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Center for Migration Studies of New York;
Undocumented immigration has been a significant political issue in recent years, and is likely to remain so throughout and beyond the presidential election year of 2016. One reason for the high and sustained level of interest in undocumented immigration is the widespread belief that the trend in the undocumented population is ever upward. This paper shows that this belief is mistaken and that, in fact, the undocumented population has been decreasing for more than a half a decade. Other findings of the paper that should inform the immigration debate are the growing naturalized citizen populations in almost every US state and the fact that, since 1980, the legally resident foreign-born population from Mexico has grown faster than the undocumented population from Mexico.
Greater New Orleans Foundation;
The RESTORE Act presents an historic opportunity to invest in the revitalization of the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem on an unprecedented scale. The Act also can provide support for spurring economic recovery for a region hit hard by the BP Deepwater Horizon spill of 2010. Though much remains uncertain about how the Act will be funded and put to use, enough is clear to take stock of what the Act can do, what it will not do, and how affected communities and stakeholders might best engage the RESTORE Act process to ensure it fulfills its promise of a revitalized Gulf of Mexico.
Given the unprecedented nature of the RESTORE Act and the hopes and expectations that many have for the Act, it is important to keep in mind what the Act will not and cannot be expected to do. Simply put, the Act does not address, much less solve, the deep ecologic challenges facing the Gulf of Mexico and its associated coastal ecosystems. Nor does it address the longstanding challenges to the sustainability and resilience of the communities of the region, many of which are tied to past and projected environmental trends in the coast and the Gulf. The Act can certainly improve conditions and create greater possibilities for the future, but it will take much more than RESTORE Act dollars to create the intellectual, civic, and financial capacity to achieve the goal of a Gulf and coast that are ecologically, culturally, and economically vibrant and sustainable.
Indeed, it is far more certain that the challenges of participating in the RESTORE Act process -- which will stretch on for some years -- and ensuring that the Act in fact lives up to its promise will put new demands on communities and stakeholders that the Act does not meet in any way. Those demands and the broader demands of creating sustainable communities and environments will likely have to be met by the sort of civic, academic, and philanthropic investment that helped make the RESTORE Act a plausible public investment.
Pew Charitable Trusts;
Ocean fish populations are a vital renewable resource for human populations, providing food,employment and recreation, as well as contributing to global biodiversity. Unfortunately, due to overfishing, environmental degradation, climate change and other stressors, many fish stocks worldwide are in considerable decline.
Biological overfishing occurs when fishing rates exceed population growth rates. The resulting declines in fish populations can impact the economy at large. This study analyzes one important component of the costs of overfishing: forgone revenues from lost commercial fisheries harvests due to years of continuedstock depletion, or historic overfishing. It estimates the present annual forgone revenue of overfishing for three regions in the United States: New England, the South Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. These regions were chosen for analysis because they are grappling with the effects of historic overfishing and therefore have a significant number of overfished stocks. The 20 stocks included in this analysis are federally managed stocks particular to each region that are included in the Fish Stock Sustainability Index and are currently classified by the National Marine Fisheries Service as "overfished." A stock that is classified as overfished is defined as having a biomass level below a biological threshold specified in its fishery management plan.
Overfishing means fewer fish are available to catch in future years. The annual forgone revenue of historic overfishing, therefore, is an estimate of the value of lost catch in a given year due to overfishing. To arrive at the catch loss for each fishery, we first estimated the potential landings of each overfished stock as if it were at healthy levels, and compared those estimates directly to current landings values. We measured potential landings for each fish stock on the basis of optimal yield, and examined four approximations of optimal yield. Our estimates of commercial catch losses are for 2009, the most recent year for which all necessary data were available.
Based on our estimates, the aggregate catch loss summed over all three regions in 2009 was $164.2 million. Under a less-conservative approximation of optimal yield, commercial catch loss across all three regions in 2009 was estimated at $222.5 million. Across all three regions, we demonstrated that only 20 to 29 percent of potential landings in 2009 were realized in actual landings. We found the commercial catch loss ($149 million) to be greatest in New England, where there are more overfished species than in any other region in the United States. In the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic regions, where large catch allocations are apportioned to recreational fishing, and therefore not accounted for in this analysis, commercial catch losses were lower but still significant. Commercial catch loss in the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic regions were $12.3 million and $2.9 million, respectively.
Our estimates of losses resulting from historic overfishing apply to commercial landings only, and do not account for the backward-linked economic impacts of commercial harvest, nor the forward-linked economic activity that would have resulted from the processing and retail sale of these potential catches. Additionally, there are further economic losses beyond the commercial sector in other industries, such as recreational fishing, and there are costs associated with negative impacts to food security, biodiversity and other ecosystem services that are not addressed in this analysis. Commercial catch losses are onesignificant component of the total economic costs of overfishing. Estimates of commercial catch loss we find in this study provide a strong economic argument in support of maintaining healthy fish populations and avoiding delays in rebuilding stocks currently subject to overfishing and/or classified as overfished.
Pew Environment Group;
In 2009, commercial fishermen in the New England, South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico regions that targeted depleted ocean fish populations lost $164.2 million and realized just 25 percent of potential revenues because of decades of overfishing – catching fish faster than they can reproduce (for full analysis, see www.pewenvironment.org/costofoverfishing). This additional income could have been earned had these fish populations not been subject to years of overfishing that resulted in their current depleted condition. Congress recognized this costly legacy of overfishing in 2006 when it strengthened the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) with bipartisan requirements to establish science-based catch limits to end overfishing and rebuild depleted fish populations. Congress should stay the course with the MSA so that we can restore our nation's fish populations to healthy levels and put those dollars back in fishermen's wallets.
Pew Charitable Trusts;
Ocean fish are a vital renewable resource for human populations, providing food, employment, and recreation. Many fish stocks worldwide, however, are in a state of serious decline due to overfishing, environmental degradation, climate change, and other stressors. Fishing effort worldwide has remained relatively constant with only slight increases recorded, while the global production of marine fisheries has decreased (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2010). The South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico regions of the United States have witnessed significant declines in fish stocks that are important to recreational and commercial fisheries. As of 2011, nine fish populations across the two regions were officially classified as "overfished." An additional 12 populations were classified as "subject to overfishing." Biological overfishing occurs when harvest rates from fishing exceed the growth rates of fish stocks. The resulting declines in fish populations can impact the economy at large. This study examines an important component of the costs of overfishing in the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico regions -- recreational catch losses from historic overfishing and their associated economic impacts. Our analysis covers nine federally managed overfished stocks in these two regions over the period 2005–2009, the most recent years for which the necessary data were available prior to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf. Those stocks are black sea bass, red grouper, red porgy, red snapper, and snowy grouper in the South Atlantic; and gag, gray triggerfish, greater amberjack, and red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. Recreational fishing has long been an important economic activity in these regions. The money spent by recreational fishermen on charter fishing excursions, tackle, bait, fuel, and other expenses supports employment and economic activity across those regions. Our analysis assumes that recreational fisheries could have contributed more to regional economic activity had the stocks been capable of producing greater yields over the study period of 2005–2009. We estimate the size of the recreational catch loss for each species for each year and the economic activity that could have resulted had that catch been available. To arrive at our estimates of recreational catch loss, we compared average annual recreational harvests and effort for each stock for each year over the study period to potential estimated harvests and effort had the stocks been producing at optimum yield. We sourced our measures of optimum yield and maximum sustainable yield for each individual stock from regional stock assessments and fishery management plans. We valued the resulting catch loss by using data on trip expenditures by recreational fishermen in the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico. Effort and expenditure data were sourced from the Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistics Survey and includes trips that caught, targeted, or caught and/or targeted the stocks in our analysis.1 Economic multipliers were used to estimate the total direct, indirect, and induced economic activity that could have been generated by those recreational fishing expenditures. Our estimates of catch loss and associated economic impacts are not additive across stocks since trips and their respective expenditures may be associated with multiple stocks. Our analysis finds that recreational fisheries in the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico could have contributed millions of dollars more in additional recreational expenditures and associated economic activity had the fish species been producing at optimum yield over the study period. The greatest direct losses were associated with South Atlantic black sea bass and South Atlantic red snapper. Recreational fishermen in the South Atlantic spent $41.7 million on average annually to realize 44% of the total recreational catch that could have been available had the fish population been producing optimally. We estimate that recreational expenditures on South Atlantic black sea bass could have been $52.8 million greater each year over the five-year study period had the stock been producing at optimum yield. An additional $52.8 million in recreational expenditures each year could have generated an additional $138 million in economic output and $40.3 million in income, and supported 896 jobs annually for the region. In the case of South Atlantic red snapper, fishermen spent $9.2 million on average annually over the study period to catch 37% of the recreational catch that could have been available under optimum yield. We estimate that recreational expenditures on South Atlantic red snapper could have been $15.9 million greater each year and could have contributed an additional $41.6 million in economic output and $12.2 million in income, and supported 270 jobs for the region annually between 2005–2009. In the Gulf region, the greatest losses were associated with red snapper, where recreational fishermen spent $22.4 million to realize 64% of the optimal catch that could have been available. We estimate that recreational expenditures on Gulf red snapper could have been $12.7 million greater each year had the stock been producing at optimum yield. An additional $12.7 million in recreational expenditures each year could have generated an additional $33.2 million in economic output and $9.7 million in income, and supported 215 jobs annually for the region. Our findings support the conclusion that overfished stocks can lead to significant economic losses for regional economies through forgone recreational fishing expenditures. This is only one component of the cost of overfishing. Our analysis does not estimate the value of catch losses in commercial fisheries or the broader impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity. The total value of catch losses resulting from historic overfishing would be greater still if other impacts had been considered. Despite these limitations, this study provides strong economic evidence in support of maintaining healthy ocean fish populations and continuing efforts to rebuild stocks currently subject to overfishing or classified as overfished.
Pew Charitable Trusts;
The Deepwater Horizon (DWH) well blowout released more petroleum hydrocarbons into the marine environment than any previous U.S. oil spill (4.9 million barrels), fouling marine life, damaging deep sea and shoreline habitats and causing closures of economically valuable fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. A suite of pollutants—liquid and gaseous petroleum compounds plus chemical dispersants—poured into ecosystems that had already been stressed by overfishing, development and global climate change. Beyond the direct effects that were captured in dramatic photographs of oiled birds in the media, it is likely that there are subtle, delayed, indirect and potentially synergistic impacts of these widely dispersed, highly bioavailable and toxic hydrocarbons and chemical dispersants on marine life from pelicans to salt marsh grasses and to deep-sea animals. As tragic as the DWH blowout was, it has stimulated public interest in protecting this economically, socially and environmentally critical region. The 2010 Mabus Report, commissioned by President Barack Obama and written by the secretary of the Navy, provides a blueprint for restoring the Gulf that is bold, visionary and strategic. It is clear that we need not only to repair the damage left behind by the oil but also to go well beyond that to restore the anthropogenically stressed and declining Gulf ecosystems to prosperity-sustaining levels of historic productivity. For this report, we assembled a team of leading scientists with expertise in coastal and marine ecosystems and with experience in their restoration to identify strategies and specific actions that will revitalize and sustain the Gulf coastal economy. Because the DWH spill intervened in ecosystems that are intimately interconnected and already under stress, and will remain stressed from global climate change, we argue that restoration of the Gulf must go beyond the traditional "in-place, in-kind" restoration approach that targets specific damaged habitats or species. A sustainable restoration of the Gulf of Mexico after DWH must: 1. Recognize that ecosystem resilience has been compromised by multiple human interventions predating the DWH spill; 2. Acknowledge that significant future environmental change is inevitable and must be factored into restoration plans and actions for them to be durable; 3. Treat the Gulf as a complex and interconnected network of ecosystems from shoreline to deep sea; and 4. Recognize that human and ecosystem productivity in the Gulf are interdependent, and that human needs from and effects on the Gulf must be integral to restoration planning. With these principles in mind, the authors provide the scientific basis for a sustainable restoration program along three themes: 1. Assess and repair damage from DWH and other stresses on the Gulf; 2. Protect existing habitats and populations; and 3. Integrate sustainable human use with ecological processes in the Gulf of Mexico. Under these themes, 15 historically informed, adaptive, ecosystem-based restoration actions are presented to recover Gulf resources and rebuild the resilience of its ecosystem. The vision that guides our recommendations fundamentally imbeds the restoration actions within the context of the changing environment so as to achieve resilience of resources, human communities and the economy into the indefinite future.
This GrantCraft case study, developed for Foundation Center's FundingtheOcean.org portal, explores how the Marisla Foundation stepped outside of its traditional grantmaking role to help save the vaquita from extinction. It includes the perspective of one of it's grantees in the area, World Wildlife Fund Mexico, and how they worked together to change fishing regulations and behaviours in the Gulf of Mexico to protect the species from further decline.