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The policymakers most responsible for shaping policy on the Palestinian-Israeli question in both the Bush and the Clinton administrations, a team led by special mediator Dennis Ross, came of age politically at a time when the Palestinian perspective was virtually excluded from American political discourse. These policymakers, by their own testimony emotionally involved in Arab-Israeli issues because of their Jewish roots, are naturally inclined to view the issue from the traditional Israel-centered vantage point despite their occasionally harsh criticism of Israel's right-wing government and their vaunted understanding of Palestinian sensibilities. Part III of this series examines how the old frame of reference still determines policy even in an era when Palestinians are seen as legitimate participants in the peace process.

In October 1997, during one of many efforts to restart stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erakat made an emphatic point to U.S. special mediator Dennis Ross. What mattered in the proposed talks, he said, was the issues that would be on the table rather than precisely when the talks would begin, which is what the United States had been concentrating its energies on. “Process, meetings, and handshakes,” observed Erakat, “have so far been a shield to Mr. Netanyahu’s not making decisions.”

Erakat’s observation goes to the heart of U.S. policy on the peace process as it has been formulated throughout the administrations of Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton, when the same man, Dennis Ross, has been deeply involved in shaping Middle East policy. During both administrations, process has taken precedence over substance. Because Israel is the party holding the territory and therefore the negotiating cards, the American concentration on process has tended to favor Israel by perpetuating the status quo.

The new policy-making team has at various points included Ross, who became director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in the Bush administration and stayed on as principal mediator under Clinton; Richard Haass, director of Middle East affairs on the National Security Council (NSC) staff under Bush; Aaron David Miller, a Policy Planning Staff analyst in both


Journal of Palestine Studies XXVII, no. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 53-64.
administrations, who wrote two books on the Palestine question in the 1980s; Daniel Kurtzer, a Foreign Service officer in the Near East Bureau fluent in both Hebrew and Arabic, who left direct involvement in a policy-making role when he became ambassador to Egypt during Clinton’s second term; and Martin Indyk, a former pro-Israeli lobbyist who succeeded Haass on the NSC staff when Clinton took office and has since served as ambassador to Israel and assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs.

All these men believe that a peace settlement can be achieved by cajoling Israel into taking small, incremental steps rather than by squeezing or coddling it. They appear to believe that because they have often been harshly critical of Israel, they are unbiased on Palestinian-Israeli issues. They all have had a deep interest in Arab-Israeli issues since their teenage years, and most have at least some familiarity with Arabs. Ross is said to feel that there is a warmth in both Arabs and Israelis that he has not found in other regions. Miller and Kurtzer have written about Palestinians with considerable understanding. But to call these men neutral, or able to view the issue objectively from both Palestinian and Israeli perspectives, is to misunderstand the mindset from which they are operating.

Almost all these individuals have for years been closely involved, from positions both inside and outside the government, in promoting the U.S. tie with Israel. Ross and Haass participated at middle levels of the Reagan State Department in efforts to promote strategic cooperation with Israel. Indyk came to prominence during the Reagan years as a strategic analyst for the principal pro-Israel lobbying organization the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and later cofounded and became executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank spun off from AIPAC. Most have close religious and family ties to Israel and have lived there. Even Miller, reputed to be the least biased, has said that he does not know where the line between professional and personal involvement in the peace process lies. Ross acknowledges that being Jewish has heightened his interest in the Arab-Israeli problem. These men are openly regarded in Israel as identifying with Israel’s Labor party. According to Palestinian negotiator Hanan Ashrawi, who met regularly with them during preparations for the 1991 Madrid conference and during bilateral peace talks in Washington in 1992 and 1993, the Palestinians saw the American team as representing a map not of America’s domestic political scene but of Israel’s, with allegiances to Labor, Likud, or Peace Now.

A study of the thinking of Ross and his colleagues in both administrations, as revealed in their writings and policy decisions, indicates that their fundamental views have not changed appreciably from earlier periods. The story of how these “Israelists” have helped shape (or actually made) Palestinian-Israeli policy over the last decade demonstrates the limitations of a policy that attempts to resolve a two-sided conflict from the vantage point mainly of one side.
GEORGE BUSH: WAITING FOR "RIPENESS"

When President Bush took office in early 1989, U.S. policy on the Palestinian-Israeli problem had for so long been molded within a framework excluding the Palestinian perspective that American policymakers seem not to have recognized the opportunities presented by the new situation created by the PLO's formal acceptance of coexistence with Israel. Taking office at the height of the intifada and immediately after the start of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, had initially hoped to move forward on the peace process, but they were deterred from taking forceful action during their first eighteen months in office both by their own innate caution and by the go-slow approach advocated by the Ross team.

It is true that the Bush administration went further in terms of verbal confrontation with Israel than its predecessors. Both Bush and Baker were pragmatists, less fettered by the restraints of the U.S. relationship with Israel than any president and secretary of state except Jimmy Carter and Cyrus Vance. If not anti-Israeli, their instincts were clearly not pro-Israeli. Bush developed an intense personal dislike for Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, who, he thought, was playing him for a fool by repeatedly misleading him about settlement construction. During their first year in office, Bush and Baker publicly urged the Likud to abandon its visions of a "Greater Israel"; threatened not to grant Israel's 1990 request for $400 million in housing loan guarantees; strongly criticized Israel's settlement construction in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza; and reaffirmed longstanding but seldom articulated U.S. policy that East Jerusalem was part of the occupied territories.

But lack of sympathy for Israel did not make Bush and Baker champions of the Palestinians or advocates of an activist approach to peace negotiations. Both men were interested in the process of peacemaking rather than the substance, essentially seeking a solution as a political achievement rather than for the sake of peace. As a result, their commitment to the process waned whenever obstacles arose. In interviews, Bush referred to himself frequently as "cautious" and "prudent" and, according to one analyst, appeared to equate inaction with virtue. Baker was dubbed by former Reagan aide Michael Deaver "the most cautious human being I've ever met." These traits essentially paralyzed them in the search for peace.

Bush's and Baker's inclination to caution dovetailed nicely with the Ross-led team's aversion to innovation. The Middle East advisers believed that the United States should avoid activism and remained unconvinced of the need to deal with the Palestinian issue at all. Before the 1988 presidential election, Ross, Haass, and Lawrence Eagleburger, who became undersecretary of state, had advertised their views in a much-heralded report, drafted by a study group on which they served, recommending Arab-Israeli policy for the new administration. Issued by Martin Indyk's pro-Israeli Washington Institute, the report was a blueprint for inaction. Concluding that the United States should shun efforts to achieve a rapid breakthrough, the report urged
the administration to engage in a drawn-out "ripening process" that would gradually create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations.

The report bore the stamp of the old thinking on Palestinian-Israeli issues. After eight years in which the Reagan administration had generally acquiesced in Israel's policies, a considerable body of misconceptions about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had gained currency among U.S. political elites. Most of these misconceptions, relating to alleged Arab intransigence and the supposed marginality of the Palestinian issue in the peace process, were not new, but the rising prominence of think tanks such as the Washington Institute, with its easy access to policymakers, gave these assumptions a coherence they had not previously enjoyed. This body of assumptions found its way into the basic premises of the Washington Institute report and then formed the initial basis of Bush administration policy.

Baker was sufficiently impressed with this thinking to repeat some of the same terminology years later in his own memoirs, asserting, for example, that when Bush took office there was no evidence that the climate was "ripe" for generating movement toward peace. Neither side was ready to make hard choices, he wrote; the PLO still desired Israel's destruction, and the only chance for peace lay in splitting off West Bank-Gaza Palestinians from the PLO. These views had all been put forward by the Ross-Haass team in 1989—despite the PLO's major peace initiative in November 1988 and its major concession in recognizing Israel's right to exist.¹¹

Ross, Haass, and (to the extent he had influence on early Bush administration policy via the advisers' group) Indyk had a long paper trail demonstrating their fundamental outlook and the lineage of Bush administration policy in its early period. The writings and speeches of Ross and his colleagues (with the exception of Miller) tend to belie current commentary about how well they understand the Arabs.¹² Several themes recur: that the PLO was incapable of compromise and had to be bypassed; that West Bank and Gaza Palestinians were inherently more moderate than the PLO and could constitute an "alternative Palestinian leadership"; that most Arab demands on Israel were by their very nature unreasonable; that the burden of compromise lay with the Arabs; that most Arabs believed that they did not have to act because time was on their side and because the United States would exert pressure on Israel; that the Palestinians were not a distinct people and had only lately inserted themselves into what was essentially an interstate conflict; that Israelis had vital security needs that needed to be accommodated, but that Palestinians, as the mere "intercommunal" element of an interstate conflict, had no similar concerns.

The notion underlying the 1988 Washington Institute report, which remains the guiding principle behind Clinton administration policy to this day, has been part of Ross's approach for over a decade. In a nutshell, it holds that the United States should do virtually nothing to move the peace process
along until the parties themselves are ready. In 1985 Ross authored a policy paper for the Washington Institute, aptly titled "Acting with Caution," which concluded that because the Arabs (but not Israel) were inflexible and unready to move toward a settlement, the United States should simply await "real movement from the local parties." When he moved into the Bush administration four years later, he still gave the Palestinians little credit for recent compromises and reportedly believed (despite his support for the Israeli Labor party and opposition to the Likud government's hard-line stance) that Shamir could be cajoled into greater flexibility. Much of the verbal pressure that Bush and Baker exerted on Shamir, particularly Baker's May 1989 speech urging Israel to abandon dreams of a "Greater Israel," originated in Ross's belief that at base Shamir was a pragmatist who only needed some tough talking.

Richard Haass, who was a key White House participant in early Bush policy-making and later accompanied Baker on several shuttle missions to organize the 1991 Madrid peace conference, espoused the same nonactivist role. Much in his writings, in fact, points to his heavy hand in drafting the Washington Institute report, including the concept of "ripeness." American activism, Haass consistently maintained, would harm U.S. interests by antagonizing Israel and encouraging the Arabs to believe they could rely on the United States to pressure Israel rather than make concessions themselves.

The notion that an active U.S. role would encourage Arab intransigence—an old shibboleth among Israel supporters—was a recurrent theme not only in Haass's writings but in those of Ross and Indyk as well. Ross made the point in his 1985 paper. Indyk pushed the idea at the Washington Institute. In a symposium held shortly after the PLO had accepted the terms set down by the United States for opening a formal U.S.-PLO dialogue, Indyk chastised the PLO for aiming its concessions at the United States rather than Israel—even though the United States for years had demanded precisely those concessions for a U.S.-PLO dialogue. He believed that dealing too closely with the Palestinians was risky because it would encourage them to hold out for concessions from Israel.

Perhaps the most notable aspect of the thinking of these men throughout the Bush years, and well into the Clinton administration—indeed, until the 1993 Oslo agreement legitimized the PLO—was their reluctance to recognize the centrality of the Palestinian element in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the critical role played by the PLO in Palestinian politics. Indyk, for instance, was chagrined when, as a result of the intifada and PLO concessions, the Palestinian issue came to be seen as part of the broader conflict. The intifada, he said, had introduced a "complication" into the situation because it indicated that the Arab-Israeli conflict was suddenly no longer only an interstate conflict but "now possesses an additional intercommunal component." Similarly, Haass revealed a misunderstanding of the roots of the conflict when he observed in a 1990 book that the intifada had "Palestinianized" what had previously been "a traditional interstate conflict." Even after the United States had
formally opened a dialogue with the PLO, these men clung for some time to
the hope that an alternative Palestinian leadership, of West Bankers and
Gazans ready to forsake the PLO, would emerge to make bypassing the PLO
possible.

With the Palestinians by the late 1980s anxious for negotiations and
Israel's Likud government opposed to any change in the status quo, the non-
interventionist approach taken by the Washington Institute authors team
once inside the administration automatically favored Israel's refusal to move
forward. Bush and Baker, lacking a strategic vision of a Middle East at peace
and with little interest in the substance of the process, initially were inclined
to follow the "Israelist" team's cautious approach even though they opposed
Israel's policies. As a result, so little was accomplished in the administration's
first eighteen months that the peace process went completely off track in the
summer of 1990. Some analysts believe that had the negotiating process not
collapsed, and had PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat not in frustration thrown in
his lot with Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader might not have been embold-
ened to invade Kuwait.\textsuperscript{13} The ensuing Gulf crisis diverted attention from
attempts to restart the peace process for almost a year.

One result of the Gulf War was to temporarily reduce the role of the Mid-
dle East advisers. Thus, when Bush and Baker turned their attention again to
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, they did so because their own impulses
pointed in that direction, not because of any urging from the Ross team. The
intensive shuttle diplomacy involved in organizing the Madrid peace confer-
ence, the pressure exerted on Israel to bring Yitzhak Shamir to the table, and
Bush's unusual action in withholding approval of Israel's request for $10 bil-
lion in housing loan guarantees in the fall of 1991 and forcefully standing up
to AIPAC on the issue were the policy initiatives of a president and secretary
of state spurred to new levels of activism by the success of the Gulf War and
a sense that in the postwar atmosphere they could achieve a political victory
by forcing the peace process. Madrid was a major departure from the hands-
off policy advocated by Ross.

Still, even this activism was on behalf of process, not of substance, and it
was quickly shown to contain the seeds of its own failure. \textit{New York Times}
correspondent Thomas Friedman noted that the "Baker-Bush peace process
was . . . focused primarily on getting the parties to the table. It never really
intended to get the parties to agreements, with compromise proposals of its
own."\textsuperscript{14} Having acheived their goal of convening the conference, they
seemed to lose interest. The peace process was thus left to the care of the
Ross team, which continued to recommend against activism and ultimately
allowed the negotiations to bog down.

**Bill Clinton: A Continuum**

Whereas in the Bush administration, both the president and Baker coun-
terbalanced their advisers' Israeli orientation, there is no one in a key posi-
tion under Clinton who is not in some way emotionally connected to Israel. Indeed, Clinton is usually labeled the most pro-Israeli president in history, surpassing even Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan. As a result, and because neither the president nor either of his secretaries of state, Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright, has taken an interest in the details of Palestinian-Israeli policy, Ross and his team, now consisting of Miller and Indyk, generally have had free rein to formulate policy. The antipathy of Clinton and his policymakers to the Likudist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu parallels the Bush administration's antipathy to Likud's Shamir, and the verbal fireworks occasionally have been intense. But the fundamental emotional commitment to Israel has been what principally determines U.S. policy.

Clinton himself, a product of the Bible Belt, shares the sentimental affinity for Israel that influenced many of his predecessors, an affinity unmarred by his poor relationship with Netanyahu. As a nonconfrontational politician on all issues, Clinton's inclination is to avoid pressing Israel even when he disagrees with its policies. Thus, his unhappiness as of early 1998 over the West Bank redeployment issue never took the form of real economic or military pressure. Clinton has been particularly reluctant to do battle over Israel with Congress, where Netanyahu has the solid backing of conservative Republicans. Political scandal has heightened this tendency.

Vice President Albert Gore's outlook is likewise oriented to Israel's perspective. His close friendship with New Republic publisher Martin Peretz, who is deeply attached to Israel and extremely hostile to Palestinian nationalism, no doubt has heavily influenced his thinking. Peretz is a former tutor of Gore's at Harvard, the Peretz and Gore families vacation together, and it is likely that Gore learned much of what he knows about Arab-Israeli issues from Peretz. With a Senate record that placed him in the ranks of Israel's staunchest supporters, Gore has shown no inclination as vice president to modify his approach.

In this atmosphere, although the Palestinian perspective has assumed greater legitimacy in public discourse, the Palestinians are still not accepted as equal contenders for public or policymaker attention. U.S. policy has, by omission and in many ways by commission, remained as focused on Israel as it ever was. In an April 1998 interview to Near East Report, for example, Indyk declared that the ideas of "even-handedness" and of "pressure" are "not in our lexicon." Hanan Ashrawi has portrayed Ross and his colleagues throughout the negotiating process from 1991 through the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP) as patronizing toward the Palestinians and motivated principally by a concern to do what was good for Israel. This was also the Palestinian impression during negotiations leading to the January 1997 Hebron agreement, where strong U.S. backing of Israel's security concerns was seen by Palestinian negotiators as undercutting their own positions. In documents accompanying the Hebron accord, the United States assured Israel that the "key element" in the U.S. approach to peace "has always been a
recognition of Israel's security requirements," as defined by Israel, and made it clear that further withdrawals by Israel under Oslo would be decided by Israel alone and not in negotiation with the Palestinians. The Clinton team's focus on Israel's perspective seems to have prevented it from recognizing the Palestinians' own security concerns or the fact that a stable peace requires that both sides feel secure.

Since Netanyahu's election in 1996, the peace process has lurched from crisis to crisis, each necessitating some American intervention. In the final analysis, however, the United States has done nothing to overcome the negotiating impasse, taking refuge in the old Ross notion that Washington is virtually powerless to move things along unless the parties themselves are ready. The United States did venture beyond the hands-off approach during the 1998 conflict over the extent of Israel's next West Bank redeployment, but Washington's insistence on a 13-percent redeployment instead of Israel's offered 9 percent hardly constitutes a dramatic initiative on substance. Even so, Indyk downplayed the proposal, explaining that the United States saw it merely as an "idea" and that "drawing lines on maps" is "up to Israel."

When American officials say that the parties are not ready for movement, they appear not to recognize that because it is only the Likud government that is "unready," any American decision to maintain hands off while waiting for the parties to become ready automatically favors Israel. This is a scenario familiar to Ross; having gone through this with Shamir in the early days of the Bush administration, he cannot have been surprised that Netanyahu would procrastinate or that procrastination would bring deadlock.

Since Israel and the PLO signed the DOP in 1993, the Clinton administration has taken the view that honest mediation prevents the United States from espousing a position on virtually any substantive issue. In its overriding concern to avoid dealing with substance, the administration has even backed away from some of the key positions that had undergirded U.S. policy for decades. This has altered the ground rules, changed the language of negotiations, and, in a key way, reframed the objectives of the peace process.

On Israeli settlements, for instance, whereas the Carter administration called them "illegal" and even the Reagan administration termed them "obstacles to peace," the Clinton administration has labeled them merely "complicating factors"—a change in terminology and ground rules that former Secretary of State James Baker has called a "mistake . . . if you want to make progress." Even Madeleine Albright's call in the fall of 1997 for a "time-out" in settlement construction tends to legitimize settlements: settlement construction is to be temporarily halted, not stopped. At the United Nations, the United States since the Oslo agreement has refused to debate Israel's settlement activity because it is "unproductive to debate the legalities of the issue." In March and April 1997, the United States voted against four UN resolutions
criticizing Israel's construction of the Har Homa settlement in East Jerusalem, contending that it was inappropriate for the UN to become involved in an issue that the two parties to the conflict had to settle by themselves. The administration has also urged the elimination of several longstanding UN resolutions, including one the United States had annually cosponsored for over forty years, because it believes these resolutions are "contentious."20

Most significantly, the United States has subtly but fundamentally altered its position on the ultimate disposition of the occupied West Bank and Gaza. In June 1993, Ross authored a statement of principles that left ultimate sovereignty of the territories—and even of areas coming under Palestinian autonomous control—to be decided in final-status negotiations.21 Ross's statement, written for Secretary of State Christopher's signature, made no specific mention of land for peace (beyond a perfunctory reference to UN Resolution 242) and accepted Israel's right to assert a claim to the territories. This fundamentally altered the longstanding U.S. position that the territories should be returned to Arab control except for "minor border adjustments" in return for Arab agreement to full peace with Israel.

These terms of reference indicate that the United States has come to consider the territories "disputed"—not, as previously, "occupied"—and that what had been understood to mean "full territory for full peace" has become instead "some territory for full peace." Ross's position on the subject had been spelled out years earlier, in his 1985 paper for the Washington Institute. Urging the Arabs and their Soviet backers to recognize Israel's security requirements, he suggested that they "go beyond" UN Resolution 242, where the land-for-peace concept originated, and accept "the need for 'defensible borders,' meaning the acceptance of the principle of territorial compromise, rather than total withdrawal."22 The concept of "territorial compromise" had until then implied withdrawal by Israel in return for full peace from the Arabs—not, as Ross indicated here, territorial compromise by the Arabs in order to guarantee Israeli security.

The United States' supposedly neutral position of refraining from voicing opinions on such issues as the status of the land and Israel's occupation practices is actually a position of support for Israel. While ostensibly attempting to create a "level playing field," the United States has in fact, by ignoring UN resolutions, removed the international guarantees that have been the Palestinians' principal support. Symbolic and intangible though these guarantees may be, they have been what the Palestinians have had to rely on in a situation in which Israel enjoys the real tangible advantages—a state, physical control of the land, clear military superiority—that the United States itself underwrites.

A significant aspect of the old frame of reference has been its power to obscure the effect of U.S. aid in stiffening Israel's resistance to demands for concessions. In concluding that the situation was not "ripe" for a serious American initiative, Ross and his colleagues have argued that the polarized Israeli body politic could not reach a consensus on how to alter the status
quo. But this observation begs the question of whether massive amounts of no-strings-attached U.S. aid encourage Israeli Likud governments in the belief that hard decisions are not necessary. This situation further leads the more dovish elements in Israel to believe they can do nothing themselves to alter the status quo. None of the proponents of the "ripeness" theory seems to have examined the role of the American factor in bringing or failing to bring Israel to the point of "ripeness."

These policymakers do not appear to have drawn any lessons from the Bush experience of 1991–92, when Bush and Baker used precisely the leverage of U.S. aid to exert pressure on an intransigent Likud government and ultimately persuaded the Israeli body politic to vote it out of office. The Ross line that cajolery rather than direct pressure would eventually bring Israel around, consistently maintained until then, obviously did not work. Yet despite this clear evidence, Ross and his colleagues are again pursuing the same policy of trying to coax Netanyahu. The gentle art of persuasion, however, has never had much impact on Likud.

**Conclusion**

"Perceptual predispositions," which one scholar has observed establish a paradigm that sets limits on thinking and "marks out areas to be ignored,"25 have always governed U.S. policy-making on Palestinian-Israeli issues. This has been true from the earliest days of the Palestine problem, when British and American policymakers were able to block out from their perceptions the interests of the majority Palestinian population in order to further the Zionist enterprise. Perceptual predispositions function today as well, for although Palestinians are now more widely recognized to have a national existence, American policymakers still tend to exclude from their thinking the Palestinian viewpoint. Although the United States presents itself as a neutral intermediary between the two sides, Israel's security continues to occupy the central place in U.S. ideas of a reasonable settlement; Israel's readiness to negotiate determines American readiness to mediate; Israel's decision to build or not to build settlements in the occupied territories and to redeploy or not to redeploy troops from the West Bank in the end determines American policy. The question of Palestinian security rarely enters U.S. calculations, and Palestinian readiness to negotiate has seldom pushed the United States to press forward with a mediation effort.

Rather than ensure the Palestinians an equal place in political discourse in the United States, the peace process ironically has provided a kind of shield that often makes it more difficult for the Palestinians to put forward their views. After Madrid and especially after Oslo, it became so widely assumed that peace was at hand that few noticed or cared about what might be occurring on the ground to undermine further progress. Israeli writer Meron Benvenisti observed this phenomenon in 1992 and 1993 when the Palestinians and Israelis were engaged in unproductive post-Madrid bilateral talks
that U.S. policymakers were allowing to languish. Noting the “iron fist” policies being employed by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in the occupied territories, Benvenisti observed that for West Bankers and Gazans, life was becoming much harsher “in a way unseen by eyes blinded by the bilateral talks.” When Palestinians protested to Secretary of State Christopher, the latter had responded: “How long will you go on complaining? The time has come to start talking business!” In other words, Benvenisti translated Christopher’s meaning, “talk to me in the jargon I know and don’t bother me with the street talk of reality.”24 The jargon the United States knows is to a great extent that of the old frame of reference, and the partial peace that has existed since 1993 in many ways has made it more difficult to change that jargon.

One wonders what might have happened if the United States from the outset had been committed to a neutral diplomacy—if it had not looked so consistently through an Israeli prism but had been more cognizant of the concerns of the other side and less dismissive of the origins of the conflict. Such an approach might have—indeed probably would have—been able to bring about a resolution years ago. Several wars and much bloodshed resulted because Israel denied and United States policymakers too often misunderstood the real reasons the conflict arose in the first place.

Notes

2. Currently a foreign policy analyst at the Brookings Institution in Washington, he has continued access to his former colleagues in the administration.
3. Miller’s extensive writings on the Palestinian question show him to be better able than the others to distance himself from the Israeli perspective and to view the Palestinians clearly and dispassionately. Miller has warm connections with Israel and is often referred to as the good cop in the “good cop-bad cop” routine policymakers use to manipulate the Palestinians, but given his own background and the atmosphere in which he wrote in the mid-1980s, his insights showed a rare degree of understanding of the Palestinian viewpoint. See Aaron David Miller, The PLO and the Politics of Survival (New York: Praeger, 1983); Aaron David Miller, The Arab States and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology and Self-Interest (New York: Praeger, 1986); and Aaron David Miller, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1987: A Retrospective,” Middle East Journal 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 349–60. Kurtzer wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on the Palestinians and also indicated a fair understanding of the issue and of Palestinian concerns. See Daniel Charles Kurtzer, “Palestine Guerrilla and Israel Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Radicalization of the Palestine Arab Community to Violence, 1949–1970” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1976).


21. The statement was in the form of a U.S. proposal for an "Israeli-Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles" and was presented on 30 June 1993 to the Israeli and Palestinian delegations to the ongoin bilateral peace talks. Reprinted, along with the official Palestinian response, dated 5 August 1993, in JPS 22, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 111–14.

