North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China

Shen Dingli

Buffer Zone

From China’s strategic perspective, Taiwan and North Korea are intrinsically linked.

China has claimed that its core national interests lie not just in economic development but also in national reunification.1 In terms of economic relations, both China and the United States gain substantially from each other. In the security field, however, there is more competition and even rivalry between the two countries. This is especially pronounced with the issue of Taiwan – though the two countries are also cooperating to contain hardline pro-independence rhetoric. Beijing aspires to achieve reunification through peaceful means. However, certain U.S. actions, such as arms sales to Taiwan, can hardly be viewed as constructive on this issue and are inimical to China’s security.

Shen Dingli is the executive director and professor of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. He is also the co-founder and director of China’s first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security, at Fudan University’s Center for American Studies, where he is director.

China Security, Autumn 2006, pp. 19 - 34
©2006 World Security Institute
North Korea, also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) serves as China’s strategic buffer zone in Northeast Asia. With a shared border of 1,400 kilometers, North Korea acts as a guard post for China, keeping at bay the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. This allows China to reduce its military deployment in Northeast China and focus more directly on the issue of Taiwanese independence. To a certain extent, North Korea shares the security threat posed by U.S. military forces in South Korea and Japan.

At present, North Korea has acquired certain nuclear capabilities through testing that has greatly irritated the United States, though not yet to the point of provoking it to use force. The United States has to maintain military pressure in the Korean Peninsula to prevent North Korea from taking pre-emptive action. However, the deterrent that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons obtains could further restrict the U.S. military’s room to take action in the Korean Peninsula. The net effect of this also helps to contain the freedom of U.S. policy choices regarding Taiwan. Whether China needs it or not, this is North Korea’s “contribution” to China’s national security, and China is, therefore, unlikely to ignore its strategic value.

Cooperation and assistance between China and North Korea is, at a minimum, mutual. In fact, China merely provides North Korea with the means to survive, while North Korea acts as a bulwark against U.S. forces. How much has China spent on this arrangement? For approximately no more than a few billion dollars a year (as of late), China has been provided with more than 50 years of peace. There is an argument that China has helped North Korea without getting anything in return. This statement is partially wrong. There is no altruism in international relations, including those between China and North Korea. By providing aid to North Korea, China is in essence helping itself. In this way, North Korea’s resistance to American interference on the question of Taiwan and China’s aiding North Korea are intertwined.

Conversely, North Korea may have its own view regarding this state of affairs. It may not be satisfied with the outcome of the original Korean War – a divided Korea – despite the best efforts of a Chinese Volunteer Force.
The DPRK may still bear a grudge over conducting the war on its own soil. When China provides aid to North Korea some would view this as buying security insurance at a basement bargain price. One could even interpret the China-North Korea alliance as being more important to China than the U.S.-Japan alliance is to the United States because the latter is largely asymmetrical in nature; that is, the security the United States has provided Japan was not equally reciprocated until roughly 10 years ago.4

**A Northeast Asian Libya?**

The antagonism between North Korea and the United States creates a complicated strategic situation for China. A North Korea with nuclear weapons deters aggression on the one hand, but can also potentially trigger destabilizing events on the other. For China, any destabilizing action runs counter to its interests of economic development. In addition, China needs to act in accordance with its role as a ‘responsible stakeholder’. In this regard, China will work with the United States and other states to the six-party talks to dissuade North Korea from nuclear brinkmanship. Meanwhile, the U.S. push to sell weapons to Taiwan directly harms mainland China’s national security. Even if China would not ask for it, a nuclear North Korea’s ability to pin down U.S. forces in a Taiwan Strait contingency deters America’s consideration of possible military intervention. Whether one likes it or not, this is the link between North Korea and Taiwan.

China must then ask itself: what kind of security situation it will face if one day North Korea signs a treaty with the United States, exchanges nuclear weapons for friendship, and, by doing so, follows in Libya’s footsteps? It is not a trivial question. The question that is more fundamental than nuclear weapons development is what North Korea’s orientation will be. If China fails to handle the matter with deftness there is a real chance that North Korea will be cornered into provoking a war with the United States, a conflict that might eventually lead to North Korea’s defeat. The latter scenario would be disastrous for China. If North Korea was defeated, the eventual outcome could lead to Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan (a part of China)
all aligning with the United States. In that case, China’s security pressure regarding Taiwanese independence would be far more severe – a burden that would be hard to bear.

Naturally, if Taiwan does not declare independence and if China can eventually achieve reunification, the aforementioned complications are greatly reduced. But this process won’t take place overnight. Therefore, the linkage between North Korea and Taiwan will remain, whether China needs it or not. The logical extension of this, as some perceive it, is that following the resolution of the Taiwan question, the possible strategic value that China held with North Korea and its nuclear arms would disappear. To an extent, this is reminiscent of the United States’ dependence on China to counterbalance the Soviet Union, which ended after the Cold War. What such a scenario would mean for Chinese and Northeast Asian security is a more distant and complex issue and beyond the scope of this paper.

North Korea’s Rationale

To understand the DPRK’s nuclear calculus it is necessary to look at the situation in other countries with nuclear weapons, beginning with the United States. The United States began its nuclear weapons program spurred on by the existential threat of Nazi Germany’s own development of an atomic bomb. Following the defeat of Germany, however, the United States did not give up nuclear weapons because it perceived newly emerging threats. At the same time, the United States accrued many other benefits from possessing nuclear weapons, including influence on allies through providing them with a security umbrella, as well as establishing its position as a superpower and thus dominating world affairs.

Since those early days, the United States has never relaxed its research on nuclear weapons. Currently, the American government is planning to conduct research on an enhanced “earth-penetrating nuclear warhead”, a new nuclear weapon that was included in the 2006 defense research budget. This weapon, along with the “miniaturized nuclear warhead”, which possesses an explosive force of a few kilotons or less, typifies the concept of “usable nuclear weapons” that the Bush administration has tried to develop.

China has developed a limited nuclear weapons capability under the nuclear threat of the United States. So, when can China eliminate its nuclear weapons?
If someone were to call for the six-party talks to dismantle China’s nuclear weapons with a promise not to invade China, would Beijing act based on the good faith promised by others? Would China be willing to destroy or even reduce its nuclear weapons while the United States keeps its arsenal? The answer is obvious.

Currently, there are four main countries in the world that remain outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They are India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Among them, North Korea joined the NPT but withdrew from it in early 2003; the three other countries never joined. The fundamental reason these four countries refuse to give up a nuclear weapons option lies in their consideration of national security. In addition, obtaining nuclear weapons helps to boost national morale is good for raising the prestige of the ruling party. This is also true for both the United States and the former Soviet Union.

It is thought that North Korea was wielding the political card when it announced it had nuclear weapons. But North Korea is not just playing politics; rather, it is seeking a security guarantor. Because of its distrust of the United States, North Korea’s true aim is to possess nuclear weapons. If even a superpower such as the United States, for the sake of its own security, is not willing to give up nuclear weapons, how can one expect a weak country such as North Korea to do so? The greatest benefit nuclear weapons can offer a country is to deter a potential adversary from invading or threatening a nation’s core interests. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea’s aim in having nuclear weapons in the face of external pressures is to protect their own national security. For them, possessing nuclear weapons and the deterrence it provides always seems to be more reliable than giving up the development of nuclear weapons and exchanging them for uncertain or empty security assurances.

In fact, a more meaningful question is whether a country that is much weaker than the United States and possesses such an arsenal to compensate for a deficiency in conventional force would give up its nuclear weapons even if the United States took the lead in eliminating its own nuclear weapons. Again, the answer is self-evident. North Korea is developing

Because of its distrust of the United States, North Korea’s true aim is to possess nuclear weapons.
nuclear weapons in response to the U.S. threat against it, which has been exac-
erbated by the American invasion of Iraq. Given the facts that in recent years
the DPRK does not have an optimistic assessment of the security situation in
its surrounding region, and that the United States itself is not willing to give
up its own nuclear weapons, and that North Korea has invested 20 years or
more into developing its nuclear program, why would North Korea give up its nuclear
weapons in exchange for a guarantee of no invasion, a basic commitment the United
States is not even willing to provide?

The purpose of the six-party talks was
to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear
ambitions. During the talks, North Korea
did express its intention to give up nuclear
weapons in exchange for other benefits. But in fact, it is unlikely that North
Korea will ever give up its nuclear weapons. Judging by North Korea’s current
mentality, this doesn’t seem to be the foremost among Pyongyang’s options.
As for why it once took part in the talks; first, it had no other choice early on
since it had not yet obtained nuclear weapons capability. Second, it may have
held out hope for real dialogue with the United States. However, the bottom
line remained that it would acquire nuclear weapons. It may have even used
the six-party talks to buy time to develop its nuclear weapons.

The North Korean nuclear issue was mainly ignited by the United States,
but China is able to play only a minor role to resolve this issue for several rea-
sons. First, China’s efforts to host the multilateral talks pressured North Korea
to abandon nuclear weapons while at the same time undercuts Pyongyang’s
chance to negotiate directly with Washington. As a result, North Korea may
perceive China as unfriendly if not a saboteur of its core national interests.

Second, Beijing’s security relationship between China and North Korea
is not one-sided. China provides security to North Korea, but North Korea
also affords China with a measure of security, and it is unlikely that China
will risk it by pressuring North Korea too much. When the United States
threatens other countries (just as it did China, prompting China to develop
nuclear weapons), it seems unreasonable that it then demand other countries
impose sanctions on the threatened country. Should any substantial sanctions
be imposed, they should be done by the United States.

North Korea’s bold move to develop nuclear weapons is also to
make war on the Korean Peninsula more unlikely.
Given that it is virtually impossible to fundamentally improve the North Korea-U.S. relations while President Bush is in office, North Korea can only concentrate on improving its nuclear weapon development at this time and postpone the goal of rapprochement for a new administration. When North Korea regains acceptance in the international community, it is likely to open up economic cooperation with the rest of the world. Therefore, nuclear tests end up being the key to opening North Korea’s development.

In addition to considerations of strengthening national security, the nuclear option helps alleviate the massive input of resources required for conventional weaponry and shift them to economic development. This is also the road that other nuclear weapons states such as the United States and China have taken. Though in the initial stages of nuclear development a significant outlay is necessary, North Korea has made this investment and can now reap economic benefits of its nuclear effort.

North Korea’s bold move to develop nuclear weapons also makes war on the Korean Peninsula more unlikely. Given nuclear weapons capability, the possibility that war will break out on the Peninsula is slim because of a number of deterrent factors. The United States has 90,000 servicemen stationed in East Asia and the Pacific Region, with more than 30,000 of them in South Korea. This puts the U.S. Army in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis North Korea, which maintains one of the largest active military forces in the world, including a regular army of 1 million and up to 6 million reserves. As for conventional weaponry, North Korea has sufficient artillery and short-range missiles to cause massive casualties to the U.S. forces in South Korea. This arsenal might also constitute a significant deterrent to South Korea. But nuclear weapons constitute an additional deterrent, aimed at making the United States take North Korea more seriously. If the United States takes pre-emptive action it cannot ensure success without heavy cost. On the contrary, it would sink into another quagmire of a messy war. The balance of troops between North Korea and the United States as well as the destructive force of nuclear weapons simply makes it hard for the United States to take military action against North Korea.

**Boundaries of Sino-DPRK Relations**

There is also an important factor related to the Sino-DPRK dynamic in North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. China is now much bet-
China appears uninterested in sustaining Article II of its Treaty with North Korea signed in 1961, which assures mutual military assistance in the case of aggression by a third party against either one of them. The United States has a security alliance with Japan and a Taiwan Relations Act concerning Taiwan, providing sufficient security guarantees to both. Comparing the U.S. security arrangement with its partners in East Asia, what China has provided to North Korea lately is far less in terms of a military commitment. In light of the current environment, it is likely that the DPRK won’t feel very secure under this treaty relationship with China.

North Korea may judge China to be in a state of indecision regarding its priorities. On the one hand, the nuclear testing by the DPRK could give rise to serious considerations of regional nuclear proliferation and regional tensions and instability. However, North Korea may have concluded that China is more concerned about preventing a regime change in North Korea, thus ensuring the stability of the Korean Peninsula, and less concerned about non-proliferation. As a result, China may be forced to accept North Korea’s nuclear test. In addition, North Korea may calculate that not every country is willing to follow the United States. At the United Nations Security Council, although China and Russia have expressed dissatisfaction with the nuclear testing, substantive and comprehensive sanctions against North Korea simply do not accord with their fundamental interests and are definitely not a policy option for them or for other countries. To demonstrate that they are responsible powers, China and Russia have agreed to limited sanctions but have not accepted comprehensive sanctions, let alone cutthroat economic measures against North Korea.

China and North Korea used to carry the responsibility of a “blood-bound alliance.” This allied cooperation seems to have greatly dissipated, though not abolished under international law. An attack launched by North Korea on South Korea or the United States, regardless of whether North Korea has nuclear weapons, would not fall within the scope of mutual assistance required under the China-North Korea Treaty. But if North Korea comes under a pre-
emptive strike by the United States as a result of having developed nuclear weapons, China would then be obligated to assist its partner, as interpreted by the terms of that bilateral Treaty, if it is still effective. Otherwise, China would lose the trust of North Korea and the world and, therefore, would seriously harm its international credibility.

In all of this, North Korea has greater vested interests than China does. This fact made it extremely difficult for China to stop North Korea’s first nuclear test, just as it failed to prevent North Korea from conducting missile tests in August, 2006. Whether or not the DPRK conducts nuclear tests is ultimately Pyongyang’s decision, not China’s. What’s more, North Korea still has strategic value to Beijing given the potential headache of Taiwanese independence, and therefore a “regime change” in North Korea looks unacceptable to China. Even though North Korea has conducted a nuclear test it is still a security partner – albeit a difficult one – of China. China needs North Korea, and North Korea understands this.

In the short term, a North Korea with nuclear weapons would not pose a direct threat to China because China has not threatened North Korea. Rather, the problem is the responses that North Korea elicits from Japan and South Korea. Yet it is reasonable to ask what the long-term impact of a nuclear weapons-capable North Korea will have on China and the region. The possibility that China’s future relations with North Korea or a reunified Korea would include the element of nuclear weapon diplomacy cannot be excluded, especially given the border dispute between the two countries. North Korea is developing nuclear weapons based on a threat by the United States, but the weapons can be used for other purposes, as well. If China is one day perceived as a threat, the DPRK’s nuclear arms could vastly complicate China’s handling of its relations with the North. In the final analysis, China needs to maintain normal and friendly relations with North Korea.

Managing a Nuclear North Korea

United States

By testing nuclear weapons, North Korea is bound to meet resolute opposition from the United States because it has now breached one of the two “red lines” set by the United States regarding the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula – nuclear testing and the exportation of nuclear weapons or nuclear
weapons technology. However, the United States has no effective means to punish the DPRK for having tested a nuclear weapons device. The United States currently doesn’t seem to have the political option of taking military action against North Korea,\(^{11}\) nor does it have substantive economic ties with North Korea, precluding a viable course of action through direct economic sanctions.\(^{12}\) The United States can, at most, request of its allies and UN member states that have economic relations with the DPRK to use their leverage. In reality then, the United States now has only one remaining bottom line: that North Korea does not proliferate nuclear weapons, and in essence, that it becomes a responsible \textit{de facto} nuclear country – a requirement the United States has of China, India and Pakistan.

In fact, issues regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons are themselves controversial. Historically, nuclear weapons research began in Nazi Germany and the atom bomb was first acquired by the United States. Today eight countries have declared they have nuclear weapons. From one perspective, a consequence of this has been a decrease in the danger of large-scale war, so to a certain extent, nuclear weapons have stabilized relations between major powers, such as between China and the United States. The real concerns regarding the spread of nuclear weapons are accidental and unauthorized launch, as well as such weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible actors.

As for Northeast Asia, China considers its possession of nuclear weapons as increasing the stability and security of the region, rather than destroying the peace. China doesn't intend to threaten other countries with its nuclear weapons, yet its nuclear weapons have served to deter aggression by the United States to some extent. The question follows, then, whether it is logical that China’s nuclear weapons are stabilizing while nuclear weapons of other states may be destabilizing. Clearly, this assumption is not necessarily correct. The truth is that no nation should threaten another in the first place, but when coercion has occurred, the logic of proliferation will ensue, and given certain international dynamics, the one that initiates the threat has to accept the reality of proliferation. This is what happened when the United States

\begin{quote}
The United States now has only one remaining bottom line: that North Korea does not proliferate nuclear weapons.
\end{quote}
threatened China and eventually had to accept China’s response of developing its own atomic bomb. Most Chinese believe that without China’s nuclear weapons, the United States would take China less seriously.

Under the reality of international politics, once China, India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons as a result of their respective security concerns, the world became pragmatic about the situation. They are certainly expected to be responsible by working to assure the safety and security systems of the weapons and not to transfer either the weapons or related knowledge and capabilities outside their borders. For example, the United States has long complained of China’s record regarding nuclear and missile exports to Pakistan. Yet, through great effort, China has built up a legal system of export control in cooperation with other countries. As a result, today China is credited with handling such affairs with far more caution and experience.

Regarding North Korea, it is reasonable to ask whether the country will be a responsible actor in handling nuclear technology. Indeed the DPRK has shipped missiles to Yemen and possibly other countries. Would North Korea proliferate nuclear weapons? The possibility certainly exists, but one cannot conclude that the DPRK will proliferate because it is under a repressive political system. When China obtained nuclear weapons in the 1960s its government was also regarded by Western countries as a dictatorship. Yet, China did not threaten to sell them or use them, except as a deterrent force for ensuring national security.

Without a chance to improve relations with America, Pyongyang will continue to develop its nuclear force.

Without a chance to improve relations with the United States, which is viewed by Pyongyang as threatening its national security, North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear force. With its uranium mines, North Korea can be self-sufficient in building a closed fuel-cycle for a nuclear arsenal. While it may not yet have a sufficient nuclear deterrent, as few as 10-20 nuclear warheads would surely force the United States to accept it and deal with North Korea as a de facto nuclear nation.

As long as North Korea becomes and remains a responsible nuclear nation, i.e., it does not threaten other countries with nuclear weapons or participate in their proliferation, aid or abet terrorists, engage in money laundering or drug
trafficking then it is bound to achieve normal relations with the United States. North Korea could expect that after it has made sufficient breakthroughs in nuclear weapons development and after withstanding international pressure for a certain period of time, it will eventually return to the international community.

This opportunity will not likely come until the term of the next U.S. president. On the whole, before North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, the core of its conflict with the United States lay in their development. But now that it has obtained them, its nuclear weapons capability will become the bargaining chip to obtain strategic status from the United States, as well as the key to attaining strategic understanding from the United States. By then, proliferation to other countries will become the core issue in DPRK-U.S. relations.

**China and Northeast Asia**

While accepting sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test, concerned countries in Northeast Asia must be careful not to push North Korea into a corner, forcing it to take pre-emptive action. Therefore, room for compromise needs to be preserved so that North Korea is prompted to exercise self-restraint and not continue its nuclear testing.\(^\text{15}\) However, this is still a retreat from the six-party talks, which required North Korea to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Even if North Korea makes a tactical retreat, it probably would not halt the overall development of its nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, it could regard the international community as having accepted its position as a new nuclear power. These are the contradictions that must be faced.

As for China, even if it did impose economic sanctions, the total of its affected aid would not be more than few billion U.S. dollars.\(^\text{16}\) This is actually a small amount for North Korea’s population of 23 million and will not be sufficient to fundamentally alter its economic situation. There are also lessons from China’s own past that it would do well to remember. For instance, when the Soviet Union withdrew its aid following the Sino-Soviet ideological split, not only did China virtually disregard all of the past assistance provided by the Soviet Union, but it also bore a grudge for a long time afterward.\(^\text{17}\) In similar fashion, China has not expressed much appreciation for the aid provided by Japan during the past two decades, but has rather showed great contempt for Japan when it threatened to dramatically reduce that aid. Therefore, if China
discontinues aid to North Korea, the reaction by the DPRK will likely be the same.

North Korea has issued a statement guaranteeing that it will be a responsible nuclear country and that it will not strike first with nuclear weapons or proliferate them. If this is true, their possession by North Korea should be less of a stimulus for Japan or South Korea to develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it will certainly affect the alliances between the United States and Japan as well as between the United States and South Korea.

In the face of North Korea’s nuclear test, Japan and South Korea have two options: develop their own nuclear weapons or strengthen their alliances with the United States without developing their own nuclear weapons. They are more likely to choose the latter option, relying to a greater degree on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and missile defense system rather than developing their own nuclear weapons, a move that would provoke the United States itself and many other countries. In Japan, there has been some debate on the future of its nuclear path with some officials suggesting a review of the country’s three “no” principles on nuclear weapons. But these have been suppressed by the United States’ reaffirmation of extended deterrence. For South Korea, the course of “localizing” and limiting its forces in the joint combat system with the United States could slow down or even be reversed if the situation deteriorates. Whatever the strategic decisions by Japan and South Korea in response to North Korean nuclear tests, China will have little influence over them.

On the other hand, bilateral relations between China and South Korea are deepening because of the North Korea issue. Both are opposed to North Korea’s military nuclear program and would opt for a peaceful settlement. This is a major positive force within the six-party talks.

Farther afield, North Korea’s nuclear tests will undoubtedly encourage Iran. The DPRK nuclear model – resisting pressure and gaining recognition – could embolden Tehran. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the United States is mired in Iraq and Afghanistan and will not attack Iran or

**While accepting sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test, other countries must be careful not to push North Korea into a corner.**
North Korea anytime soon. Withdrawing now will cause Iraq to become the world’s most dangerous breeding ground for terrorism. If a decision is made to attack Iran, it would be the quickest way to undermine the United States as a first-class superpower.

The war on terror has in effect lowered China’s place on America’s list of perceived threats. This has served as an opportunity for China’s peaceful development as the United States must show goodwill toward Beijing on the issue of Taiwan. To successfully pursue its development goals, China has persisted in commanding a stable and smooth course without making any mistakes. In the meantime, the United States has made major mistakes as of late, many of which will be difficult to reverse. Launching a strike against Iran or North Korea would be one more blunder that will push the United States further into decline.
North Korea’s Strategic Significance

Notes


5 For information on the “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,” See: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/rnep.htm.

6 Ibid


10 Indeed, the UNSCR 1718 imposed very light sanctions: It disallowed luxuries and heavy armament to flow into North Korea and forbade North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction leaders to visit abroad, It also demanded a freeze on North Korea’s WMD account overseas and a cargo search, as well. This resolution was nearly exclusively restricted to missile and WMD items. However, it did not ask for economic or financial sanctions. The Japanese government, indeed, imposed unilateral sanctions, banning North Korea’s ships from visiting Japan. But it did not ban the flow of financial remittance from Japan to North Korea. It also didn’t ban the trade between the two countries on the high seas. See Resolution 1718 at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement.

11 To force a regime change in Pyongyang through military action would have cost some $1 trillion during the Bill Clinton administration. Given the DPRK’s subsequent development of nuclear weapons, the cost will certainly be far higher. Richard N. Haas, “Regime Change and Its Limits,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005.


18 On Oct. 5, 2006, the DPRK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement to announce that it was going to conduct a nuclear test. It declared that “The DPRK will never use nuclear weapons first and will strictly prohibit the threat with and export of nuclear weapons.”
