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Troubling Signs for South African Democracy under the ANC

by Marian L. Tupy

Executive Summary

Thirteen years ago, South Africa underwent a peaceful transition from white minority rule to majority rule. Today, the country is a stable multiparty democracy. It has the largest and the most sophisticated economy in Africa, which generates almost 40 percent of all the wealth produced on the African continent south of the Sahara. The African National Congress government, which came to power in 1994, deserves credit for stabilizing the economy and returning it to a steady, albeit slow, growth path.

The ANC's democratic record is less impressive. The government has transformed the state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation into an ANC propaganda machine that has banned some of the government's most prominent critics from appearing on it. The culture of political correctness stifles public debate over the direction

of South Africa's economic and social policies. Those who dare to criticize the government are often labeled as racist. Moreover, the ANC is considering new laws that would undermine judicial independence.

It is increasingly apparent that the ANC wishes to dominate the social and institutional life of South Africa in the same way that it dominates the country's political life. Fortunately, the ANC continues to put great value on its international reputation and tends to be hypersensitive to international criticism. When the government does not act in accordance with the spirit of liberal democracy, members of international civil society groups, the diplomatic corps, and the business community should voice their concern. Constructive criticism could change the ANC's behavior and positively influence political developments in South Africa.

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Introduction

When he lifted the ban on the African National Congress on February 2, 1990, South African president F. W. de Klerk declared that 1989 would “go down in history as the year in which Stalinist communism expired.” He later added: “It was as if God had commanded a turnabout in world history. We had to seize the opportunity.”¹

Indeed, South Africans have seized that historic opportunity, and, some 17 years later, the country that once stood on the brink of a civil war is a stable multiparty democracy and an influential member of a number of international organizations.

Many of South Africa’s macroeconomic indicators have improved. Between 1984 and 1993, the last 10 years of white rule, the compounded average annual GDP growth rate per capita was a *negative* 1.3 percent. In contrast, between 1994 and 2003, the first 10 years of ANC rule, the compounded average annual GDP growth rate per capita was 0.9 percent.² The GDP growth rate has accelerated in recent years, reaching 5 percent in 2006.³

The budget deficit declined from 9.5 percent of the GDP in 1993 to a projected budget surplus in 2007.⁴ Consumer price inflation has declined from a high of 18.7 percent in 1986 to a low of 1.4 percent in 2004. Inflation has hovered around 5 percent since then.⁵ Unfortunately, some problems have gotten worse. For example, the unemployment rate increased from 20 percent in October 1994 to 26.7 percent in September 2005.⁶ Moreover, violent crime and high rates of infectious diseases continue to be a major problem.

Overall economic freedom in South Africa increased from 5.3 in 1990 to 6.7 in 2004 on a 10-point scale. Out of the 130 countries surveyed by the Fraser Institute in its 2006 *Economic Freedom of the World* report, South Africa came in at 53rd place in 2004. After Botswana and Mauritius, South Africa had Africa’s third freest economy. The increase in South Africa’s economic freedom is good news, because countries with higher degrees of

economic freedom tend to have higher rates of growth and higher per capita incomes than countries with more restricted economies.⁷

But all is not well with South African democracy. The ANC may have jettisoned Marxist economics, but it has not abandoned its Marxist party structure and its intolerance for political opposition. The party is dominated by President Thabo Mbeki and his circle of advisers, who discourage internal dissent within the party. On the national level, the ANC continues to extend its influence into virtually every sphere of political and economic life. The opposition parties are being undermined through government propaganda and out-right bullying.

Though the ANC continues to enjoy much of the international support it received in the days when it fought apartheid, a realistic reassessment of the ANC’s attitude toward multiparty democracy is long overdue. The ANC seems determined to build and maintain a permanent hold on power, while using questionable tactics to achieve those aims. Notwithstanding its contribution to the end of apartheid, the time has come for the ANC to be treated like any other political party—with a critical eye.

SABC: The Government Propaganda Machine

The South African Broadcasting Corporation is a state-owned and publicly funded media group that includes 18 radio stations and 4 television stations, with the unmatched ability to reach viewers and listeners throughout that vast country. South Africa also has a privately owned and free-to-air broadcaster called ETV and a privately owned and subscription-funded (i.e., cable) network called DSTV.

In addition to the SABC’s news coverage, ETV is the only subscription-free source of television news in South Africa. The SABC used to broadcast CNN and BBC news, but no longer does so. South Africans who wish

to watch foreign news programs can do so only by subscribing to DSTV. Unlike the SABC, ETV does not receive public funds and is, therefore, at a considerable disadvantage.⁸ ETV's reporting in African languages, for example, is dwarfed by that of the SABC. At the end of 2006, consequently, the SABC's news programs averaged 9.3 million viewers per week compared to ETV's 1.3 million.⁹

In the days of apartheid, the SABC was seen as a propaganda tool of the National Party government. South Africans used to joke about the SABC's extensive coverage of international events and its lack of coverage of domestic news, which, due to political turmoil in the country, was mostly bad. The end of apartheid was supposed to have made the SABC independent, but the broadcaster soon became accused of being a mouthpiece for the ANC. Its reporting has been criticized for ignoring the opposition parties, while lionizing the ANC, government ministers, and President Thabo Mbeki.

For example, the International Federation of Journalists, which is the largest global federation of journalists' trade unions, has denounced the SABC for cancelling the airing of a documentary that the broadcaster deemed critical of President Mbeki. According to Aidan White, the general secretary of the IFJ, the "SABC management had an informal meeting with the presidency's communications department . . . [and that] suggests there was a degree of outside interference . . . There are real concerns the station's editorial independence is under serious threat."¹⁰ To make things worse, it later emerged that the management of the SABC asked the producers of the Mbeki documentary not to speak to the journalists about the cancellation.

The SABC's love-fest with the ANC often leads to embarrassment. Soon after she was appointed as South Africa's deputy president, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka was booed by the supporters of her predecessor, Jacob Zuma. The SABC covered the rally, but did not broadcast the footage pertaining to the incident. In the politically charged atmosphere that followed Zuma's dismissal from the number two

spot in the government, heckling of the new deputy president was certainly newsworthy—a fact pointed out by the South African print media, much of which remains independent of the government. Snuki Zikalala, the SABC's head of news and former spokesman for the ANC, argued that the SABC cameraman was not present when the vice-president was booed. When ETV aired footage showing the SABC filming the incident, the SABC was forced to issue a humiliating apology.¹¹

Moreover, a recent report coauthored by the former head of the SABC, Zwelakhe Sisulu, found that the SABC has banned a number of outspoken critics of the ANC government from appearing on the SABC.¹² Among them was President Mbeki's brother, Moeletsi, who criticized some of the government's race-based redistributionist economic policies, such as the Black Economic Empowerment legislation, as well as his brother's accommodating attitude toward the Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe.¹³

During the 2005 parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe, which most international observers, though not South Africa, rejected as fraudulent, Zikalala banned Mbeki from appearing on the SABC. He alleged that Mbeki "was not on the ground in Zimbabwe" and "did not know what was happening." In fact, Mbeki knew Zimbabwe very well. He used to live there when the apartheid government banned him from South Africa. His real transgression, it seems, was to talk about the economic meltdown and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe.¹⁴

South Africa's state-owned and publicly funded broadcaster is an important source of information among the poor. Its pro-government bias may have contributed to the ANC's increasing share of the vote, which has risen from 62.6 percent in 1994 to 69.7 percent in 2004.

Centralization of Power

The ANC's goal, to quote former deputy president Jacob Zuma, is to stay in power "until Jesus comes back."¹⁵ Indeed, the ANC

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seems set on extending its influence as widely as possible. As an internal discussion paper drafted by Joel Netzhitenzhe, a member of the ANC's National Executive Committee and one of President Mbeki's closest confidants, put it in 1998, "Transformation of the state entails, first and foremost, extending control over all levers of power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals [i.e., state-owned companies], and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the central bank and so on."¹⁶

But, Netzhitenzhe remonstrated, progress has been too slow. "Have we often not allowed ourselves to be distracted by the shallow protestations of the Opposition backed up by the media? Have we been sufficiently open with the people about the problems we face and the challenges that lie ahead or have we reinforced the false impression that '*we are fully in charge*,'" he asked.¹⁷

Much has changed since Netzhitenzhe wrote those words. For example, the ANC has come to dominate all nine provincial legislatures. In the KwaZulu-Natal, which used to be the power base of the Zulu chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party, the ANC formed a majority government following the 2004 general elections. The same happened in the Western Cape, which used to be governed by the NP. Not content with those electoral gains, the ANC has employed questionable tactics to try to gain control of the only major city that remains outside of its control—Cape Town.

For much of the post-apartheid era, Cape Town has been run by the opposition, first by the NP and then by the Democratic Alliance. Today, the city government consists of a coalition of eight parties led by Mayor Helen Zille. A former member of the Black Sash movement, a South African human rights organization, and a recipient of the United Nations' Human Rights Award, Zille is a woman of unimpeachable anti-apartheid credentials. But her membership in the DA, which is South Africa's main opposition party, makes her unpalatable to the ANC. The ANC has recently tried to

replace Cape Town's executive mayor system with an executive committee, on which the ANC, currently excluded from the city government, would have a decisive say. The ANC was forced to abandon its plans, but many commentators saw the ANC's proposals as a blatant attempt to gain control over the city.¹⁸

As the anti-apartheid activist and the head of the South African Institute of Race Relations, John Kane-Berman, wrote at the time:

It is . . . beyond doubt that an abuse of power is being planned in the Western Cape, where Richard Dyantyi, member of the executive council (MEC) for local government, has given notice of his intention to use the Municipal Structures Act to change the system of municipal government in Cape Town. The key import of the change will be to strip the city's mayor, Helen Zille of the Democratic Alliance, of her executive powers at the head of a coalition and reduce her to a figurehead. . . . If the ANC finds it so difficult to accept the outcome of a municipal election it loses, will it be able to accept the outcome of a general election it might one day lose?¹⁹

The ANC has also contemplated an even more controversial initiative—amending the Constitution to deprive the judiciary of some of its independence. Judicial independence is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for equal treatment of individuals before the law—which is a fundamental characteristic of a free and democratic society. Under the leadership of Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay, for example, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court routinely struck down Robert Mugabe's unconstitutional legislation as late as 2000—some 20 years after Mugabe came to power. Threatened with violence, Gubbay quit the court in 2001. With his departure and Mugabe's appointment of a loyalist to head the top court, the era of judicial independence in Zimbabwe came to an end.²⁰

An independent judiciary free of arbitrary government interference is also vital to the protection of private property and inviolability of contracts, which are necessary for economic development. Again, the Zimbabwean economic meltdown in recent years provides a good example of what happens when a government undermines the rule of law and expropriates private property.²¹

Unfortunately, some of the ANC's proposals would take the "administrative power" over the courts from the chief justice and give it to the justice minister. That would put the justice minister in charge of court budgets—something that the judiciary perceives as an attack on its independence. Significantly, the ANC's proposals included a law that would remove the power of the Constitutional Court to suspend an act of Parliament that it deemed unconstitutional.

George Bizos, a prominent lawyer who defended Nelson Mandela during the latter's treason trial in 1963, commented: "Any attempt to limit the functions and jurisdiction of the judiciary is an interference with its independence and therefore a danger to be avoided. . . . I think there may be persons within the Department of Justice who are anxious to control aspects of judicial administration."²²

He also likened the ANC's proposals to the events in the 1950s, when the all-white Parliament passed a law that allowed it to override unfavorable court rulings. "I am not suggesting that we are witnessing a similar level of animosity today, but it may well be that some recently proposed constitutional amendments are the first step down that path," Bizos continued.²³ Though it seemed that the ANC's appetite for a battle over the judicial independence waned last year, the National Executive Council of the ANC revisited the courts agenda in March 2007, suggesting that the proposals are still very much alive.²⁴

Liberation Mythology

In its drive to consolidate power, the ANC mimics other liberation movements that

have created elaborate liberation myths that overemphasize their own role in bringing about majority rule while ignoring or denying the contributions of others. Such myths are useful, for they enable liberation movements to monopolize the appearance of virtue and, with it, power.

Robert Mugabe, for example, has managed to create a powerful narrative that denies anyone but his own party, the ZANU-PF, any historic role in bringing about the end of Ian Smith's government in Rhodesia. A permanent possession of the moral high ground by the ZANU-PF made it immensely difficult for competing political forces to make a meaningful contribution to the policy debate. Prevented from scoring policy successes, opposition parties in Zimbabwe found it difficult to make headway with the electorate.

Worse still, the liberation narrative propagated by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) allowed it to undermine important contributions that others, like Abel Muzorewa²⁵ and Ndabaningi Sithole,²⁶ played in the fight against the Rhodesian government. Unfortunately, by the time that the majority of the Zimbabwean electorate saw through the fog of Mugabe's propaganda and saw him for the tyrant that he was, the opposition parties were emaciated and the rule of law fatally undermined. Zimbabwe had become a one-party dictatorship.

South Africa could face similar dangers in the future. Young people today are increasingly exposed to a doctored history of anti-apartheid struggle that largely ignores the role that Western powers, which imposed economic sanctions on South Africa in the 1980s, played in ending white rule.²⁷ The role of the so-called white liberals, including iconic figures like Helen Suzman, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, and Colin Eglin, is also being minimized.

The emerging liberation myth in South Africa is deceptively simple. The blacks, represented by the ANC, fought the whites, represented by the NP, and the former won. In fact, the ANC was far from alone in opposing apartheid. As Tony Leon, the current leader

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of the DA, wrote:

One wonders how many school children today know that Steve Biko²⁸ was not an ANC member, that the protest in which Hector Peterson²⁹ was killed was organized by the AZAPO,³⁰ or that hundreds of anti-apartheid activists were neither black nor ANC supporters.³¹

As Leon pointed out, dissent against apartheid spanned the entire racial spectrum. Prominent members of the ANC included Indians like Ahmed Kathrada and people of mixed black and white origin like Trevor Manuel. The South African Communist Party was for a long time run by Joe Slovo, who was Jewish.

Helen Suzman, also Jewish, was for a long time the only opponent of apartheid in South Africa's all-white Parliament. First elected in 1953 on the United Party ticket, she switched to the liberal Progressive Party, which she represented between 1959 and 1989. When the government accused her of deliberately asking embarrassing questions about imprisonment without trial and mysterious deaths in detention, Suzman retorted, "It is the answers, not the questions that are embarrassing."³²

Political Correctness and the Silencing of Dissent

The ANC's greatest ally in silencing dissent is a monumentally oppressive culture of political correctness in South Africa. Political correctness originated in Great Britain and in the United States in the 1980s.³³ It came to be characterized by elaborate speech codes and behavioral patterns intended not to cause offense to others, but in South Africa it means something quite different.

As R. W. Johnson, South African writer and former director of the Helen Suzman Foundation, has written:

The consciousness that large groups of people have been badly treated in the

past leads, on the one hand, to a strong sense of assertiveness among such groups . . . and on the other, to a powerful sense of guilt among the former oppressors. These two emotions interact to produce a sort of moral auction, which has evolved into a permanent bargaining process . . . [the result of which] is a culture of "entitlement."³⁴

One of the most consequential political developments in post-apartheid South Africa was the ANC's success in projecting itself as the central vehicle for correcting past wrongs. The ANC, Johnson continued:

has been able to tack large parts of its own agenda . . . onto the desiderata for political correctness. This is why the term [political correctness] is so differently understood in South Africa than it is elsewhere. In practice, a great deal of what is taken for political correctness in South Africa is actually better understood as part of the ANC's hegemonic project: that is to say, its attempt to dominate the social, cultural and institutional life of the country as well as its political life.³⁵

The ANC has been successful in creating a political atmosphere in which views critical of the ANC have become synonymous with opposition to transformation of the society from racial exclusion to racial inclusion. In some cases, the critics of the ANC, including those with impeccable anti-apartheid credentials, have been labeled racists.³⁶ The effect of such slurs, which are in the vast majority of cases utterly unwarranted, on the political discourse in South Africa can be readily imagined. For example, liberal politicians, who are often on the receiving end of the ANC's invectives, advocate a distinctive and potentially beneficial set of economic and social policies. Those policies are effectively disqualified from consideration in the public forum, not because of their lack of merit, but because of the racial profile and the political affiliation of their advocates.

Today's main opposition party in South Africa is the Democratic Alliance. The DA is a successor to the Progressive Party, which opposed the apartheid policies of the dominant NP in the all-white Parliament between the 1960s and the 1980s. With its historical commitment to equality before the law and limited government, the DA has been critical of the government's affirmative action policies as well as of the centralization of power in the hands of the ANC.

In return, the ANC has demonized the DA as un-African and, to use a contemporary South African euphemism, "anti-transformationist." Referring to the DA, Kader Asmal, the erstwhile member of the ANC's National Executive Committee and government minister, wrote that South Africa was fed up with the "liberals." "A genuine liberalism," he wrote, "would not entertain untrammelled enthusiasm for the free markets. . . . A truer liberalism would embrace and promote real equality and equity, guided by liberal theorists such as Oxford's Joseph Raz or, before him, even John Rawls, rather than by the libertarian excesses and self-servingness of Thatcherism and Robert Nozick."³⁷

The liberal critique of the ANC is varied. In 2004, for example, Suzman gave an interview in which she was highly critical: "I had hoped for something much better," she said. "The poor in this country have not benefited at all from the ANC. This government spends like a drunken sailor. . . . Instead of investing in projects to give people jobs, they spend millions buying weapons and private jets, and sending gifts [of weapons] to [Jean-Bertrand Aristide of] Haiti."³⁸

Suzman's criticism of the government went beyond its failures to deliver on the promises it has made to the electorate: "Debate is almost non-existent and no one is apparently accountable to anybody apart from their political party bosses. It is bad news for democracy in this country."³⁹

Tony Leon, who succeeded Suzman in Parliament, has criticized the ANC for undermining debate and opposition. In turn, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, a onetime leader of

the New National Party who switched to the ANC and became South Africa's Minister for Environmental Affairs and Tourism, accused Leon of becoming the Ian Smith of South Africa, which is to say, a leader of a white community that is "isolated, angry, frustrated, with no say [in politics] whatsoever."⁴⁰

Comparing opposition figures to former white rulers alludes to racism or, at least, racial insensitivity. Considering the history of South Africa's race relations, accusations of racism are particularly painful for those whites, like Leon, who were genuinely committed to fighting for racial equality during the time of apartheid. Persistent allusions to apartheid and racism in everyday political discourse discourage most nonblacks from expressing their dissatisfaction with the ANC's rule. Deprived of an effective political voice and punished for the crimes of their fathers through vigorous application of affirmative action, many young whites choose to leave. Between 1995 and 2005, for example, the white population of South Africa declined by 16 percent.⁴¹

Of course, the poisonous political atmosphere in the country does not affect whites alone. Black South Africans, like Moeletsi Mbeki, who speak out against government policies, have often been silenced by the state-run broadcast media.

Still a Marxist Party

The ANC's distaste for the opposing point of view is rooted in the Cold War. When the NP government started cracking down on the party in the late 1960s, many of its top members went into exile. Some, including Mbeki, undertook military training in the Soviet Union and became members of the ANC's sister organization, the SACP. (Curiously, most of Mbeki's biographies omit his stint in the USSR.) Many who remained in South Africa were murdered or, like Nelson Mandela, spent decades in prison. While in exile, the ANC cadres were exposed to the rigid structure and anti-democratic nature of the global communist movement.

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The end of the Cold War proved crucial to South Africa's transformation to a multiracial democracy. It pulled the rug from under those in the NP who feared that majority rule in South Africa would bring about nationalization of private property and the large-scale pogroms that marked communist rule throughout the world. But, the fall of the Berlin Wall also exposed the ANC and the SACP as ideological dinosaurs. Both parties were still wedded to communism. In fact, the SACP re-committed itself to building "East Germany in Africa" just a few months before the Berlin Wall fell.⁴²

Nelson Mandela, who was released from jail in February 1990, undertook the difficult task of modernizing his party's political agenda. Helped by the ANC's iron discipline and his unchallengeable stature as its leader, Mandela severed the close link between the SACP and the ANC, and forced the ANC to abandon much of its Marxist ideological baggage. The "exiles" were strong enough to push through Mbeki's appointment as South Africa's Deputy President despite Mandela's opposition, however. That appointment, together with the aging Mandela's increasing detachment from day-to-day politics, ensured that the ANC retained its Marxist party structure and its intolerance for political opposition.

When Mandela retired from the political scene in 1999, Mbeki became president. Soon, he made it clear that he would not tolerate opposition within his own party. Thus, when potential rivals began to emerge from within the ANC, the president's circle fabricated a ridiculous "presidential plot" that accused high-ranking ANC officials, including Mathews Phosa, Cyril Ramaphosa, and Tokyo Sexwale, of conspiring against the president.⁴³

Having silenced his opponents, Mbeki was reelected in 2004. As R.W. Johnson observed, "Mbeki's second inauguration was a virtual coronation, for he was now an undisguisably imperial figure. More power was now centralized under one man than ever before in South African history—no less than 400 people now worked in the presiden-

tial office and both the new cabinet positions and the new premierships of the provinces were awarded in very much the way an absolute monarch of old distributed offices to clients, mistresses and favorites."⁴⁴

Mbeki's paranoid style of party leadership, as demonstrated by the fabrication of the "presidential plot," is mirrored by the ANC's attitude to political opposition in the country. Its treatment of the Democratic Alliance and other opposition groups suggests that the ANC perceives opposition parties, no matter how loyal and well-intentioned, as enemies.

Conclusion

South Africa has the largest and the most sophisticated economy in Africa. With a GDP of \$240 billion, South Africa accounted for 39 percent of all the wealth produced in Africa south of the Sahara in 2005.⁴⁵ A prosperous and free South Africa is vital to stability and economic development in Southern Africa.

For all those reasons, the Western diplomatic corps, members of international civil society groups, and the business community should keep a closer eye on political developments in South Africa. While recognizing the improvements that have taken place under ANC rule, they should speak out against those policies and political behavior that would undermine the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the media and the functioning of opposition parties.

Clearly, the interests of the ANC and those of South Africa are not identical. The ANC appears interested in concentrating and maintaining power, while South Africa needs a vibrant opposition movement. Only in an atmosphere of openness, where different views and policy recommendations can be thrashed out without intimidation, can South African society hope to find the answers to its pressing social problems such as crime, poverty, unemployment and the spread of infectious diseases. After all, it is precisely the ANC's failure to deliver a higher standard of living and ensure public safety

that makes social unrest in South Africa a real possibility.

Fortunately, the ANC continues to derive much of its international standing and confidence from the accolades it has received from all corners of the world since the end of apartheid. The party is hypersensitive to criticism and, as President Mbeki's reversal of his denialist position on the causal link between HIV and AIDS suggests, able to change course. Constructive criticism of the ANC's more outrageous policies could change its behavior and positively influence political developments in South Africa. In order to do so, however, such criticism must be loud and unambiguous.

Notes

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4. International Marketing Council of South Africa, "South Africa's Economic Policies," http://www.southafrica.info/doing_business/economy/fiscal_policies/fiscal.htm. Also see Trevor Manuel, "Budget Speech," February 21, 2007, <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/budget/2007/speech/speech.pdf>.
5. World Bank.
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11. Edwin Naidu, "'Sorry' Seems Not to be the Hardest Word in this SABC Drama," September 11, 2005, <http://www.sundayindependent.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=1042&fArticleId=2872217>.
12. The SABC refused to publish the report, but *Mail & Guardian*, a South African newspaper, obtained a copy and published it on its website. See "South African Broadcasting Corporation Commission of Enquiry into Blacklisting and Related Matters Report," October 14, 2006, <http://www.mg.co.za/Content/Images/286848/SABCBLACKLISTREPORT.pdf>.
13. Recently, South Africa, which chairs the United Nations Security Council, blocked a Security Council debate on human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. South Africa's ambassador to the United Nations, Dumisani Khumalo, opposed the debate, arguing that the matter belonged to the Human Rights Council because Zimbabwe was not a threat to international peace and security. Ironically, that reasoning was often employed to block Security Council debates on apartheid South Africa. See Wyndham Hartley and Dumisani Muleya, "South Africa: Country Leaving UN Chair on Controversial Note," *Business Day*,

- March 20, 2007, <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A416890>. For a critique of current African policies see Moeletsi Mbeki, "Underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the Private Sector and Political Elites," Cato Foreign Policy Briefing Paper no. 85, April 15, 2005, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb85.pdf>.
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23. *Ibid.*
24. Carmel Rickard, "Judges See Red over ANC Plans to Transform Courts," *Business Day*, March 17, 2007.
25. Abel Muzorewa was a Methodist bishop and nationalist leader, who became the first nonwhite prime minister of Zimbabwe (then known as Zimbabwe Rhodesia) when the white minority rule ended in 1979.
26. Ndabaningi Sithole was the founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union. In the late 1970s, Sithole was sidelined by Robert Mugabe, who transformed ZANU into ZANU-PF (Patriotic Front). Sithole was later accused and convicted of an assassination attempt on Mugabe. Sithole escaped to the United States, where he died in 2000.
27. R.W. Johnson, *South Africa: The First Man, The Last Nation* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2004).
28. Steve Biko was the famous South African anti-apartheid activist murdered by the police in 1977.
29. Hector Peterson was the 13-year old student who was shot and killed during the 1976 Soweto riots. The picture of his dead body carried through the streets of Soweto became an internationally recognized symbol of that uprising.
30. The Azanian People's Organization is a South African political organization.
31. Tony Leon, "A Form of Cowardice," in *Political Correctness in South Africa*, ed. Rainer Erkens and John Kane-Berman (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 2000), p. 65.
32. Judy Rensberger, "South Africa's Helen Suzman: The Conscience of a Troubled Land," *The APF Reporter*, January 24, 1974.
33. R.W. Johnson, "Political Correctness in the Universities, NGOs and the Press" in Erkens and Kane-Berman, p. 30.
34. "Typically, what this [culture of entitlement] means," Johnson continues, "is that a group that is able to point to a past history of victimization is 'entitled' to claim compensation from the present and future generations for the cumulative disadvantages heaped on it previously. This notion has a rough and obvious justice, but it is full of pitfalls. It is one thing to compensate somebody for something that happened to him personally, particularly if you yourself were the one who wronged him; it is quite another to claim that he must benefit now as a consequence of the terrible injustice done to his great-grandfather by someone else." *Ibid.* pp. 38-39.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
36. Leon, p. 64.
37. Kader Asmal, "Is Liberalism Dead or Alive?" *Sunday Times*, May 30, 1999, <http://www.anc.org.za/elections/articles/liberalism.html>.
38. Jane Flanagan, "Democracy? It Was Better under

Apartheid, Says Helen Suzman” *The Daily Telegraph*, May 16, 2004, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/05/16/wsuz16.xml>.

39. Ibid.

40. African National Congress, “Leon Is SA’s Ian Smith: Van Schalkwyk,” April 19, 1999, <http://www.anc.org.za/elections/news/apr/en041703.html>.

41. Patrick Laurence, “Oops, the Census Shrunk the Whites,” *The Sunday Independent*, October 8, 2006,

<http://www.sundayindependent.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=3475894>.

42. Johnson, *South Africa*, p. 199.

43. “Row Deepens over ANC ‘Plot,’” BBC News, April 26, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1298640.stm>.

44. Johnson, *South Africa*, p. 229.

45. Current dollars.

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