This essay argues that the limitations and injustices of the Oslo agreement force a rethinking of the future of Israel/Palestine. The "separation" embodied in Oslo allows Jews to see the Israeli state as innocent and Palestinians to yearn for empowerment, but over the past hundred years a common history has been forged. The author argues that the disappointments on both sides constitute a "broken middle" that could serve as a common ground on which to build a shared future. The article ends with a plea for binationalism as the way to justice and reconciliation, arguing on historical, practical, and especially ethical grounds.

The clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinians in areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in September 1996, ignited by the opening of the archaeological tunnel in Jerusalem, provide a glimpse into the contradictory aspects of the peace process taking place between Jews and Palestinians within the context of the Oslo accords. On the one hand, Jews and Palestinians have come to a historic agreement to settle the military and geographic struggle in which they have engaged for most of this century. On the other hand, the limitations of this settlement are increasingly clear: Every inch of land reverting to the Palestinians is reclaimed within the context of much larger losses. The January 1997 Hebron protocol, which keeps 20 percent of the city (and over 30,000 Palestinians) under Israeli occupation so that 450 Jewish settlers may remain there, illustrates these limitations. Even as the renegotiation of the agreement was drawn out over months, the expropriation of Palestinian land, the building of bypass roads allowing Jewish settlers to crisscross the West Bank without ever seeing a Palestinian, and the further expansion of the settler population in Jerusalem and the West Bank has continued unabated.

For many people, the essential contradiction of Oslo is already in evidence: Whereas Palestinians thought that Oslo was the first step toward an expanded agreement that would see Israel withdraw to its 1967 borders, Israelis have seen Oslo as a final step to solidify their state beyond those borders. And it has become apparent in the era of Netanyahu that even the

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openings for a more generous and just settlement thought to be within Oslo are to be narrowed and limited severely. To be sure, Oslo's contradictions were there from the beginning, but the celebration surrounding the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 held these contradictions in a hopeful, almost suspended, state. Nonetheless, many of us recognized even at the time that the accord represented in crucial ways an Israeli victory and a Palestinian defeat. The rhetoric notwithstanding, the Declaration of Principles promoted a peace without justice for Palestinians, as Israel promised to grant them only a limited and peripheral place in parts of the land that was once theirs.

In some ways, the declaration of Palestinian statehood in 1988 already had abandoned the dream of the reunification of historic Palestine by limiting the Palestinian state to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. That is why the drama of that declaration, issued as it was in the midst of the heady days of the uprising, was for many Palestinians bitter-sweet. Today, these Palestinians feel that Oslo, by retreating from the policy of a clear partition and contiguous geography, with Jerusalem at its center, carries them even further from their dream of reconstituting an historic Palestine. Instead, it provides for a truncated autonomy that, even if eventually called a state, would be so in name only. And whereas Oslo represents for these Palestinians complete and unacceptable surrender, Jews on the ideological right view it as a Jewish capitulation, a travesty in the opposite direction. Thus, while one side feels that the accords herald the end of any viable sense of Palestine, the other feels that they end the messianic dream of the Greater Land of Israel. Still, it is possible to look beyond the immediate situation and see Oslo as neither the end of Palestine nor the end of the Greater Land of Israel. Instead, the accords can be viewed as bringing the almost century-long struggle of Jews and Palestinians to a new stage, the outcome of which remains undecided.

THE "CIVIL WAR" AMONG JEWS

At the height of the Palestinian intifada in 1988, I believed that the uprising would knock to the ground the last Israeli justifications for the occupation. Even if the justifications remained, the cost had increased significantly. The Palestinian casualties, I believed, would only encourage and enlarge the justice of their cause and at the same time exact a cost on the Israeli and international Jewish community that would be so high as to cut at the very fabric of the post-Holocaust Jewish narrative.

Although Palestinians had intimate knowledge of the realities of Jewish behavior in Palestine and Israel, Jews had maintained an aura of victimization and innocence in their empowerment. This aura was essential to mobilizing Jews and others, especially Christians in the West, to support Israel as a moral obligation after the Holocaust. An identity of victimization and innocence, however, has its limits in credibility, especially within the framework
of empowerment. With regard to Israel, this aura already had experienced a steady erosion over the years; one thinks here of the invasion of Lebanon and the bombing of Beirut in 1982 and the policy of might and beatings instituted by Yitzhak Rabin in 1987. With the uprising, Palestinians confronted Jews and the world with the fact that the empowerment of the Jews after the Holocaust is not innocent, and that Jews are no longer victims but, on the contrary, have created in their empowerment victims by displacing another people.

The political struggle within the Jewish community that arose as a consequence of the intifada had all the intensity of a civil war. It had two components. The first was a debate over the policies of the government to quell the uprising, a debate that continued and expanded on the debate that had accompanied the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In some cases, differences led to confrontations between the Jewish establishment in America and in Israel. Those who habitually supported, funded, and spoke for the state and who attempted to silence Jewish dissent were confronted with actions that even they could neither justify nor explain away. Israeli power was too abusive, Palestinian suffering was too intense and the contradictory images of violence and innocence were too visible to be transcended, dismissed as enemy propaganda, or attributed to anti-Semitic influences.

The intensity of this debate arose from that fact that it had to do with the essence of Jewish identity—what it means to be Jewish, the place of justice in the tradition, the squandering of an entire history, and, as well, Jews' right to carry the suffering and the memory of the Holocaust. Would we be able to speak of our own martyrdom in a world where others speak of their own people as being martyred by Jews? The civil war within the Jewish community came to the fore because the images of Jews behaving like those who had oppressed them in the past no longer could be suppressed.

The second component of the "civil war" continues even today: The fight to maintain innocence and power is predicated on the possibility of separating Jews from the "other"—the Palestinians. Only by separation could we Jews pretend that the Jewish struggle for Palestine and Israel had been righteous. In effect, only by pretending that Palestinians do not exist and that their history is not intertwined with Jews can we maintain our post-Holocaust Jewish identity. For how can Jews pretend to an innocence when faced daily with those who embody an indigenous culture that preceded Israel and with the fragments of a society diminished by Israel's birth and expansion? Separation allows a cleansing of Jewish history, to maintain that no one was displaced, no villages were destroyed, no resisters were murdered. The cleansing of separation is twofold: Palestinians are cleansed from their land and Jews are cleansed of their deeds. Victory is assured, and with clean hands, as if the crime of displacing a people had not been committed. It is a strange paradox: Jews who refuse to forget the Holocaust, who refuse
pardons to those who committed criminal acts against the Jewish people, through separation would attempt to forget that Israel came into being through the destruction of Palestine.

The impossibility of forgetting was revealed and emphasized in the uprising. There is a bonding of Jews and Palestinians in blood and struggle (as there is in emerging clusters of solidarity) that makes the conflict, at its very deepest level, an internal one. The uprising intensified the interaction of both peoples in military confrontation and in efforts that sought to minimize and overcome the violence. Some Jewish soldiers experienced their own violence as extreme and unjust. They even at times felt their presence to be akin to the occupation forces that had in the not-so-distant past brutalized Jews. The use of Nazi symbolism by Jews to explain their own behavior became almost commonplace during the uprising, a reversal that cut to the very heart of Jewish history. Legal, educational, and medical solidarity groups crossed the boundaries of both communities, as Jews who no longer could tolerate the actions of their own government and soldiers who found it increasingly difficult to occupy and brutalize innocent people traveled across communal and historical boundaries to confront the issues that divide Jew and Palestinian. In the midst of violence and solidarity, a new level of awareness came into being among those groups that recognized that the future of both peoples, like their recent past, would be shared. A fundamental question was posed: Did Jews and Palestinians want to continue a history of strife and destruction, or was there a way to create a tradition of tolerance and respect, perhaps even a social and political path where difference and mutuality would be seen as enhancing the life of each community?

I do not want to romanticize or diminish the conflict between Jews and Palestinians, which continues to this day, or to attempt to equalize the two communities' suffering, which was and remains completely unequal. Rather, it is necessary to understand that within this war the discovery of a common humanity and a shared destiny has emerged, forcing at least some Jews to reexamine their history and identity and begin to see separation of Jews and Palestinians as a violation of the "other" and the self. An internal interdependence surfaces, proposing to Jews that the healing of the trauma of the Holocaust will not come by oppressing the "other," who is also now a part of Jewish history and identity. It even suggests that, in the long run, the healing of the "other" is crucial to the healing of the self. At one level, the violation of Palestinians may even increase the trauma of Jewish suffering by externalizing that trauma rather than coming to terms with it. How can Jews while having displaced another people feign innocence and claim that empowerment has led to a healing of the Jewish people? It is possible that only a healing of both parties will make the healing of each possible because the history and identity of each at important points have merged. In other words, Jews will be free and secure in their own homeland only when Palestinians are free and secure in their own homeland. And today, those homelands, geographically and historically, coincide.
EMPOWERMENT AND THE BROKEN MIDDLE

The era of Netanyahu forces the seeming contradiction—the point where the "other" is seen as also "within"—to its last stage. The Jewish forces supporting separation are both on the conservative/right and the liberal/left. The religious right, the settlers, and the voices of "dissent" like Amos Oz and A. B. Yehoshua are all in a similar framework. Despite the bitter rhetoric that divides them, the conservative/right and the liberal/left—in political terms Likud and Labor—both believe in the need for what Amos Oz has described as a "divorce" of the two peoples. They differ over the terms of the divorce: The conservative/right would retain all the land (any division of the "Land of Israel" being anathema) but would allow the Palestinians to manage their own affairs on that land; the liberal/left, recognizing Palestinian demographics and troubled by issues of occupying and dominating another people, concedes a territorial dimension to Palestinian self-rule. Both groups, however, share a consensus that Israel is and must be alone to develop its path and destiny.

Yet the idea of "Israel alone," whether on the right or left, is difficult to sustain in the surge of history. Even the Oslo accords, which solidify separation, include joint military patrols and checkpoints and provide for increased political, economic, educational, and cultural contacts. The September 1996 violence found Jews and Palestinians caught in the similar binds of facing one another with guns while securing medical help for the other's wounded. Although this cooperation has been labeled collaborationist and to the advantage of Israel, it is difficult to deny aspects of the essential humanity of these gestures, some made at great risk. It also is difficult to imagine how the Oslo accords can enforce even a compromised separation of Jews and Palestinians in a situation where a significant Palestinian population remains within Israel as citizens, and many more are in close proximity as residents and workers in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. This inside/proximate reality will encourage and demand increased contact and exchange. How else can the economies of both countries be expanded, their security be protected, and peaceable borders be promoted if not through a complex series of relationships that allow distance and proximity?

There is no reason to romanticize the situation in order to see the possibility of a breakthrough to the other side of this conflict. Trends in Israeli society and politics are difficult to predict, while Palestinian society and politics face new and unprecedented challenges. Edward Said has analyzed the steadily deteriorating situation of collaboration, corruption, censorship, and violation of human rights under the PA. Some Palestinians even have compared the PA to the Israeli occupation forces in its autocratic use of power, disdain for alternative voices, and desire to rule the Palestinians with an iron fist. However, the Israeli occupation was clear, purposeful, and easy to mobilize support against, whereas the PA is more difficult to oppose because of the history, symbolism, and possibility of self-rule it represents.
Empowerment is always important and often disappointing. The exile longs for a return to a place that in memory is idealized and enlarged beyond any capacity to be fulfilled in reality. No state or authority is innocent; the empowerment when implemented is inevitably abused, as memory and reality collide. Every people who have suffered and are empowered experience the deflation of expectations and the violation of values held to be at the center of their history. In short, just as empowerment is necessary, thus reminding one not to romanticize disempowerment, it also adds a brokenness to the history of suffering that is sometimes more difficult than the brokenness experienced in the suffering itself. Whereas brokenness in the struggle can be held up as a further reason to carry on, the brokenness of empowerment can be seen as a reason to retreat from history, as if the unfulfilled expectation is too much of a burden. This very disappointment, however, could serve as a deeper call to struggle, another phase of a process that seeks an end but is endless. The situation is completely unequal, and one could argue that the minimum Palestinian empowerment is a dependent one. If empowerment of the Palestinians is too little and too late, they nonetheless experience what many Jews have experienced in relation to Jewish empowerment in the State of Israel: tremendous disappointment, even for some a betrayal of the central ethical thrust of Jewish history.

Perhaps the broken dreams of Jews and Palestinians could provide as meaningful a meeting ground as the battlefield or the negotiating table. The dream of empowerment and the limits of that empowerment, especially in the ethical realm, may provide an opening for both peoples to renegotiate the victory and the surrender into an interdependent space called the “broken middle.” In between, beneath, and within Israel and Palestine is a middle ground where there is no internal or external occupation, no specialness that precludes the “other,” and no idealization of self and peoplehood that promotes the demonization of the “other.” In fact, in the broken middle—a place that includes the memories and dreams of both peoples lived in the present with each other—a new space is open for the ordinary life of two extraordinary peoples. Identity is retained but not isolated or stored up against a future that is feared. The broken middle, while attentive to the past, lives in the present and from that present seeks a common future. The hope is that over time a new culture will be born, one that includes the particularity of both peoples and creates a new identity from a shared life. How that future will evolve cannot be determined in advance.

Living in the present allows a future to develop that would be impossible if Jews and Palestinians were separated. The current situation makes clear that for Jews and Palestinians to live alone, separate, hostile, and walled off from one another only will continue the cycle of mistrust and atrocity. For Jews, the trauma of the Holocaust remains unhealed; for Palestinians, their 1948 Catastrophe remains with them. The era of Auschwitz and the Palestinian Catastrophe can be ended only in the broken middle of Israel/Palestine.
trophe can be ended only in the broken middle of Israel/Palestine, where both Israel and Palestine are present and transcended.

Jerusalem, where Jews and Palestinians intermingle and where the heightened significance of the city could be balanced by an ordinary life lived by Jews and Palestinians, should be the meeting ground where two peoples come together to create a future of peace and justice. At the same time, Jerusalem serves as a warning that the recognition of a shared history and the possibility of meeting in the broken middle can be realized only with a reversal of the expansion of Israel and restoration of the multicultural nature of Jerusalem. Increasingly, the Old City, as symbolic of the larger city, is becoming Jewish, and Palestinian residents are encroached upon, with little left to them but tourist boutiques. What has occurred over the years in the division and “unification” of Jerusalem shows us once again that the Jewish desire for separation is a desire for victory.

One wonders how the shared life of Jew and Palestinian can be envisioned for the whole of Israel/Palestine without being centered in Jerusalem. With Jerusalem as the center, the identity of both would be affirmed and, over time, joined. As a religious, cultural, political, and economic crossroads for the larger life of Jews and Palestinians, the reversal of Israeli dominance and the restoration of Palestinian life must be enshrined symbolically and politically, that is, through recognition of a common center and with joint governance. Recognition of shared history means a reintegration of Palestinian and Jewish life, that is, a reversal of the displacement of the Palestinian people. Jerusalem only can become the broken middle (and thus the birthplace of an identity that includes and transcends Israel and Palestine) if a viable and equal life of Jew and Palestinian is planned and implemented.

Binationalism and the Future

The present impasse is illustrative of the need to search out this broken middle. There will be those who say no to such a proposal and their reasons, to some extent, will be understandable. After this long history of division, suspicion, torture, and death, why trust the “other,” the Jew or the Palestinian? Why risk the inclusion of the “other” in the framework of a carefully choreographed identity? Why would the victor give up hard-fought gains? Why would the loser trust the victor to begin a process of reconciliation? Yet, there are practical reasons to choose this direction, although they only come into view within a larger moral or religious framework.

If the larger historical view is neglected, if the question of peoplehood is denied, if nothing beside power is seen to be at stake, if no historical responsibility is assumed, if the question of fidelity—including the question of fidelity to the martyrs of one’s own people—is left out, then there is no reason for the victor to pursue the broken middle. There is no hope for the defeated, or rather the only hope for the defeated is to inflict a defeat on the present-day victor at some later date. If nothing is at stake except the pursuit of victory—a
total victory if possible—then protection of that victory is the only avenue to pursue. The defeated can expect nothing of the victor except the heel of the boot so that the defeated never will rise again. The cycle of history will con-
tinue, and it is power alone that determines who survives the cycles.

Although the terrain of the broken middle as yet is unexplored in the sense of an active, just, and shared communal life of Jews and Palestinians, the intellectual groundwork has existed for decades in Jewish life. For exam-
ple, Martin Buber and Judah Magnes, both of whom were religious, Zionists, and binationalists, hammered out their commitments before the State of Israel was created in 1948, and both opposed the declaration of a Jewish state in favor of a federation or confederation of Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Neither Buber nor Magnes were marginal Jews. Buber was known through-
out the world as a pioneer in the field of religion, and Magnes was the first
president of Hebrew University. Hannah Arendt, the great philosopher, was also a binationalist in the tradition of Buber and Magnes. All three saw the joining of Jew and Arab in Palestine as a witness to the potential of Jewish
life during and after the Holocaust and as a necessity if the universal witness of the Jewish people was to continue in the future. Magnes even actively
opposed recognition by the United States of the declaration of Israeli state-
hood by lobbying in personal meetings with Secretary of State George Mar-
shall and President Harry Truman. What today might seem extreme, even
traitorous, to Jews, was for Magnes his solemn duty as a Zionist. To choose
statehood would mandate the expulsion of Palestinians and, for Magnes,
contradict the Zionist impulse to reconstruct Jewish life, culture, and lan-
guage in a spirit of fraternal solidarity. Such a division of Jew and Arab only
could mean building and maintaining a garrison state whose thought, action,
and vision would be consumed by the exercise of military might. This divi-
sion would bring about the opposite of the Jewish people’s cultural aspira-
tions: After the long travail of Jewish history, a Jewish state would continue
the cycle of displacement that binationalist Jews wanted so desperately to
end.

Binationalism is rejected today by most Jews, or simply dismissed as na-
ive. It is almost as if the predictions of Magnes, Buber, and Arendt about the
formation of a Jewish Sparta had come to fruition with such force that even
the memory of an alternative has been forgotten. That, of course, is the ulti-
mate price of a militarism that takes on a life of its own and is assumed as a
way of life. The “before” of militarization is forgotten, as well as the possibil-
ity of a demilitarized life in the future. Nonetheless, the tradition of bination-
alism survives, albeit on the fringes of Jewish life. Paradoxically, it appears
increasingly reasonable as the accords, divisions, and confrontations be-
tween the two sides increase. As the final stages of the conflict and settle-
ment appear, as the negotiated surrender is fought for and fought over, as
the cycle seems destined to continue indefinitely, the common program of
building and rebuilding, development and redevelopment takes on new im-
petus. The Jewish state retains its power, but at an increasing cost. The final
division between Palestinian and Jew is seen as more and more unworkable if both peoples are to have a viable communal, economic, cultural, and geographic life.

To allow Israel and Palestine to remain in their present configuration is to consign Palestinians to a ghettoized, apartheid-like series of Bantustans. Even withdrawing to the 1967 boundaries, including the rededication of Jerusalem, would leave the Palestinians with little of historic Palestine and further remind Jews of the dangers of a small and isolated state in the Middle East. If on the Israeli side there is little movement toward complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and if on the Palestinian side a severely truncated Palestinian autonomy has no viability, then the solution stands not midway between the two but beyond the two in a merger that respects both identities in their independence and interdependence. It is becoming clearer now, as the Oslo process continues, that the binational option is the only possible future for both Jews and Palestinians. If one looks at the very mapping of Oslo, what will be left of Palestine when it is implemented? Although for Buber, Magnes, and Arendt the choice of binationalism was perspectival, in that they foresaw the future in division if statehood was pursued, those who seek binationalism today do so because the future has arrived with a clarity difficult to deny.

Binationalism today in the Jewish community is carried along two fronts, one religious, as represented by Daniel Boyarin, a Talmudic scholar, and the other secular, as represented by Tikva Honing-Parnass, editor of the journal *News from Within*. This binationalism accepts the framework of a democratic secular state that separates religion and national identity and promotes citizenship without reference to ethnic or religious identity. Both Boyarin and Honing-Parnass cite the contradiction between a Jewish state and a democratic one, a contradiction that cannot be resolved through the Oslo accords. For Boyarin, a Jewish state fundamentally distorts Judaism as it comes into the service of the state. For Honing-Parnass, a Jewish state fundamentally distorts the concept of democracy. That Judaism and democracy can thrive in a secular state is an axiom accepted by Jews in the West, even as they deny its possibility in Israel. In Israel, a secular democracy is favored by a majority of Jews for Jews but is denied to Palestinians. How Israel can be a secular democratic state for the almost 20 percent of the population within Israel that is not Jewish is a question that often is buried; also buried is the question of how a secular democratic state for Palestinians can be constructed in an area without the resources to support a state at all. The Jewish nature of the state is assumed when the majority of the empowered population is Jewish by birth. However, Boyarin wonders whether the content of that Jewishness might not serve as a cover for other interests, for example, the monopolization of status and power. Can a state credibly claim to be Jewish and democratic when it denies equal access to non-Jews living within that society?
From the Palestinian perspective, Azmi Bishara echoes the ideas of Boyarin and Honing-Parnass in the following challenge to Jewish progressives:

We will have to point out to the Israeli left that its current slogan of separation—in the context of Oslo—is actually a racist slogan: it legitimates the idea that Palestinians are a demographic threat. In its stead, we must propagate political programmes that emphasize the genuinely binational values of equality, reciprocity, and co-existence.2

Boyarin and Honing-Parnass fulfill this challenge in their commitment, but the details of such a program remain to be articulated. It is possible that recognition of shared destiny would force a practical consideration of a democratic secular state.

The reasons for a binational and secular democratic state are deeper than religion and politics. There is a less theoretical and intellectual movement toward a system that recognizes the rights of all and prohibits prejudice against any group or individual. Within the context of histories of suffering and in the midst of a complex political situation, there have been historically, and are today, Jews and Palestinians who have crossed the boundary of “otherness” into a solidarity that proposes an outstretched hand and the prospect of healing. From the Jewish side, I think especially of Holocaust survivors and their children who have experienced the intimacy of suffering and the brokenness that is part of that suffering, and who nonetheless, or perhaps because of their Holocaust experience, recognize the suffering of the Palestinians as part of their own. Or they recognize the suffering of the Palestinians as an extension of their own suffering, as a further violation of the same human dignity that had been so grievously violated in them. That Jews could do such things, that such things could be done in their name, and that the cycle could be continued by those who protest against Jewish suffering, all deepen the wound of the Holocaust.

It is almost as if these survivors and their children see the cessation of violence against Palestinians as necessary for their own healing, that somehow the histories of the Holocaust, Israel, and Palestine have become one, and that the reconciliation of Jew and Palestinian holds forth the possibility of ending the cycle of violence and atrocity. By ending the cycle—by beginning to walk together in pain and hope—a future beyond the Jewish Holocaust and the Palestinian Catastrophe is envisioned. For example, the poet Irena Klepfisz, whose father died heroically in the Warsaw ghetto uprising, compared that event to the Palestinian uprising as a way of asserting the right to restore the ordinary life of Palestinians as her father had died defending the right of Jews to that same ordinary life. Sara Roy, whose parents sur-
vived the Nazi death camps, has spent years traveling among Palestinians in Gaza researching and writing about the effects of the Israeli occupation on the Palestinian people. The medical doctor Henry Asher, a child of refugees from Nazi Germany, traveled to Lebanon and during the Israeli invasion provided medical care to the injured. In this context one also hears the prophetic words of the survivor of Buchenwald who, his son a paratrooper in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, went on a hunger strike in front of Yad VaShem, the Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem, to protest that invasion. His words are telling: "When I was a child of ten and was liberated from the concentration camp, I thought that we shall never suffer again. I did not dream that we would cause suffering to others. Today we are doing just that. The Germans in Buchenwald starved us to death. Today in Jerusalem, I starve myself, and this hunger of mine is no less horrific. When I hear 'filthy Arabs' I hear 'filthy Jews.' I see Beirut and I remember Warsaw."\(^3\)

It is this memory that can provide the impetus for a political, humanistic, and religious solidarity that will expand the negotiated surrender beyond the dichotomous division of winner and loser. This solidarity shouts in word and deed that the hour is very late, and that once squandered, the possibility of recognizing and reconciling that shared history may be lost forever. Jews and Palestinians will continue to share the land in a bloody struggle without end. Then a new generation will come of age with their own memories of suffering. Will the possibility of solidarity be heard by them, or will that path be so faint that only the cry of expansion and revenge makes sense? In the era of Netanyahu, the choice is starkly presented. That choice awaits our response—clear, unequivocal, now.

**Notes**


2. Quoted in Graham Usher, "Bantustanisation or Bi-nationalism?" *Race and Class* 37 (October-December 1995), p. 49.