and affirmative-action suits and its opposition to various California ballot initiatives affecting Latinos. “Yet MALDEF,” Skerry continues,

is not a membership organization. It has no members whatsoever in the communities it purports to represent, and therefore no real bonds of accountability to those communities. It gets most of its funding from a few corporations and large foundations, in particular the Ford Foundation, which played the critical role in establishing the organization in the late 1960’s.

The case of La Raza is more complex, for it has more than 230 “local affiliates,” which its literature describes as “non-profit Hispanic, community-based organizations.” NLCR is run by its board of directors, however, and the local affiliates do not elect the board. In the view of Peter Skerry, both groups help make up a politics of “elite networks” whose base of support is not their “weak community ties” but “a process of specialization and professionalization by which politics become more and more an insiders’ game.”
That Mexico has friends who play and win at this game is surely an asset when what Hugh Heclo has described as “issue networks” play such an important role in Washington politics. But these networks “of proto-bureaucracies … interlaced with loose personal associations” are composed of inside operators rather than politicians with mass constituencies.\(^{411}\)

In the case of Mexican-American officeholders who do respond to mass constituencies, their power is more likely to be exercised on behalf of their U.S. electorate rather than Mexico. De la Garza cites the actions of Texas Attorney General Dan Morales and Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña in the controversy over NAFTA’s provisions allowing Mexican trucks to operate in the U.S. The former led opposition to the trucks, and the decision to postpone their entry was taken by Peña “over the protests of Mexican officials.”\(^{412}\) George Grayson, a Virginia state legislator who has written widely on Mexican-U.S. affairs, says that, despite the efforts mounted for NAFTA, the combination of Mexican Americans’ low incomes, modest educational levels, leadership conflicts, below-average voter registration, and ambivalence toward their homeland suggest that many years will pass before Chicanos play for Mexico the same role in influencing U.S. policy that Jews fill for Israel or Greek Americans do for Greece.\(^{413}\)

At the same time, Grayson points out that Mexico enjoys broad support from the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, created in 1976 to advance the agenda of Hispanic-American legislators. More than two-thirds of its members are of Mexican descent, and the Caucus “closely shadows Mexico City’s line respecting questions of immigration, human rights and drug enforcement sanctions.”\(^{414}\) Nonetheless, one-third of the caucus voted against NAFTA.\(^{415}\)

De la Garza questions “why Mexico needs an ethnic lobby” at all considering the intimate relationship “that now exists between the Mexican and U.S. governments.”\(^{416}\) NAFTA, the Clinton 1995 economic “bailout” package, and the repeated “certification” of Mexican cooperation with U.S. antinarcotics efforts are examples of this collaboration, which extends to a wide range of policies and areas.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, Mexico had dropped its reluctance to lobby Washington. That policy had been part of a hands-off approach that Mexican officials argued was part of a general commitment to nonintervention. Until then, Mexican officials argued that if they did not seek to intervene in U.S. affairs, the U.S. would be less likely to intervene in Mexican affairs. (To some in Washington this principle eroded when Mexico signed a 1981 agreement with France recognizing the Salvadoran revolutionaries. But Mexico’s activist Central American policies were pursued in the name of nonintervention, with the United States considered the representative interventionist. Mexico’s capacity for Central American activism was in any event weakened by the 1982 debt crisis and subsequently subsided as Mexico began to look to the U.S. economy for relief.)

Between 1985 and 1991, Mexico’s lobbying representation in Washington leaped from two minor contracts totaling $67,229 to more than a dozen contracts worth more than $9 million.\(^{417}\) The Salinas administration, which founded the PCME program, also opened a spanking new $16 million embassy complex three blocks from the White House.\(^{418}\) Mexico began to seek out “U.S. allies through which it could pressure the U.S. Congress.”\(^{419}\) The chief confederates were special interests and major businesses, with the U.S. Latino community bringing up the rear.

Mexico’s Congressional efforts reached a high-water mark in 1993 during the NAFTA debate, when its lobbying expenditures outstripped all but a few perennial-champion foreign lobbyists, such as Japan, Canada, Great Britain, and West Germany.\(^{420}\) Mexico mobilized its forty-two consulates and the PCME.\(^{421}\) It chose a lead agency for lobbying Congress—the Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI)—which organized a polished campaign that combined powerful Washington lobbying firms with a three-pronged grassroots effort. Washington insiders hired by Mexico included William R. Brock, the U.S. Trade Representative in the Reagan administration; Burson-Marsteller, a top Washington public relations firm; as well as Steptoe & Johnson and Shearman & Sterling, two leading Washington law firms.\(^{422}\) Opponents of NAFTA, such as Charles Lewis of the Center for Public Integrity, and Ross Perot, suggested that Mexico was “trying to buy the treaty.”\(^{423}\)

The grassroots interest-group mobilization pulled together Latino organizations, border region communities, and the pro-NAFTA U.S. business coalition.\(^{424}\) Todd A. Eisenstadt writes that, to complement its investment in Washington insiders, SECOFI retained several freelance Latino lobbyists, including two Hispanic former New Mexico governors, who were asked to persuade Hispanic interest groups to pressure the U.S. Congress. “The Mexican agents’ efforts in the [border] regions and in the Latino community” apparently had “a broad catalyzing impact.”\(^{425}\) Among the Hispanic groups enlisted were MALDEF, NALEO, the Hispanic National Bar Association, and LULAC. With the support of the PCME, NCLR and the National Hispanic Chamber of Commerce organized junkets to Mexico.\(^{426}\)

As an early convert to NAFTA, the NCLR frequently brokered relations between the Mexican government’s lobbying campaign and Mexican-American and Hispanic organizations. “The NCLR … took delegations of Chicano/Latino business, community and media representatives to meet with their counterparts in Mexico City” to win support for the agreement. NCLR president Raul Yzaguirre explained that Mexican Americans “must be players [on NAFTA]. Hispanics must learn how to make our presence felt.”\(^{427}\)

But De la Garza points out that only a modest portion of Mexico’s handsome investment in the NAFTA lobby went to Hispanic lobbyists, and but five of thirty major lobbyists involved with NAFTA were Hispanics. Of them, only two reported that their major task was to influence Hispanics.\(^{428}\) Moreover, whereas the Mexican government was interested in attracting foreign investment, the Hispanic organizations thought the proposed NAFTA agreement was slanted toward business interests and was insufficiently protective of labor and the environment. The main Hispanic organizations sided with NAFTA’s critics on those issues, ended up supporting the Clinton administration’s negotiating position, and conditioned support for NAFTA on Mexico making concessions. Hispanic groups also argued variously that NAFTA should encourage immigration, bolster border controls, and ban guest-worker programs. Mexico, fearful of jeopardizing the agreement, preferred to skirt those sensitive issues.\(^{429}\)
Hispanic elected officials were similarly refractory. For example, to secure the vote of California Representative Esteban Torres, the administration accepted the idea of a North American Development Bank. The administration hoped that others in the House would follow Torres, but this proposal secured only one vote—or, as one leader said, “One man, one bank.”

The Hispanic Caucus eventually split over NAFTA, with nine members voting in favor, eight against. Though all but two Mexican-American members of Congress ended up voting for NAFTA, the majority complied only after securing side agreements to meet constituent concerns.

Mexico’s endeavors to marshal Mexican-American elites have been deemed of only “marginal significance to NAFTA’s enactment.” Indeed, “there is no evidence … that Mexican-American members of Congress voted for NAFTA because of Mexican lobbying or because they supported Mexican interests.” De la Garza, Eisenstadt, and Grayson appear to regard the Mexican effort as a superfluous and wasteful “overkill.” Grayson says that Mexican officials “quickly learned that U.S. lawmakers respond most briskly to contacts from constituents, not to entreaties from foreign governments.”

The entire Mexican and U.S. business NAFTA campaign fell shy until President Bill Clinton weighed in with an extensive lobbying effort of his own, featuring a broad array of “pork barrel projects.” The latter provided members of Congress with political protection on a controversial vote. “Yet, once the Clinton administration got its act together, it won going away.”

But Mexican officials point out that, while the Clinton administration had many other priorities in 1993, including organizing itself in its opening year, for Mexico NAFTA was an issue “of life and death.” They believe that Mexico played a crucial role until the Clinton administration got itself organized.

In all events, the Mexican effort was not only unprecedented but so far unique. Mexico does not appear to have been able to afford to sustain such a high level of expenditure. Now “the ambassador and government officials shoulder most of the burdens of lobbying the U.S. Congress.” While Grayson argues that the NAFTA experience served Mexican officials by “developing and honing their skills for future use,” Mexico did not mount any real effort for the bailout, perhaps because it would have been counterproductive.

Nothing remotely similar to the NAFTA drive was launched in opposition to the 1996 immigration reform or in the annual battles over “certifying” Mexico’s cooperation with U.S. antinarcotics efforts (although the Mexican Embassy devotes itself to this issue for a month), but then neither of these has been matters of “life and death.”

The Mexican government did back efforts to defeat Proposition 187, the 1994 California ballot initiative limiting immigrant access to public facilities. In part the government was responding to domestic political pressures in the form of a torrent of protests in the national media and demonstrations in Mexico City, Tijuana, and other cities. The Mexican Foreign Ministry’s official responsible for the U.S., Andres Rozental, was placed in a delicate situation, as his statement to the Los Angeles Times indicates: “Without interfering with the United States, the government of Mexico will work actively to prevent the passage of the anti-immigration initiative 187.” Besides issuing several strong public statements of opposition, Mexican foreign service officials met with organizations opposed to the ballot initiative.

In his interview with the Times, “Rozental stopped short of detailing what, if any, money his government has devoted to the cause but made clear that Mexico is supporting groups in the United States working to defeat Prop. 187.” He added:

Mexico will participate with organizations, associations and human rights groups to bring down this proposition…. We have media campaign strategies to inform the entire California electorate of the contributions that Mexicans have made and continue to make to this state, so that no one will go away with the idea that we are responsible for the costs and problems of the state.”

Mexican-American activists do not consider Mexico’s efforts opposing Proposition 187 to have been effective. To the contrary, many feel that the identification of the opposition with Mexico—an impression heavily reinforced by the multitude of Mexican flags brandished by demonstrators—doomed opposition efforts. One observer notes that Mexican efforts to coordinate with advocacy groups “do not seem to [have been] followed up since then.” Apparently, however, some officials wish their government to become more active. Citing fears that other states would follow the lead of California and initiate legislation unfavorable to Mexican immigrants, a group of career Foreign Service officials circulated a memorandum urging the government to “engage in lobbying activities to influence U.S. decisions on immigration, following the model implemented … in the case of NAFTA.” Since Proposition 187, however, the Mexican government has preferred to trust its U.S. allies to handle similar U.S. domestic issues.

Lobbying for NAFTA and against Proposition 187 were singular events that seemed to call for exceptional efforts, but rapprochement with Mexican-American and Latino organizations is an ongoing and extended project. The PCME “dedicates itself to close observation of local leaders and non-government organizations with which it should consult continuously over what course to follow.” Mexican government officials and government organizations such as the PCME enjoy warm relations with some Mexican-American organizations, especially NCLR. LULAC is probably the next in importance for the PCME, followed by MALDEF and NABE. The PCME also tries to maintain warm relations with the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), the Southwest Voters Representation and Education Project (SVRREP), and the American GI Forum.

U.S. nongovernment organizations (NGOs) often fund and sponsor the Mexican government programs, as do sections of the American government (the U.S. Department of Education and many municipal, county, and state organs). The more active partners appear to be the U.S. side, but both parties share a political and sociological perspective on such issues as immigration, bilingual education, affirmative action, welfare, voting rights.

It is not at all clear that these perspectives are shared by the HTAs or even by the bulk of Mexican Americans. As the Binational Study on Migration reports,

Survey work has shown that very few Mexican Americans or Mexican migrants believe that they have been victimized by racism or discrimination. Mexican Americans seem eager to embrace a meritocratic vision of American society. While Mexican Americans in the U.S. Congress tend to find common ground with black congressional leaders...
such black-Mexican coalitions have proved much harder to create or sustain.\textsuperscript{433}

On the issue that most intimately affects Mexico and Mexican Americans, immigration, Mexico and Mexican Americans remain as far apart as ever. Various surveys have found that Mexican Americans view illegal migration in particular very unfavorably. The Latino National Political Survey conducted in 1989-90 found that 83.6 percent of Mexican Americans surveyed agreed or strongly agreed with the view that “there are too many immigrants.”\textsuperscript{434} Despite the Mexican government’s clear preference for the continuation of illegal immigration, 65 percent of Latino leaders in 1998 considered it important to control and reduce illegal immigration.\textsuperscript{435} In 1990, a majority of Mexican Americans favored reducing the number of legal immigrants to the United States.\textsuperscript{436} Surveys conducted in succeeding years indicated “a consistent pattern: Mexican Americans support reductions in the number of immigrants admitted to the United States.”\textsuperscript{437} Mexican Americans in Texas and California have offered tacit or explicit support to INS efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Mexican border.\textsuperscript{438} Mexican officials applaud MALDEF, NCLR, and other Latino organizations for having “the courage to take unpopular but enlightened stands” on issues, such as illegal immigration, where majorities of U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans differ with both MALDEF \textit{et al.} and the Mexican government.\textsuperscript{439}

Where Mexican Americans agree with the Mexican government is on the issue of allowing both legal and illegal immigrants to participate in U.S. social services.\textsuperscript{440} Thus, as De la Garza puts it, “the Mexican diaspora favors immigrants but not immigration.”\textsuperscript{441} De la Garza summarizes the situation as follows:

Clearly Mexican Americans do not rally around the positions of the Mexican government regarding U.S. immigration policies. When Mexican Americans and the Mexican government agree on a policy, as was the case with Proposition 187, it is coincidental rather than because Mexican Americans are being mobilized in behalf of Mexico’s preferences. In other words, Mexican Americans would have opposed Proposition 187 regardless of Mexico’s position, and their opposition cannot be interpreted as an indication of PCME’s success.\textsuperscript{442}

Mexican officials are well aware that there are contradictions between the two communities they serve in the United States. The Mexican consul in Los Angeles called attention to one example: the proposed settlement of the federal class action lawsuit against Western Union andMoneyGram Payment Systems Inc. for extortionate hidden fees in wiring money to Mexico—especially the unfavorable exchange rates for remittances paid in local currency. In the preliminary settlement, MoneyGram and Western Union parent First Data Corp. agreed to set aside $2.3 million in contributions to Latino community organizations and for the money to be disbursed by MALDEF and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO). The settlement was opposed by hometown associations from several states and by California politicians who argued that a better disposition could be obtained under strict California consumer protection laws. The hometown associations were joined by three Congressmen and other prominent California legislators and mayors, as well as several community rights groups and the \textit{Hernandad Mexicana Nacional}, in a friend-of-the-court brief filed in Illinois, asking that an injunction freezing the California case be lifted. MALDEF and NALEO were absent from the brief.\textsuperscript{443} In December, more than 2500 immigrants filed a new $100 million class action lawsuit against the wire companies.\textsuperscript{444}

Since 1997, the PCME has been holding informational meetings about Mexico (\textit{Jornadas Informativas sobre Mexico}) for Mexican-American leaders. Some thirty federal, state, and country officials have been invited each year to Mexico to become acquainted with the Mexican perspective on Mexican-U.S. relations and to learn about human rights, election processes, and the economic situation in Mexico.\textsuperscript{445}

It will be interesting to see what kind of relations will develop between groups like NCLR and LULAC and the incipient national Mexican immigrant organizations. It is worth recalling that at its founding meeting in Dallas, the International Coalition of Mexicans Abroad, a group of politically active U.S. Mexicans influenced by the left-leaning PRD, hastened to point out that so-called mainstream Latino organizations such as NCLR and LULAC did not “represent their interests in this country.” Some of the activists involved with the immigrants believe that NCLR and LULAC have gotten too close to the Mexican government.\textsuperscript{446}

One current in this political stream is the export of Mexican domestic politics—but another is American ethnic and minority politics. In 1998, Roberto Suro suggested that the “fissure” among Latinos on questions such as illegal immigration, “if it becomes widespread and permanent, will call into question Latinos’ ability to function as a minority group.”\textsuperscript{447}

Five years earlier, Peter Skerry systematically raised the question: “Will Mexican Americans define themselves as traditional ethnic immigrants or as victims of racial discrimination?”\textsuperscript{448} He answered that they were “ambivalent” but that there was little question that “the dominant institutions of contemporary American society” as well as “Mexican American elites” (including such groups as NCLR and MALDEF) answered that they were a minority group.\textsuperscript{449}

\textbf{Information}

The Mexican Cultural Institute of Houston produces a national monthly newspaper, \textit{La Paloma (The Dove)}, which is inserted in the eleven largest Spanish-language newspapers in the U.S. Some forty-six issues have been published. It began with a circulation of 26,000 and now reaches 727,500.\textsuperscript{450} The newspaper publicizes PCME activities, presents the Mexican point of view on bilateral affairs with the U.S. and on issues such as drugs and the human rights of Mexican immigrants, and provides health news, information on sending money to Mexico, and the like. The PCME also publishes a bimonthly bulletin that is sent to Mexican embassies and consulates and deals with cultural affairs.

The PCME supervises the radio broadcasting of informational programs, serials, public awareness spots, and other programs. They are carried on Spanish-language stations.\textsuperscript{451} Similarly, the PCME supervises television programs. The television program \textit{La Paloma} is broadcast weekly in the U.S. by the Spanish-language chain Telemundo and has an audience of some 3 million viewers.
Problems of the PCME

Despite NAFTA, whose benefits have been restricted mainly to the export sector, Mexico is a country with severe economic problems. Indeed, that is the main reason for Mexicans’ mounting emigration to the United States. Though Mexico has reduced its swollen state sector over the past fifteen years and liberalized its trade, the economy has failed to achieve sustained growth. The agrarian sector is in crisis as it tries to move from a cooperative system to individual farming; its banking sector is paralyzed; small- and medium-sized businesses are stagnant; and the entire economy is plagued by periodic financial crises. During the 1994-95 peso crisis, Mexico’s gross national product plummeted 7 percent and interest rates skyrocketed. Tens of thousands of businesses and farms were forced either to close or to cut back their operations, generating massive unemployment and plunging large numbers of people into destitution. Large sectors of the population have not recovered from that crisis, although Mexico is now enjoying annual growth rates of around 4 percent. Nearly a third of the population lives in poverty.

This situation, compounded by last year’s fall in oil prices, obliged the Zedillo government to cut the federal budget sharply. A straitened budget constitutes a major constraint on the PCME program. Andres Rozenzal, the former Undersecretary of State for North America, who was one of the engineers of the original Salinas PCME initiative, says that the Zedillo government and its foreign ministers did not maintain the same interest in the PCME. He claims the government has cut back on the PCME program, lowering its profile, discontinuing the practice of sending high-level appointments to the consulates, reducing official visits to the United States, and cutting the budget. The current leadership of the PCME and the Office of Hispanic Affairs at the Mexican embassy in Washington refute this charge, claiming that the PCME has the full support of the Zedillo administration. They do acknowledge budgetary constraints but attribute them to the austerity dictated by the peso crisis.450

Roger Díaz de Cossío, the first director of the PCME, says that there has always been resistance to the program within the foreign office “for fear of angering Washington” and hurting bilateral relations with the U.S. He says the resistance continues, though he believes that Zedillo himself supports the program. This subject bears further investigation.

Budgetary and staff resources do appear quite limited, at least in some regions. For example, the Washington, D.C., consulate has a staff of sixteen people to deal with visas and all the other normal activities of the consulate. That leaves three others to cover the PCME program, which serves a population of 400,000 in D.C., Virginia, and Maryland. The consulate also serves North Carolina, where there are 200,000 Mexican immigrants who are a ten-hour drive from the D.C. office.451

As state programs become more active, they may take up the slack.

State Programs

The federal PCME program has worked with governors of major sender states to establish some fourteen Offices of Emigrant Affairs. These are essentially smaller, state versions of the PCME.

“Two for One” and now “Three for One” programs are among the major state initiatives. These programs provide matching funds to those raised for community development by hometown associations. During the Salinas administration between 1993 and 1995, the Two for One program was a federal operation coordinated by the PCME and the Ministry of Social Development. Each dollar sent by the HTA was matched by a dollar from federal and state coffers. The Zacatecas federation of hometowns was the main beneficiary. In 1995, Zacatecas hometown projects received a total of $8.1 million, which supported fifty-six projects in thirty-four communities. After that year, the federal Two for One program was eliminated as part of the Mexican government’s decentralization efforts. The initial year of the Zedillo administration was marked by economic crisis and budget cut-backs, and leaders of the Zacatecas federation also say that “the PCME showed a lack of leadership at the time.” State governments, especially in Zacatecas but also in Guanajuato, took up the slack.452

Zacatecas responded to federal austerity by resuming and expanding its own program in a newly formed state office for Zacatecan communities abroad. The investment program was revised to include a contribution from the municipal government. Under the new terms, each of the four partners (federal, state, municipality, and the federation) make matching grants.453 In its first year of operation (July 1998-July 1999), the Zacatecas state program raised nearly $5 million for 193 projects focusing on infrastructure development in twenty-seven Zacatecan municipalities.454 The program works through the ten Zacatecas federations of hometown clubs located in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, and Texas. Each dollar contributed by a club is matched by a dollar amount from the state, local municipal government, and federal government: thus, “Three for One.” The funding, project selection, execution, and monitoring process have been formalized and unified. Accordingly, the process begins with a project proposal’s presentation to its federation, after an analysis of the village’s needs. If approved, the federation submits the proposal to the representative of the Zacatecas state government in Los Angeles and to the Presidente Municipal (mayor) for approval. The mayor sends the technical plan to the relevant state offices. If it is approved, work begins on the project.455

The Zacatecas federation generally serves as the intermediary for all club investments, a process that establishes a common formula for the presentation and evaluation of projects and centralizes information with regard to changing government requirements. “Along with making project review and monitoring much more efficient, this system also makes the federation the principal intermediary between the Mexican government and the clubs.”456

In Jalisco, a fiduciary fund Fideraza, through a mechanism called Raza Express, provides nonbanking financial services to those who send remittances to their families. The purpose is to create a guaranteed fund (Fondo de Garantía) with an initial donation by the state government and 25 cents for every dollar remitted. The fund is dedicated to the support of small and micro enterprises in the regions of highest migration. Raza Express also offers reduced charges (40 percent less than commercial companies such as Western Union and Moneygram) for money transfers from the U.S.

Because of decentralization efforts and, even more, the centrifugal tendencies in the Mexican polity, state programs are
becoming increasingly important. Oaxaca, a state where migration is of more recent origin, opened the newest state office for migrant affairs in the spring of 1999. The axis may shift increasingly to state programs in coming years. State officials also contend that immigrants are reluctant to contact Mexican government consulates. Because of the widespread distrust of the federal government, especially among immigrants, these officials claim that state programs, closely tied to the immigrants’ places of origin, have a better chance of reaching the immigrant communities.

Guanajuato is the state that receives the biggest share of remittances, some 15.4 percent of the total. Guanajuato, which is also the third biggest sender state, has a well-organized and extensive program for its migrants. There are 2 million residents of Guanajuato descent in the United States—half Mexican-born, half U.S.-born. The Guanajuato program began in 1994 at the behest of the PCME. Guanajuato had, and has, a conservative opposition (PAN) government and had some differences in perspective with the PRI-run federal government. The state office has the ultimate decision as to whether to go ahead with a project, and on the whole the relationship has been cooperative. In 1996, Guanajuato established a program (Mi Comunidad) to create sources of employment in the poorest communities through the participation of hometown associations in the U.S., with the state government providing technical and legal assistance.

The state office in Guanajuato, Guanajuato, has grown from one official in 1994 to a staff of thirty housed in the central provincial capital building. The main Guanajuato project is helping to organize Casas Guanajuato social clubs composed of Guanajuato immigrants residing in the U.S., and helping to keep these clubs in touch with local communities in Guanajuato. The office is currently working on a project to create a federated club with a central office in Washington, D.C., to represent the 2 million Guanajuatenses. The director of the Guanajuato office cites the Washington lobbying efforts of the U.S. Cuban community and Israel as precedents. Given decentralizing tendencies in Mexico, we should expect lobbies from many of the most important states, especially the sender states such as Gro, Zacatecas, and Jalisco. To the extent that state programs become a more important component of Mexican policy, we should expect that policy to become more pluralistic and less unified.

There are thirty-three Casas Guanajuato in the United States. They celebrate holidays; provide legal and migratory counsel, as well as assistance to families abandoned by fathers; find lost people; combat illness; transfer corpses to Mexico; and pay funeral expenses. They are supported by Mexican consulates and cultural institutes and centers. Casas Guanajuato are independent clubs. The Guanajuato office helps them organize, but they elect their own boards of directors. Dallas has the biggest club, with music classes, a theater group, Taekwon Do classes, English classes, and citizenship courses. The Casas Guanajuato organize partnerships among their members and others to invest funds collectively in their places of origin. These include maquiladoras (factories), which have been formed in various villages and often employ the wives of men working in the U.S.

In Guanajuato as well as several other states, there are programs that provide matching federal and state funds for those contributed by immigrants. The budget for Guanajuato is small: $800,000 annually. The state has hired a consultant to attempt to bring in funds from U.S. foundations and city governments. The state office produces radio programs that are sent via cassettes to radio stations around the U.S. to communicate with and entertain Guanajuatenses. It also produces videotapes for broadcast on Spanish-language television channels. The aim is to make “Guanajuatenses feel that they are not alone.” The office publishes a four-color magazine called Pa’El Norte, which is distributed through the Casas and the cultural institutes.

The Guanajuato office organizes assistance to families of migrants in the state. It manages a fund that offers subsidies to families abandoned by fathers in the U.S. It also offers medical assistance and help with government red tape. The Guanajuato main office has small branch offices in various parts of the state. In Silao, Guanajuato, an institute for “Chicano” community leaders has just opened. It is linked to the University of Texas in Dallas. U.S. anthropologists and sociologists study there.

The PAN-appointed director of the Guanajuato office, even more than his counterparts at the PCME in Mexico City, stresses that his program brings benefits to the United States: “our people become more cultured, polite, educated, know the rules, avoid drugs and drink, stay out of trouble. They are motivated to work. Their children study better and are better educated. We wish Mexicans to be better integrated into the U.S. by not forgetting Mexico.” The perspective on the U.S. from the PAN-run Guanajuato operation is worth noting. Officials told me that “Mexico has to adjust to the U.S.” The U.S. has “structures to which Mexico has to adjust by raising productivity, learning punctuality, improving the quality of its products to world standards.” One local official spoke of “a different kind of nationalism, not the nationalism of winning the soccer match or of the grito (a Mexican Independence Day ritual), restricted to singular and symbolic events, but a nationalism that takes pride in workmanship, in the products of our industry.” Such comments illustrate the pluralistic character of Mexican politics and of Mexican support for their paisanos in the U.S.

In the light of the “initial partisan objectives” attributed to the PCME, one should have expected conflict between the PCME and the state offices. As governor of Guanajuato, Vicente Fox, now the Mexican president, expanded the migrant program and used it to attract U.S. investors to his state and to open offices in the United States. Zacatecas is now governed by a PRD member whom leaders of the Los Angeles Zacatecas federation promote as a presidential candidate in 2006. To the extent that Guanajuato and Zacatecas become opposition bases, fortified by remittances, investments, and political solidarity from the Mexican diaspora in the U.S., the PCME will have contributed to the entrenchment of strong rivals to the PRI. At the very least, the state emigrant-affairs offices afford a source of financing independent of the federal government, thus increasing the base for autonomy from the center.

The Guerrero-Chicago Program

In 1998, the government of the state of Guerrero, a dirt-poor southern state, agreed to match with three dollars every dollar
raised by the Chicago Federation of Guerrero for development projects. The local community was to propose the projects, and they were to be carried out in a transparent manner. Under this accord, projects in 1998-99 were completed in seven communities, with the state government contributing 6 million pesos and the communities 2 million ($200,000).

In 2000, the agreement was expanded—raising the levels of the matching funds and establishing a program for productive investment in Guerrero of the funds raised by Guerrerenses in Chicago. In addition, a contingency fund of $200,000 was established, providing medical insurance and for which the state pays one third of the cost, for families divided between Chicago and Guerrero. An additional endowment was established to pay for the costs of transferring the remains of Guerrerenses who die in Chicago without funds. Guerrerense families who are deported will be provided food and travel expenses to return from the border to their homes. A public awareness program will be developed for the communities with the highest level of immigration in Guerrero to explain the risks and rights of immigrants. These programs are designed, according to the Chicago consulate, not to encourage illegal immigration but to prevent abuses.

The Paisano Program

While immigrants may be heroes in their local communities and regarded as a resource by top administrators, they regularly have been subjected to shakedowns and other abuses by customs officials. The Salinas administration demanded payments from immigrants and established the “Paisano Program” to combat abuses by government officials. The program sought to coordinate the action of different Mexican government agencies to provide accurate information, facilitate administrative procedures, and receive and respond to complaints from immigrant visitors.

The consulates, cultural institutes, and hometown associations distribute Paisano literature, which provides information to migrants as to their “rights and obligations … as well as facilities and support offered by the Mexican government.”

The Mexican government has been criticized for applying a double-standard: It complains that Mexican immigrants are abused in the United States but permits much worse abuse of Central American immigrants in Mexico. A hometown association leader from Oaxaca, which borders on Guatemala, confirmed that Guatemalan immigrants were treated “miserably” in his state. Los Angeles consulate officials cited a new program, based on the Paisano Program, which counsels Salvadorans and Guatemalans about their rights in Mexico.

By the mid-1990s, the Paisano Program had made headway against official abuses. In light of the failure of the Mexican government to reduce corruption substantially in other areas, and considering the notorious reputation of the customs agency, Paisano’s progress must be seen considered a significant bureaucratic and political accomplishment. But HTA leaders and academic observers say that the abuses of immigrants still occur at intolerable levels. Recently, the Mexican Center for Border Studies and the Promotion of Human Rights charged that officials of the National Migration Institute were extorting payments from Central American migrants traveling through Mexico to the U.S. The Center also accused Migration Institute officials of taking bribes from “coyotes” who smuggle migrants over the U.S.-Mexican border.

Networks of Protection (Redes de Protección)

The consulate of the Chicago area, which serves nearly 1 million Mexican immigrants, has established a very successful program that is being imitated in Wisconsin, Iowa, Indiana, and other midwestern states. Among the regular duties of a consulate is to protect the rights and interests of co-nationals in a foreign country. The Chicago consulate has developed what it calls “active protection” in order to provide “preventive protection.” Its chief innovation is “protection networks” to provide information about immigrants’ rights and obligations on migratory, labor, penal, and other subjects. The nine Chicago and midwestern “networks” are organizationally independent of the consulate. In Chicago, there are 200 network members who provide information in organizations to which they belong, such as HTAs, churches, schools, parents’ committees, and labor unions. They also organize informational meetings for members of the community. The networks are supported by lawyers from the area (there are twenty-one supporting attorneys in Chicago) as well as community organizations. The networks also serve as a communication channel for the different sectors of the Hispanic community.

Networks have produced leaflets, bulletins, brochures, videotapes, informational cards, and an information manual.

The Manual on Matters of Protection (Manual sobre Asuntos de Protección) is 112 pages long and covers migratory, penal, and labor questions, domestic violence, nationality and dual nationality, U.S. social security, transferring physical remains, economic support for victims of violent crimes, money orders for remittances, requirements for tourists who bring automobiles into Mexico, requirements for registering births, notary functions at the consulate, the Mexican social security and medical program for Mexican families in the U.S., and other subjects pertinent to U.S. Mexicans. The manual is studied chapter by chapter by members of the networks.

In August 1999, the “First Annual Conference of the Immigrants’ Protective Network in the United States” took place in Chicago. Controversy arose over how extensive that network’s work should be. Some members argued that they should be limited to providing information. Others argued that they should provide advice on how “legally to influence the dispositions sanctioned in the laws which negatively affect immigrants.” Among the key motions passed in the conference: to communicate that only “a general amnesty can resolve definitively the problems of the undocumented”; to explain to immigrants “the advantages of being unionized”; and to “disseminate by all possible means that members of the community that are detained by the authorities have the right to remain silent until they are permitted the counsel of an attorney or a consular official.”

The networks appears to be an effective method for informing immigrants of their legitimate rights. But the close relationship with the consulate and the nature of some of the records at the conference may raise the question in some minds about whether the network’s activities or their resolutions constitute intervention in the internal affairs of the United States.
Private Programs
In 1994, the Salinas administration provided seed money to found the Mexican and American Solidarity Foundation. Besides seminars for activists from U.S. Latino organizations, the foundation sponsors an annual conference to promote commercial exchange among Hispanic businessmen, and it offers a Teaching Certification in Bilingual-Bicultural Education for Mexican teachers. The latter is a three-year course jointly created by the SEP and California State University at Long Beach to certify Mexicans now residing in the U.S. whose teaching credentials are not recognized in the U.S.

In what may or may not be a sign of faltering government support for the activities oriented towards Mexicans in the U.S., the foundation is underfunded and desperately searching for money.

Dual Nationality
In 1996, Mexico amended its constitution (the amendment was formally published on March 20, 1997) to provide that Mexican nationality is not lost as a result of obtaining a second nationality. Though part of the general endeavor to forge closer ties with Mexican communities in the United States, the amendment was also a specific response to California’s Proposition 187, widely perceived in Mexico as anti-Mexican. The amendment was designed to increase the political influence of the Mexican-born in the U.S by removing obstacles to their becoming citizens and voters. Historically, Mexicans have had the lowest naturalization rate of any immigrant group in the U.S., with the exception of Canadians. Previously, Mexicans who adopted foreign citizenship became foreigners and thus lost the right to own property or shares in communal farmlands called ejidos. The amendment allows them to retain their Mexican passport and to own property. The measure was strongly opposed by the California Republican Party, which in a 1995 letter-writing campaign called on the Clinton administration to oppose it as an attempt to “influence U.S. internal affairs in order to advance Mexican national interests.”

Mexico is not alone in allowing its nationals to retain their prior citizenship upon naturalizing in the United States. In a globalized environment an international trend towards dual citizenship has emerged, aided by the revolution in communications and by economic interdependence. A strong motivation has been the avoidance of the heavy estate taxes that the U.S. government imposes on foreigners working here. In past years, voting in a foreign election incurred loss of U.S. citizenship, but while the federal government does not endorse dual citizenship, it increasingly tolerates it even as more countries allow it and more individuals seek it.

Like major U.S. allies such as Britain, France, and Israel, many “sender” countries to the U.S. near Mexico—such as Guatemala, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Colombia—now allow naturalized U.S. citizens to retain their citizenship. So do many other Western Hemisphere countries, such as Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Seven of the ten countries from which most immigrants have come to the U.S. from 1981 to 1996 now have some form of dual nationality. India and South Korea do not recognize dual nationality, but new leaderships in those countries have supported the idea. Since 1949, the United Kingdom has permitted dual citizenship, as have many of the U.K.’s former colonies, including Caribbean countries like Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Christopher and Nevis, and St. Lucia. Many of the republics of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and the Ukraine, also permit dual citizenship, as do several European countries with large immigrant populations, such as Croatia, Greece, Poland, and Turkey. In total, some seventy nations—including also Italy, South Africa, and New Zealand—allow their citizens to retain or regain citizenship or nationality after being naturalized in another country.

With the exception of Mexico, all of the above-mentioned countries allow their dual citizens to vote at home. The Mexican government offers foreign citizens born in Mexico the possibility of retaining their nationality, though not their Mexican citizenship. This dual nationality, which does not include a right to vote in Mexican elections, does allow Mexican naturalized citizens to buy property in Mexico. Thus, Mexico sharply distinguishes between nationality and citizenship. The former confers economic rights such as property, inheritance, and other rights; the latter guarantees political rights, such as the right to vote and to hold office.

Mexican-American groups had requested the 1996 constitutional change for some time as a way to raise U.S. citizenship rates among legal residents, thus increasing the political influence of Mexican Americans. But it was opposition to California’s Proposition 187 that led the Mexican Congress to act. The increasing political clout of Mexican Americans would raise the “stakes of those who would promote anti-Mexican campaigns.” The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations has stated that the amendment obeys the Mexican government’s interest in taking preventive measures to strengthen migrants’ security and other interests: “[I]t will improve[e] the protection of their rights where they reside, support … fuller development of their potential in their host countries, and improve[e] their voice and their ability to exert greater influence on the decisions that the communities of which they are a part make.”

As Alexander Aleinikoff points out, “this line of reasoning parallels that of other states [such as the Dominican Republic] that have recently permitted their nationals to maintain their citizenship when naturalizing in the United States.” Dominicans argued that the Dominican-born in the U.S. “need to integrate themselves into the political process of [the U.S.] It is the only manner of obtaining solutions …and attending to the matters that harm us.” Aleinikoff notes that the claim that naturalization will aid in the protection of the rights of U.S. residents “is distinct from the promotion of Mexican (or Dominican) national interests in the American political system.” And he comments further that such motives, rather than being signs of doubtful loyalty, could be viewed as “emblematic of precisely the kind of behavior that is generally praised in U.S. politics: active involvement in interest-group politics.”

Mexico’s 1996 legislation actually will decrease as well as increase Mexican dual nationals. Under the old rules, Mexicans who elected to live in the U.S. without naturalizing conveyed Mexican nationality automatically to their offspring, who became dual nationals at birth. They in turn could choose Mexican nationality when reaching their majority and thereby transmit it to their offspring. Thus, under the old dispensation there was the possibility of dual nationality for all subsequent
generations if the first generation did not naturalize. But under the new legislation, the children born to Mexican parents in the U.S. will be dual nationals whether or not their parents naturalize, but their children will not obtain Mexican nationality. The new Mexican legislation in effect restricts the possibility of dual nationality to two generations at the most.

Previously those Mexicans who became U.S. citizens suffered severe sanctions in Mexico: They lost the right to belong to a union or agrarian cooperative (ejido), hold property, or assume public office. A sharp breach separated Mexicans and Mexican Americans. The legislation serves Mexicans in the U.S. who wish to travel easily to and from Mexico for social and economic reasons. It will encourage Mexicans who have acquired economic and political values and skills in the U.S. to return to Mexico to invest and hold property and to vote and hold office in Mexico. Thus, while raising the question of Mexican influence in the U.S. polity, it may in the long run (especially when taken together with the other processes unleashed by NAFTA) have the effect of augmenting U.S. influence in Mexican economic and political life.

In amending their constitution to allow dual nationality, Mexican legislators sought to strengthen “the material and symbolic ties” with Mexican communities in the U.S. and “to facilitate their integration into the societies in which they lived, in order to reduce discrimination against them.” Two Mexican authorities believe that “these two purposes are complementary not mutually exclusive.” But U.S. critics consider that such measures increase the tendency to seek naturalization for “instrumental” motives.

Are naturalized Mexicans availing themselves of the opportunity to reclaim Mexican nationality? David Hayes-Bautista of UCLA writes that, of 4 million Latinos in Los Angeles County, fewer than 4000 have even applied for the dual status.

According to the U.S. State Department:

U.S. law does not mention dual nationality or require a person to choose one citizenship or another. Also, a person granted another citizenship does not risk losing U.S. citizenship. The U.S. Government recognizes that dual nationality exists but does not encourage it as a matter of policy because of the problems it may cause. Claims of other countries on dual national U.S. citizens may conflict with U.S. law, and dual nationality may limit U.S. Government efforts to assist citizens abroad. The country where a dual national is located generally has a stronger claim to that person’s allegiance. However, dual nationals owe allegiance to both the United States and the foreign country.

Though encumbered by bureaucratic backlogs, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service encourages legal permanent residents to naturalize. One difficulty is the policy of many countries to withdraw citizenship from individuals who naturalize. Since many countries require citizenship as a condition for ownership of property, to receive public benefits, to be employed, and to vote, loss of citizenship can be a hardship and an obstacle to naturalization.

In that light, dual citizenship can be seen as congruent with U.S. immigration policies. On the other hand, critics object that dual citizenship can convert citizenship from a pledge of undivided loyalty into a convenient contrivance, impairing the vow to “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty,” the exclusive commitment embodied in the naturalized citizen’s oath of allegiance. An official for the Federation for American Immigration Reform asks, “Is it in our national interest to have literally millions and millions of people who have this dual allegiance?” Proponents such as Hofstra University professor Peter Spiro join that “a dual Mexican-American citizen who advocates policies that benefit Mexico is little different from a Catholic who advocates policies endorsed by the Church or a member of Amnesty International who writes his congressman at the organization’s behest. Non-state affiliations are an accepted part of our pluralist system.” Spiro wants the U.S. to eliminate the renunciation oath. Others wish to replace the exclusivity of the oath with primacy. More generally, do affective, sentimental, cultural, or commercial ties with another country impair one’s viability in and loyalty to the U.S. polity?

By offering the example of foreign policy, Spiro raises another issue: the setting in which dual-nationality policies operate. Samuel Huntington has argued that the end of the Cold War and social, intellectual and demographic changes have brought into question the validity and relevance of traditional components of American identity. Without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests, and as a result subnational commercial interests and transnational and nonnational ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy.

Huntington argues that formerly immigrants and refugees from Communist countries vigorously opposed the governments of their home countries and actively supported Cold War policies. Today immigrants, such as Chinese Americans, tend to “pressure the United States to adopt favorable policies” toward their home countries.

Some argue that dual nationality—along with the tendency to seek naturalization primarily for instrumental motives, the lowering of the standards for naturalization, and recent Supreme Court decisions making citizenship more difficult to lose—contributes to a cheapening of citizenship. As a remedy, T. Alexander Aleinikoff advocates a renewal of the “Americanization‘ policies promulgated during the last great wave of immigration (education for citizenship, civic education, etc.), such as recommended in the final, 1997, report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.

Absentee Voting Rights

The demand for the right to vote in Mexican elections has become a major political issue both in Mexico and among U.S. Mexicans over the past decade or so. Opposition parties, especially the left-leaning PRD, have embraced this cause. The issue was broached by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in his 1988 presidential bid and sustained in part by PRD organizers in the immigrant community. The right of emigrants to vote in presidential elections was included in an eighteen-point agreement on political reform negotiated by the PRI and the opposition in July 1996. The inclusion of the provision for an absentee ballot legitimized and energized the issue for U.S. Mexicans. But when it came time to pass legislation implementing the accord, the consensus broke down.

Nonetheless, the Mexican Congress did remove a constitutional stipulation that Mexicans vote only in their home district and commissioned a Federal Election Institute (IFE)
As should be apparent from this description of Mexican federal and state policies, programs, and activities, Mexican immigrants are a “primary target,” in De la Garza’s words. Community organizing efforts are directed at the HTAs, which are composed overwhelmingly of the Mexican-born. Teacher exchanges, bilingual programs, and textbook donations concentrate on schools with important contingents of immigrant children. Health programs are similarly aimed at Mexican immigrants, as are the bulk of the sports programs. The media programs are also aimed primarily at Mexicans. The *Paisano* program benefits Mexicans returning to their homes for visits. The state programs we have reviewed are overwhelmingly aimed at U.S. Mexicans; Mexican Americans are reached mainly by the cultural and business programs and by the granting of awards. Jose Luis Bernal, the Mexican consul in Los Angeles, with far and away Mexico’s largest consulate in the United States, estimated that the consulate spent 70-75 percent of its time on routine bureaucratic processes (visas, passports, identity papers, and the like), 10-15 percent on activities relating to the HTAs, and no more than 5 percent on Mexican-American organizations. But it must be added that the Mexican embassy in Washington has an Office of Hispanic Affairs that deals primarily with Mexican-American and other Latino organizations.

If U.S. Mexicans are the primary constituency of the Mexican government’s *acercamientos*, Mexican Americans may turn out to be more important in the long run. That results from the elementary demographic and political logic discussed above (see page 30).

What is the connection between these two constituencies?

Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez, who directs the Mexican Embassy’s Office on Hispanic Affairs, says, first, that efforts on behalf of immigrants lends the government legitimacy in the eyes of Hispanic-American groups such as the National Council of La Raza, MALDEF, and LULAC. “Our legitimacy lies in our work with the most needy of the diaspora.” Secondly, Gonzalez draws the obvious conclusion from current demographic and political trends: The political salience of Mexican Americans is bound to increase in coming years. So accordingly will their “capacity to intervene and impose their own terms in issues relating to Mexico,” as Gonzalez Gutierrez writes in a book commissioned by Mexico’s Foreign Minister, with Gutierrez’s chapter on “the future of Mexicans abroad in the foreign policy of Mexico.”

Rodulfo De la Garza believes Mexico has shown little substantive interest in Mexican Americans and that the Mexican government uses the PCME “to maintain relations with emigrants so that remittances and other forms of direct financial investment in their *pueblos* will continue.” What is indisputably clear is that immigrant political and economic influence in Mexico has increased significantly during the decade of the PCME’s existence. It is hard to avoid De la Garza’s conclusion that the PCME’s mission, at least for the moment, has “much more relevance for domestic issues than for Mexico-U.S. relations.” Yet Gonzalez Gutierrez’s comments suggest that the two purposes, domestic and foreign, are not mutually exclusive. The PCME was founded by an administration convinced that Mexico’s future lay in its integration in a free-trade area dominated by the United States. For motives that went beyond lobbying on behalf of NAFTA, the administration saw improving relations with Mexican...
Americans as a worthy goal. But the PCME was also founded in the midst of an unprecedented migration of Mexicans to the United States—one that demanded the attention of the Mexican government and increasingly affected domestic economics and politics.

Mexico’s policies toward her diaspora should not be confused with those of countries with geopolitical ambitions (the Mexicans compare themselves with Portugal or the Philippines). To its north, Mexico has no geopolitical goal beyond self-defense; it is not seeking “living space” abroad nor is it attempting to weaken a global rival. Even if it had such ambitions, Mexico’s political class is not sufficiently united to pursue them. Mexico’s international policy is basically reactive to global economic forces and to internal pressures. Its political class is concerned mainly with internal economic development, with the problematic transition to democracy, and with its affluent northern neighbor. A difficult history—marked, of course, by the U.S. annexation of half of Mexico in the nineteenth century as well as by an intervention on behalf of the U.S. government during the revolutionary war of the early twentieth century—plus decades of regime ideology, as well as economic and geopolitical realities, have accustomed Mexican leaders to seeing themselves as past and potential casualties. Mexican political leaders remain highly sensitive to what they consider interference in their internal affairs, and their economic and political problems constrain foreign policy activism and still more any policy of surreptitious subversion within the United States.

Peter Brimelow believes that the “the Mexican elite” is pursuing a “geopolitical strategy” on behalf of “irredentism” and “a Hispanic-dominated political unit to be carved out of the Southwest.” Such a view misconceives not only Mexican policy but also the mentality of the Mexican Americans. As Peter Skerry writes, “by the late 1980s, even the most extreme elements among Mexican Americans had abandoned” separatist aspirations roused by the turmoil of the early seventies. The Latino National Political Survey found that 83.8 percent of U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans felt “extremely strong” or “very strong” “love for the United States” (14.1 percent said their love was “somewhat strong” and only 2.1 percent said it was “not very strong”; 90.8 percent were “extremely” or “very” proud of the United States) (see Figures 2, 3). Brimelow also overlooks the Mexican diaspora’s deep suspicion of the Mexican government. The same survey found that 85.1 percent of U.S. Mexicans and Mexican Americans considered “Mexican corruption” rather than U.S. policy to be the cause of Mexico’s problems (Figure 4). It is important to recognize that “many Mexican Americans have looked to their mother country for emotional and cultural solace while at the same time harboring great animosity toward the Mexican state that failed them.”

Brimelow also makes two mistaken assumptions about “the Mexican elite.” The first is that it is unified around a “strategy.” Not since the Mexican Revolution has the Mexican leadership class been so divided. The divisions between the PRI and the opposition over the issue of absentee voting suggest that there is more than one Mexican strategy vis-a-vis U.S. Mexicans. Second, the hostility of Mexican elites towards the U.S. is mainly a thing of the past or of present rhetorical posturing by certain vested interests. President Zedillo, together with Vicente Fox and Francisco Labastida, the leading Mexican 2000 presidential candidates, support the broadening relations between the two countries—as do, for that matter, the leading U.S. presidential candidates, and President Clinton.

The same is true of the Mexican business elites. The most dynamic sectors of the Mexican economy, such as those that produce high-tech electronic components, are linked to the U.S. market and U.S. capital. Over the past several years, Mexico’s maquiladora industry has moved from the border into the interior of Mexico. No longer merely assembling low-tech goods, it is now producing on contract with the most advanced sectors of the U.S. information industry.

Not only do Mexican business leaders see their future in the U.S., but its political class has been moving, haltingly, toward democracy. The PRI took a major step in the direction of internal party democracy by holding a national presidential primary last November. July’s 2000 elections were closely contested and brought the first opposition president to power. A new technocratic elite has emerged in Mexico that is pragmatic and not generally disposed to anti-American rhetoric. The general population is less susceptible to such gambits, in part because so many Mexican families now have relatives in the United States.

This is not to suggest that Mexico is traveling on an expressway to liberal democracy and market capitalism, nor that everyone there is deaf to anti-American invocations. Problems abound, one of them well known: Mexico’s emergence as a major transit point for illegal drugs and a home for powerful drug cartels. Less well publicized are the crime waves in Mexico’s two principal cities. Moreover, the weakening of the ruling party has been associated with centrifugal regional tendencies and with the emergence of a major guerrilla movement and two terrorist organizations. And there may indeed be those in the Mexican government who would promote an ethnic lobby by supporting the bilingual education bureaucracy and multicultural radicals in the United States. But the United States appears to have more to fear from a weak and divided Mexico than from one whose “geopolitical” agenda will encourage a discordant Mexican diaspora.

Is Mexico therefore above promoting an ethnic lobby should circumstances warrant it? No, and U.S. officials should be willing to raise with Mexico any instances where her officials cross the line from support for “the Mexican nation” to interference in U.S. political affairs. But Mexico’s leaders believe their future lies in adapting to the U.S., not subverting it. Many Mexican leaders would probably wish a Mexico-oriented ethnic lobby, were it feasible, but not at the price of alienating Washington. In any event, such a coalition appears out of reach for the foreseeable future, because of the divergence of interests and the widespread distrust of the PRI.

In the last analysis, the impact on Mexican communities in the United States may be the more powerful one. I have mentioned the economic and political repercussions of U.S. Mexicans on Mexican rural communities. It is just as likely, perhaps more so, that their descendants will favor reforms in Mexico. As U.S. Poles, Cubans, Filipinos, Haitians, African Americans, and Jews, among others, have demonstrated, American ethnic groups tend to press their countries of origin for human rights and for the very democratic and market-oriented institutions to which they feel indebted in the United States.
States. Through the major Mexican-American organizations have not played a conspicuous role in Mexico's drive for market reforms and democracy, that day may come. Already the President of MALDEF, Antonia Hernández, sits on the board of the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy and actively supports programs that assist Mexican election monitoring, anticorruption initiatives, and other democratic groups. Yossi Shain writes that

if elements in countries dependent on diasporic voices inside the United States wish to mobilize their diasporas, they must heed their diasporas' Americanness, including their allegiance to "American values" such as democracy and human rights; they must incorporate diasporic perspectives in a redefinition of the homeland. To a large extent, U.S. diasporas have emerged as the true marketers of the American creed.

The Mexican government may find that its efforts to promote cultural ties among Mexican communities in the United States result in bolstering democratic and market reformers at home. With such an outcome, which would be welcomed by many in the government, Mexicans would be living in carne propia a central aspect of the American polity—the relative autonomy of culture from politics. The United States is a civic, not an ethnic, nation. The American "civic culture"—the term is Gabriel Almond's but we could also borrow Gunnar Myrdal's term: "the American creed"—honors freedom of speech and association and the separation of church and state, but has from the outset, in Lawrence Fuchs's words, "facilitated and protected the expression of ancestral cultural values and sensibilities." In so doing, the United States forged a system of voluntary adhesion in which ethnic groups mobilized their economic and political interests and fostered a vast array of voluntary organizations and interest groups. Fuchs and Yossi Shain think Mexican Americans are following this path. As they do so, Peter Skerry finds that "Mexican Americans are ambivalent, poised between defining themselves as an ethnic group [traditional ethnic immigrants] and as a minority group [victims of racial discrimination]."

That is one sort of ambivalence. Another quite different variety, to which I have already alluded, is expressed in an adage associated with the heyday of LULAC, the oldest Mexican-American organization: "Mexican in culture and social activity, but American in philosophy and politics." Shain suggests a corollary: "Mexican-American elites realize that they can wear two hats without compromising their ancestral ties or their American identity, a reality that Mexico itself, in a departure from its historic inclination, has begun to recognize and now interprets as a positive development."

Whether these realities prove a positive development for the U.S. may depend less on Mexican policy than on that of the United States. An ethos of integration and incorporation characterized government and business programs, public schools, and the progressive political movement throughout the "first great wave," a situation that stands in dramatic contrast to the second great wave, which began in 1967. Since the 1960s, these same institutions and movements have been broadly characterized by an opposition to "assimilation" and sponsorship of multiculturalism and minority-based preferences. In contrast to the

Progressive of the earlier period, the current ethos "denies that there can be a unitary American identity based upon common assent to universalist principles, an identity that makes Americans one people despite differences of ethnic derivation."

Mexico's courting of Mexican communities in the United States can be seen as part of a larger acercamiento of the entire countries. NAFTA, increased trade, investment and migration, the multiplication of nongovernmental liaisons, the diversification of links between localities, and closer and more institutionalized bilateral relations all have converged to create a unique era in Mexico-U.S. relations and a novel, multifaceted relationship between Mexico and the United States. In this new setting, Mexico and the United States have differences and common interests respecting Mexican communities in the United States.

Regarding immigration, for instance, their differences concern, on the one hand, Mexico's labor surplus and its policy need for an emigration "safety valve"—which leads Mexico to permit uncontrolled migration—and, on the other, the U.S.'s sporadic desire to control its border. Recently there has been considerable movement on the immigration issue in the United States. The AFL-CIO has broken with much of its restrictionist tradition and come out in support of a new amnesty for illegal immigrants. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has advocated letting more foreign workers into the United States to ease labor-market constriction. On the Mexican side, as already discussed, the effect of NAFTA, a stable economy, and lower rural unemployment may ease pressures to emigrate. The two countries should consider a binational accord that would regulate immigration. In return for a new amnesty of illegal aliens, most of whom are Mexican, Mexico could cooperate with U.S. immigration authorities in stemming the tide of illegal immigrants.

Citizenship promotion could be an additional component of the binational accord. Both Mexico and the United States have an interest in U.S. Mexicans becoming U.S. citizens. As Mexico's ambassador to the United States stated in March of this year, "most immigrants and their descendants want to become an integral part of the United States." They have a "natural desire to be good citizens of this country," one that is "perfectly compatible" with cultivating "their roots and ties with Mexico." The Mexican government believes that U.S. Mexicans, by becoming U.S. citizens, increase the ranks of Americans less likely to be hostile to Mexico. The U.S. also has an interest in U.S. Mexicans becoming citizens because that furthers their social and political integration into U.S. society. HTAs are one vehicle for citizenship promotion. Several clubs, as we have noted, have citizenship programs. Mexican consulates are in touch with many HTAs and are thus in a position to encourage such initiatives. On the U.S. side, funding for citizenship instruction—through HTAs, community colleges, night schools, or some other vehicle—would be a wise way to profit from the acercamiento of Mexico with its nationalists in the U.S. Promoting the integration into U.S. life of the long wave of immigration from Mexico is, with its unique challenges, the maiden task of the American twenty-first century.
Endnotes


11. Interview Roger Diaz de Cossio, Mexico City, August 31, 1999; Interview Carlos Manuel Sada, General Consul of Mexico in San Antonio, Texas, July 12, 1999.


13. For various estimates, see Banco de Mexico, www.banxico.org.mx/ eInfoFinanciera/ FSinfoFinanciera.html; “A New Future for Mexico’s Work Force,” Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2000; Consejo Nacional de Poblacion, “Las Remesas Enviadas a Mexico por los Trabajadores Migrantes en Estados Unidos” en *La Situacion Demografica de Mexico*, 1997, Mexico City, 1999; see also Victor Espinosa, “The Federation of Michoacan Clubs in Illinois,” Chicago, Heartland Alliance, 1999: 3 and B; Lindsay Lowell and Rodulfo de la Garza, “The Development Role of Remittances in U.S. Latino Communities,” Inter-American Dialogue and The Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, June 2000. It is likely that the total remittances may be considerably higher since it is estimated that as much 20 percent to 40 percent of them may be carried personally by the migrant recipient.


15. Interview Andrés Rozenal, Mexico City, September 2, 1999.


20. Interview Díaz de Cossio; Interview Leonardo Ffrench, Mexico City, September 1, 1999; see Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez, “Los mexicanos de fuera en el futuro de la politica exterior de Mexico,” mimeo, forthcoming.


25. Interview Rozenal.


29. Interview Graciela de Orozco, Mexico City, August 31, 1999.


34. Interview Diaz de Cossio, 1999; Rodulfo O. De la Garza, “Foreign Policy Comes Home: The Domestic Consequences of the Program for Mexican Communities Living in Foreign Countries,” in Rodulfo O. de la Garza and Jesus Velasco, eds., 1997: 78.

35. Interviews Diaz de Cossio, 1999 and Ffrench; De la Garza:78.


38. Espinosa: 11.

39. Interview Rozenal.


Interview Roberto Lopez y Lopez, Director of Special Programs, Secretary of Public Education (SPE), Mexico City, September 1, 1999; Interview José Hernandez Hernandez, Director of Service to the Community of Guanajuato Living Abroad, León, Guanajuato, August 24, 1999; Interview Elsa Borja, Mexico City, September 1, 1999; Interview Ffrench.


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Gann and Duignan: 42.


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Consulado General de Mexico en Nueva York.


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Zabin and Escala: 8.

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169 Interviews Barron, Barracas et al.; see also “A Mexican State’s Crowning Glory: Southland Latinas compete for a title to keep a homeland and a heritage alive,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 1999, and Zabin and Escala: 11.
173 Interviews Dominguez et al., Larios et al Zabin and Escala: 20.
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175 Interviews Dominguez et al., Larios et al Zabin and Escala: 20.
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Roger Díaz de Cossío, Mexico City, August 31, 1999; March 17, 2000
Carlos Manuel Sada, General Consul of Mexico in San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas, July 12, 1999
Andrés Rozental, Mexico City, September 2, 1999
Leonardo Ffrench, Mexico City, September 1, 1999
Rodulfo De la Garza, Washington, D.C., October 28, 1999; Austin, TX, February 17, 2000
Cecilia Muñoz, National Council of the Raza, Washington, D.C., October, 1999
Graciela de Orsoco, Mexico City, August 31, 1999
Carlos González Gutiérrez, Washington, D.C., January 6, 2000
Dante Gomez, Community Affairs Coordinator, Mexican Cultural and Educational Institute of Chicago, Chicago, November 2, 1999
Rogelio Rojas, Consul of Community Affairs, San Antonio, TX, July 12, 1999
Roberto Lopez y Lopez, Director of Special Programs, Secretary of Public Education [SPE], Mexico City, September 1, 1999
José Hernandez Hernandez, Director of Service to the Community of Guanajuato Living Abroad, León, Guanajuato, August 24, 1999; Guanajuato, August 25, 1999
Elsa Borja, PCME, Mexico City, September 1, 1999
Ambassador Jose Luis Bernal, General Consul of Mexico in Los Angeles, Los Angeles, December 15, 1999
Jose Antonio Lagunas, Community Affairs Consul, New York City, February 2, 2000
Ambassador Jorge Pinto, General Consul of Mexico in New York, New York City, February 2, 2000
Consuelo Iglesias de Hudson, Jose Sanchez, Sarah Sanchez, Ramon Lopez, Rosalie Diaz et al., Club Zixtlan del Rio (Nagarit), Los Angeles, December 15, 1999
Simón Rincón, Club Solidariad Jose Tetla (Puebla), New York, February 3, 2000
Gerardo Escamilla, San Antonio, TX, February 3, 2000
Adolfo Rodriguez, Casa Guanajuato, San Antonio, TX, July 14, 1999; February 17, 2000
Abel Alonso and other leaders of El Club Solidaridad, Chinantla (Puebla), Brooklyn, New York, February 2, 2000
Octavio Barron, Fraternidad Sinoaloense de California (Sinaloa), Los Angeles, December 14, 2000
Carlos Vargas, Federaciones de Clubes Jaliscienses (Jalisco), Los Angeles, December 18, 1999;
Rafael Barracas, Manuel De la Cruz, Guadalupe Gomez and Guadalupe Rodriguez, Federación de Zacatecas de California del Sur, Los Angeles, December 17, 1999
Frank de Avila, ACOPIL (Association of Potosinos–San Luis Potosí), Chicago, October 3, 1999
Otomil Dominguez, Regional Organization of Oaxaca, Los Angeles, December 15, 1999
Enrique Juan Aquaro, Club San Francisco Tutla
Jose Antonio Larios and Armando Garcia, Mexican Consulate, Los Angeles, December 15, 1999
Luis Escala, Westwood, CA, December 16, 1999
Marcia Soto, Durango Unido (Durango), Chicago, October 3, 1999
Heriberto Galindo, Consul General of Mexico in Chicago, Chicago, October 2, 1999
Juan Carlos Cue, General Consul of Mexico in Washington, D.C., Washington, D.C., July 7, 1999
Tomás Ramirez, Casa Guanajuato (Guanajuato), Chicago, October 3, 1999
Guadalupe Rodriguez, Montelongo (Guanajuato)
Lydia Lopez, community organizer, Los Angeles, December 16, 1999
Municipal officials in Dolores, Hidalgo, Guanajuato, August 25, 1999
Manuel de la Cruz, Mexican liaison to the United States from Zacatecas, Los Angeles, October 3, 1999
Guadalupe Gomez, President, Frente Cívico Los Angeles, November 20, 1999
Maria Ofelia Torre, Coordinator of Education Programs for the New York Mexican Cultural Institute, June 13, 2000
Officials of SEP, Guanajuato, August 25, 1999
Luis Valenzuela, Consular Agent, Mexican Consulate, Chicago, November 4, 1999
APPENDIX A

Abbreviations

CIME International Coalition of Mexicans Abroad
CONADE (Mexican) National Sports Commission
HTAs Hometown associations
IDRA Intercultural Development Research Association
IMSS Mexican Institute of Social Security
INEA (Mexican) National Institute of Adult Education
IRCA Immigration Reform and Control Act
LEP Limited English-Proficient
LULAC League of United Latin American Citizens
MALDEF Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
MEDIR Migrant Education Data International Record
NABE National Association for Bilingual Education
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAFIN (Mexican) National Development Bank
NALEO National Association of Latino Elected Officials
NASBME National Association of State Directors for Bilingual Education
NGOs Nongovernmental organizations
OBEMLA (U.S. Department of Education) Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Language Affairs
ORO Organizxacion Regional de Oaxaca
PROBEM (Mexican) Binational Program for Migrant Education
SECOFI (Mexican) Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development
SED (Mexican) Education Department
SRE Secretariat of External Relations/Ministry of Foreign Relations
SWVREP Southwest Voters Representation and Education Project
TEA Texas Education Agency
UPN Universidad Pedagogica Naciona
### TABLE 1

**Resident Hispanic-Origin Population in the U.S.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>RESIDENT HISPANIC</th>
<th>TOTAL U.S. RESIDENTS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>14,609,000</td>
<td>226,542,199</td>
<td>6.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>15,560,000</td>
<td>229,466,000</td>
<td>6.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>16,240,000</td>
<td>229,664,000</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>16,935,000</td>
<td>233,792,000</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>17,640,000</td>
<td>235,825,000</td>
<td>7.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>18,368,000</td>
<td>237,924,000</td>
<td>7.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>19,154,000</td>
<td>240,133,000</td>
<td>7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>19,946,000</td>
<td>242,289,000</td>
<td>8.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>20,786,000</td>
<td>244,499,000</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>21,648,000</td>
<td>246,819,000</td>
<td>8.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>22,372,000</td>
<td>248,765,000</td>
<td>8.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>23,384,000</td>
<td>252,127,000</td>
<td>9.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>24,275,000</td>
<td>254,995,000</td>
<td>9.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>25,214,000</td>
<td>257,746,000</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>26,152,000</td>
<td>260,289,000</td>
<td>10.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>27,099,000</td>
<td>262,765,000</td>
<td>10.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>28,092,000</td>
<td>265,190,000</td>
<td>10.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>29,160,000</td>
<td>267,744,000</td>
<td>10.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>30,250,000</td>
<td>270,299,000</td>
<td>11.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>30,461,000</td>
<td>272,330,000</td>
<td>11.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>31,366,000</td>
<td>274,634,000</td>
<td>11.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>36,057,000</td>
<td>285,981,000</td>
<td>12.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>41,139,000</td>
<td>297,716,000</td>
<td>13.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>46,705,000</td>
<td>310,134,000</td>
<td>15.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>52,656,000</td>
<td>322,742,000</td>
<td>16.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>96,508,000</td>
<td>393,931,000</td>
<td>24.50</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Table 2

**Population of Hispanic and Mexican Origin in 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER PERCENTAGE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Hispanic Origin</td>
<td>22,354,000 100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>13,496,000 60.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>2,728,000 12.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>1,044,000  4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Hispanic</td>
<td>5,086,000 22.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3

**Population of Hispanic and Mexican Origin in 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER PERCENTAGE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Hispanic Origin</td>
<td>30,773,000 100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>19,834,000 64.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>3,117,000 10.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>1,307,000  4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central-South American</td>
<td>4,437,000 14.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Hispanic</td>
<td>2,079,000  6.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4

**Total Mexican-Born Population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>IN THOUSANDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>103,000</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>486,000</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>617,000</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>377,000</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>454,000</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>576,000</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>759,000</td>
<td>759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,199,000</td>
<td>2,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4,298,000</td>
<td>4,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7,017,000</td>
<td>7,017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 5

**Total Mexican-Origin Population in the United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>IN THOUSANDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>385,000</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>740,000</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,423,000</td>
<td>1,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,077,000</td>
<td>1,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,346,000</td>
<td>1,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,736,000</td>
<td>1,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,532,000</td>
<td>4,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8,740,000</td>
<td>8,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>13,393,000</td>
<td>13,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>18,039,000</td>
<td>18,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>19,259,000</td>
<td>19,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>25,876,000</td>
<td>25,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>33,908,000</td>
<td>33,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>43,211,000</td>
<td>43,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>54,031,000</td>
<td>54,031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 6

**Mexican Legal Immigration to the U.S.: 1990-1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>IN THOUSANDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>679,068</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>946,167</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>213,802</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>126,561</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>111,398</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>89,932</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>163,572</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>146,865</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>131,575</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 7
**Estimated Illegal Immigrant Population for Top Twenty Countries of Origin, 1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY OF ORIGIN</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>RESIDENCE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>All states</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mexico</td>
<td>2,700,000</td>
<td>1. California</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. El Salvador</td>
<td>335,000</td>
<td>2. Texas</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guatemala</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>3. New York</td>
<td>540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Canada</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>4. Florida</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Haiti</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>5. Illinois</td>
<td>290,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Philippines</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>6. New Jersey</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Honduras</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>7. Arizona</td>
<td>115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Poland</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>8. Massachusetts</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Nicaragua</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>9. Virginia</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Bahamas</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>10. Washington</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Colombia</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>11. Colorado</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ecuador</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>12. Maryland</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Dominican Republic</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>13. Michigan</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>14. Pennsylvania</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Jamaica</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>15. New Mexico</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Pakistan</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>16. Oregon</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. India</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>17. Georgia</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Dominica</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>18. Colombia</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Peru</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>19. Connecticut</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Korea</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>20. Nevada</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>744,000</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Illegal Alien Resident Population Report, INS. Table 1. Found at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/illegalalien/index.htm#Table1

### TABLE 8
**Mexican Immigrants Admitted, by State, in 1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>163,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>5,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>64,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>3,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>3,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>11,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
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<td>Missouri</td>
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<td>Nevada</td>
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<td>New Hampshire</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
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<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Tennessee</td>
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<td>Washington</td>
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<td>West Virginia</td>
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<td>Wisconsin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
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</table>

### U.S. Population by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACE</th>
<th>HISPANIC ORIGIN</th>
<th>NUMBER (IN THOUSANDS)</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td>207,901</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
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<td>53,555</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut</td>
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<td>3,534</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian, Pacific Islander</td>
<td></td>
<td>32,432</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hispanic</td>
<td></td>
<td>96,508</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mexican</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>62,200</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Puerto Rican</strong></td>
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<td>9,775</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cuban</strong></td>
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<td>4,099</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Central-South American</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,915</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Hispanic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,520</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The “Hispanic Origin” estimates assume that its composition remains the same.
FIGURE 1

Mexican Legal Immigration to the U.S.: 1901-1990

U.S. Department of Justice. INS, Office of Policy and Planning, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1998. Table 2
FIGURE 2
Strength of Love for U.S.

- Very Strong: 44.7%
- Somewhat Strong: 14.1%
- Extremely Strong: 39.1%
- Not Very Strong: 2.1%


FIGURE 3
Degree of Pride in United States

- Very Proud: 46.5%
- Somewhat Proud: 7.8%
- Extremely Proud: 44.3%
- Not Very Proud: 1.5%


FIGURE 4
Causes of Problems in Mexico

Mexican Origin

- Mexican Corruption: 85.1%
- U.S. Policy and Corruption in Mexico: 9.4%
- U.S. Policy: 5.5%

Anglo

- Mexican Corruption: 86.4%
- U.S. Policy and Corruption in Mexico: 8.4%
- U.S. Policy: 5%

Robert S. Leiken is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is the author and editor of several books, including *Central America: Anatomy of Conflict*, *A New Moment in the Americas* (foreword by Vice President Al Gore), *The Central American Crisis Reader*, and *Reporters and Revolutionaries*. His commentaries have appeared in the major newspapers and his reports and essays in *The New York Review of Books*, *Commentary*, *The New Republic*, *The Times Literary Supplement*, *The Political Science Quarterly*, *Foreign Policy*, *The National Interest*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *Current History*, and *The Journal of Democracy*. His articles have been nominated for the Overseas Press Club award, and he has appeared as a guest commentator on many television news programs and talk shows. Mr. Leiken worked for a decade in Mexico, where he was Professor of Economic History at the Center for Economic Investigation and Instruction (C.I.D.E.) and at the National Agricultural University. Mr. Leiken graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Harvard College and earned his doctorate at Oxford University.
The Center for Equal Opportunity gratefully acknowledges that funding for this study was provided by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation.